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Abstract 
 
 Departing from humanist models of American intellectual history, this dissertation proposes an 
alternative posthumanist approach to the thought of Jonathan Edwards, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Charles 
Sanders Peirce. Beginning with Perry Miller’s influential scholarship, American thought is often cast as a 
search for “face to face” encounters with the unaccountable God of Calvinism, a figure that eventually 
evolves to encompass Romantic notions of the aesthetic, imagination, or, most predominately, individual 
human feeling. This narrative typically culminates in the pragmatism of William James, a philosophy in 
which human feeling attains priority at the expense of impersonal metaphysical systems. However, 
alongside and against these trends runs a tradition that derives from the Calvinist distinction between a 
fallen material world and a transcendent God possessed of absolute sovereignty, a tradition that also 
anticipates posthumanist theory, particularly the self-referential distinction between system and 
environment that occupies the central position in Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory. After systems theory, 
the possibility for “face to face” encounters is replaced with the necessary self-reference of communication 
and observation, an attribute expressed in Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce through, respectively, the figures 
of “true virtue,” an absent and inexpressible grief and, in its most abstract form, Peirce’s concept of a sign. 
In conclusion, Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce represent an alternative posthumanist genealogy of 
pragmatism that displaces human consciousness as the foundational ground of meaning, communication, or 
semiosis. 
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Introduction 
“The Eye is the First Circle” 
 “Man is thus metamorphosed into a thing, into many things.” 
--Ralph Waldo Emerson, “The American Scholar” (Prose 57) 
 
 
American philosophy begins in an encounter with nature. In “The American 
Scholar,” Emerson announces, “The first in time and first in importance of the influences 
upon the mind is that of nature. Every day, the sun; and, after sunset, night and her stars. 
Ever the winds blow; ever the grass grows. Every day, men and women, conversing, 
beholding and beholden” (Prose 57). The scholar is what Emerson calls “man thinking,” 
the one most stricken with nature’s mystery: “What is nature to him? There is never a 
beginning, there is never an end, to the inexplicable continuity of this web of God, but 
always circular power returning into itself” (Prose 57). Confronting the world as a circle for 
which—like Augustine’s God—the center is everywhere and the circumference nowhere, 
Emerson proposes a symmetrical relationship between the unboundedness of nature and 
its reflection in the human mind: “He shall see, that nature is the opposite of the soul, 
answering to it part to part. One is seal, one is print. Its beauty is the beauty of his own 
mind…And, in fine, the ancient precept, ‘Know thyself,’ and the modern precept, ‘Study 
nature,’ become at last one maxim” (Prose 58). These words would seem to suggest 
something like a perfected dualism, an achievement of harmony between mind and 
nature in which every point finds its mirrored likeness in the other, part to part.  
The seemingly insurmountable divide between mind and nature is then overcome 
through a spontaneous symmetry or magnetic attraction, a facet of Emerson’s thought 
that Russell B. Goodman identifies with “the marriage of self and world” (35) 
characteristic of the European romantic tradition. As Goodman writes, this tradition 
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supposes that “If our feelings, including our moral feelings…help constitute the world, 
then the world becomes something valuable in itself, or ‘ideal.’ The unknowable 
noumenal overflow recedes or disappears, becoming part of phenomenal reality, the only 
reality there is. If ‘human forms of feeling’ reveal the phenomenal world, then at least 
part of the noumenal has been recovered, and part of the supernatural has been 
naturalized” (32). This emphasis on “human forms of feeling” may also, as Goodman 
then argues, be connected with the eventual emergence of American pragmatism: “Both 
James and Dewey follow Emerson in focusing on the shaping power of the human mind, 
holding that the world we know is a malleable product of our pragmatically determined 
concepts…Whether through their interest in feeling, in religious experience, in 
imagination, or in the shaping powers of the mind, the American Romantic philosophers 
seek to expand the narrow focus of classical empiricism while retaining the empiricist 
commitment to human experience for our knowledge of the world” (57). Here, in a single 
sweeping gesture, a continuous tradition emerges to connect Emerson’s engagements with 
nature to an emphasis on the role of personal feeling in grounding a pragmatic 
relationship to the world in the philosophy of William James and John Dewey. 
Broadly speaking, the identification of this continuity in American thought 
belongs to a familiar tradition of romanticist and humanist engagements with modernity, 
in particular the process of secularization deriving from what Michel Foucault indentifies 
as a conviction that “the manifestation and sign of truth are to be found in evident and 
distinct perception” (56). Following a loss of faith in the hierarchical cosmos described by 
medieval religious dogma, new foundations were secured on the somewhat shaky ground 
of man’s innate sensual and rational faculties. Absent the transcendent authority of God, 
the mysteries of the universe could still be plumbed to their depths through the 
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transparent observational powers afforded by science and rationalism—powers that 
derived their authority from what modern humanism postulated as a unique ability to 
encounter the world in itself (at least momentarily) through the self-present immediacy of 
consciousness, without the trappings of any interpretive filter: “man became that upon 
the basis of which all knowledge could be constituted as immediate and non-
problematized evidence” (345). Following from this, as Cary Wolfe writes, “the 
philosophical situation of modernity” lead to an “ungrounding of reason” that “invites the 
various forms of idealism that have been attributed to romanticism in the all-too-familiar 
narratives of secularization, where Mind, Spirit, Imagination, or the equivalent comes to 
take the place of self-generated knowledge and its authority previously reserved for God” 
(Posthumanism 244).  
From his vantage point in the mid-twentieth century, Perry Miller’s seminal 
readings of the early American “life of the mind” follow this familiar pattern by tracing 
the decline of religious authority and resultant affirmation of the possibility for personal 
revelation: 
From the time of Edwards to that of Emerson, the husks of Puritanism were being 
discarded, but the energies of many Puritans were not yet diverted—they could 
not be diverted—from a passionate search of the soul and of nature, from the 
quest to which Calvinism had devoted them. These New Englanders—a few here 
and there—turned aside from the doctrines of sin and predestination, and 
thereupon sought with renewed fervor for the accents of the Holy Ghost in their 
own hearts and in woods and mountains. But now that the restraining hand of 
theology was withdrawn, there was nothing to prevent them, as there had been 
everything to prevent Edwards, from identifying their intuitions with the voice of 
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God, or from fusing God and nature into the one substance of the transcendental 
imagination. Mystics were no longer inhibited by dogma. They were free to carry 
on the ancient New England propensity for reeling and staggering with new 
opinions. They could give themselves over, unrestrainedly, to becoming 
transparent eyeballs and debauchees of dew (Errand 203). 
In particular, Miller’s landmark studies of Jonathan Edwards seek to rescue the Puritan 
minister from the darkness of medieval religious doctrine still beholden to a stern and 
unknowable divinity by drawing him and his God into the daylight of modern humanist 
understanding. Miller links Edwards to Emerson through a mutual turn to nature in the 
grip of a “sense of the heart”—which is to say that the quest for immediacy is a quest for 
a self-grounding experience of subjective feeling: “If the object—be it thing, word, 
abstract idea, simple idea or ‘mixed mode’—is vividly realized, the mind is in a healthy 
relation with truth. But if the only object the mind has in view is a word, a counter for 
mechanical discourse, a verbal substitute, the mind is diseased and piety is bankrupt” 
(“Heart” 127). As Emerson succinctly puts it, “Our faith comes in moments; our vice is 
habitual” (Prose 163). On this basis Miller powerfully argues that American thought 
derives from a search for personal religious experience, a turn to nature that 
simultaneously turns inward to reveal divine truth, setting the stage for Emerson’s 
rhetorical question in Nature: “Why should not we also enjoy an original relation to the 
universe?” (Prose 27). Miller argues that Edwards also turns away from a transcendental 
understanding: “In Edwards’ ‘sense of the heart’ there is nothing transcendental; it is 
rather a sensuous apprehension of the total situation” (“Heart” 127). Drawing upon these 
insights, Miller quite brilliantly traces an historical lineage that extends from Edwards’s 
sensuous subjectivity to Emerson’s Nature—in the process forming the dominant model 
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(whether acknowledged or not) for many subsequent understandings of American 
intellectual history. 
In a more contemporary setting, Stanley Cavell’s important writings on Emerson 
engage with the American romantic tradition in a quite different way. Cavell reads 
Emerson though the prism of philosophical skepticism, what he often calls the romantic 
disappointment with Kantian philosophy, the outcome of which is “to deny that you can 
experience the world as world, things as things; face to face, as it were, call this the life of 
things” (Quest 53). As he writes, 
I continue in this lecture to be guided by the thought of romanticism as working 
out a crisis of knowledge, a crisis I have taken to be (interpretable as) as response 
at once to the threat of skepticism and to a disappointment with philosophy’s 
answer to this threat, particularly as embodied in the achievement of Kant’s 
philosophy—a disappointment most particularly with the way Kant balances the 
claims of knowledge of the world to be what you may call subjective and objective, 
or, say, the claims of knowledge to be dependent on or independent of the specific 
endowments—sensuous and intellectual—of the human being. And in turn 
perhaps means a disappointment in the idea of taking the success of science, or 
what makes science possible, as an answer to the threat of skepticism, rather than 
a further expression of it. Romanticism’s work here interprets itself, so I have 
suggested, as the task of bringing the world back to life (Quest 52). 
The Kantian “settlement” is in this sense the trade off between knowing the contents of 
experience without knowing the “thing-in-itself”—to be bereft of an intimate relationship 
with the external world: “To settle with skepticism…to assure us that we do know the 
existence of the world or, rather, that what we understand as knowledge is of the world, 
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the price Kant asks us to pay is to cede any claim to know the thing in itself, to grant that 
human knowledge is not of the things as they are in themselves” (Transcendental 63). 
For Cavell, the desire for “face to face” encounters is always demoralized by the 
ongoing and ever-present threat of skepticism, and thus Emerson’s sense of self is not 
understandable as achievable, or only achieved by a certain “onwardness” or 
abandonment, the intrusion of what Emerson calls the “opposing force” pushing towards 
the future. In Emerson’s text, Cavell finds “the Critique of Pure Reason turned upon itself: 
notions of limitation and of condition are as determining in the essay ‘Fate’ as they are in 
Kant, but it is as if these terms are themselves subjected to transcendental 
deduction…Emerson is, I believe, commonly felt to play fast and loose with something 
like contradiction in his writing; but I am speaking of a sense in which contradiction, the 
countering of diction, is the genesis of his writing of philosophy” (Transcendental 113). 
Cavell thus revises Miller’s classically romanticist understanding for one that supposes 
that the achievement of an intimate relationship with the world remains out of reach. In 
its place Cavell proposes an “acceptance of separateness” or “loss of the world” 
(Transcendental 132) at the heart of Emerson’s philosophy (especially his later essays) that 
continually cuts the legs out from underneath any possibility for intimacy, sacrificing or 
expelling experience of the present (or presence) for the sake of the future. As Cary Wolfe 
notes, Cavell’s sense of Emerson’s purposeful vacillations, the persistent reversals in essays 
like “Experience” and “Fate,” suggests that “Emersonian perfectionism may thus be 
conceived as a kind of ongoing act of radical negative capability that provides the 
foundation (though that is eventually not the word we would want, of course) for 
democratic relations with others, with those other selves I have not yet been but who 
also—and this is the engine of Emerson’s constant polemical project—need to surpass 
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themselves, in an ongoing process of democracy conceived as otherness always yet to be 
achieved, or if achieved, only achieved in the present by the other and not by me” 
(Posthumanism 248). It may be noted that these words form an idea of an “unlimited” 
community that is evoked in the thought of Charles S. Peirce, but for Wolfe they also 
emphasize “Emerson’s insistence on the contingency, not transcendence of observation” 
(Posthumanism 250). In other words, Emerson emerges as a philosopher deeply engaged 
with the question of the inescapably embedded (and thus always partial or limited) 
relationship between mind and nature, that the mind is fully within nature, one might say 
encircled by it. 
When observed through these lenses, it becomes possible to see that Emerson’s 
idea of “part to part” symmetry is overtaken by an image of something altogether less 
familiar, less a depiction of romantic intimacy and harmony than an irruption of 
asymmetrical otherness. As already quoted, the immanence of God’s creation resolves 
into what he describes as “always circular power returning into itself.” In “The Method of 
Nature,” the image returns: nature as “a work of ecstasy, to be represented by a circular 
movement” (Prose 84). In “Circles” the image adopts a fractal repetition: “The eye is the 
first circle; the horizon which it forms is the second; and throughout nature this primary 
figure is repeated without end…there is no end in nature, but every end is a beginning” 
(Prose 174). This vision of a circle re-entering itself suggests something like a Möbius strip, 
a turning inside out and outside in; as if simultaneously nature contains the mind and the 
mind contains nature. Turning inward to the self would then diffuse the self into the great 
impersonal expanse of nature, and turning outward to nature inevitably brings to bear an 
encounter with one’s own face. Beholding, it would seem, is then beholden, and seeing is 
seen. “You are one thing,” Emerson writes, “but nature is one thing and the other thing, in the 
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same moment” (Essays 581). These words seem to gesture towards the embedded or 
contingent aspect of observation—that observation of nature takes place in nature. Such 
ideas—a double gesture that takes at the very moment it gives, what Emerson often calls 
an “aversion” or “antagonism”—are not uncommon in his writings, and in fact 
Emerson’s text is replete with observational paradoxes that destabilize the symmetrical or 
part to part harmony of mind and nature, leading to what Wolfe calls the “insistent 
strangeness, the unremittingly heretical quality, of his writing, in which a signature 
feature is to take precisely the turn of thought or phrase that seems to undermine at a 
stroke the entire argument just made, a seemingly relentless drive to pursue thought 
where it may lead, even into paradox and conceptual meltdown” (Posthumanism 239). 
Familiar understandings of romanticism or skepticism cannot cope with this “insistent 
strangeness”—a method of writing, it would seem, that disrupts the complacency of 
consistent interpretations by making them fall over into their contrary. 
Wolfe points the way to an unexpected resource for understanding this feature of 
Emerson’s thought that avoids Cavell’s insistence on the force of philosophical skepticism 
because “skepticism remains tied, one might argue, to the representationalism [Cavell] 
would otherwise seem to disown, because skepticism holds on to the desire for a 
representational adequation between concepts and objects even as it knows that desire to 
be unappeasable” (Posthumanism 250). Instead of skepticism Wolfe turns to the “second-
order” systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. As he notes, “Luhmann’s work on observation 
will help to clarify why Emerson’s relentless explorations of these problems cannot and 
should not resolve themselves into a dialectic” (Posthumanism 251). More generally, the 
gambit of this study is that bringing to bear the self-referential theories of observation and 
communication in contemporary systems theory raises the possibility of a counter-
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tradition in American thought that is very different from the humanist model, a tradition 
in which the philosophical and theological writings of Edwards, Emerson and Peirce 
perform a questioning of the foundational immanence of feeling by stressing its 
contingency, a questioning that in turn derives from the very theological tradition that 
Miller claimed was slowly abandoned by American philosophy. In fact, as Wolfe claims, 
“the closest thing we could find to Emerson’s work in the theological tradition would be 
not Quakerism or Unitarianism but the line of medieval theology that works its way from 
Saint Augustine through John Scotus Eriugena to the fifteenth-century theologian 
Nicholas Cusanus” (Posthumanism 253). One not need look far to find the American 
provenance of this Augustinian heritage in the Calvinism of the early Puritans. Indeed, as 
Miller writes, “The soul of Puritan theology is the hidden God, who is not fully revealed 
even in His own revelation” (New England Mind 21). 
Attending to decidedly non-romantic religious traditions brings to the fore the fact 
that the question deflected by romantic or secular philosophies of the subject is how the 
world may observe itself, how observation of nature can take place in nature. As 
mathematician George Spencer-Brown puts it, “It seems hard to find an acceptable 
answer to the question of how or why the world conceives a desire, and discovers an 
ability, to see itself, and appears to suffer the process” (105). Bereft of the transcendent 
observing powers of God supposed by traditional theology, romanticism makes the 
discovery, as Luhmann notes, of its own autonomy: “Romanticism discovers itself as if 
new born in an empty space and called upon to give itself its own meaning” 
(“Redescription” 513). Because of this, romanticism marks the transition “from 
hierarchical fixed positional orders describable as nature to the primacy of the distinction 
between self- and hetero-reference” (“Redscription 512). Luhmann ultimately sees this 
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predicament (the predicament, as it were, of modernity) as the inescapable and 
paradoxical necessity of self-reference, a derivation of meaning from “inside” without 
access to any authoritative or objective “outside,” “[The system] owes its stability to itself, 
not to its elements; it constructs itself upon a foundation that is entirely not ‘there’” (Social 
Systems 48). In American thought this problem coalesces around the image of a circle on a 
blank page, an imagine that for Edwards, Emerson, and Peirce takes on something like a 
fractal recursiveness, a repetition of circles within circles. This is a notion that seeks to 
address problems of autonomy and contingency, ultimately problems of self-reference, 
without recourse to the traditional escape hatches that emerged after Kant in the form of 
feeling, imagination, geist, and many others. 
 Luhmann’s “radical constructivism” likewise avoids recourse to romanticism’s 
evasions of contingency, its collapse of the world into unity or wholeness, by supposing 
that self-reference is simultaneously other-reference, but only in the manner of a paradox:  
There is an external world—which results from the fact that cognition, as a self-
operated operation, can be carried out at all—but we have no direct contact with 
it. Cognition could not reach the external world without cognition. In other 
words, cognition is a self-referential process. Knowledge can know only itself, 
although it can—as if out of the corner of its eye—determine that this is possible 
only if there is more than mere cognition. Cognition deals with an external world 
that remains unknown and, as a result, has to come to see that it cannot see what 
it cannot see (Theories 129).   
Self-reference, in other words, leads to the conclusion that “the epistemologist 
him/herself becomes a rat in the labyrinth and has to reflect on the position from which 
he/she observes the other rats” (“Cognition” 250). One can only observe, in other words, 
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by making a distinction, by adopting an observational position which then hides something 
else. As Luhmann notes, “No traditional epistemology…could dare to go this far—
obviously because the position from which it would have had to deal with distinctness was 
occupied by theology” (“Cognition” 250). What this means is that “The partner for 
radical constructivism is therefore not traditional epistemology, but traditional theology” 
(“Cognition” 251). In the American religious inheritance of the Puritans one finds an 
emphasis on the “hidden God” as the unseen, occluded, and radically unavailable 
“outside” that runs through Edwards to Emerson and Peirce, secularized but never truly 
domesticated. It is then systems theory which best allows for a description of posthumanist 
trends in American thought because, perhaps unexpectedly, it is systems theory, and not 
humanism, that draws our attention to the unseen, “the indistinct which once was called 
God, and today, if one distinguishes system and environment, is called world, or, if one 
distinguishes object and cognition, reality” (“Cognition” 252). 
Systems theory, as will be argued, also helps mark out the critical difference 
between the Jamesian and Peircean forms of pragmatism. Both conceive of thought not as 
representational but instrumental, but while James accomplishes this conversion through 
an emphasis on feeling, an insistence on the primacy of an “inside” that remains resistant 
to the “outside” of rational absolutes, Peirce’s pragmatism had, as he put it, “nothing to 
do with qualities of feeling” (EP2 402). James enacts a distinction between the outside of 
conceptual thought and the inside of feeling that Peirce turns inside out to form the 
asymmetrical (triadic, not dualistic) structure of a sign—the sense in which, as Peirce puts 
it, “man” may be conceived as an “external sign.” In Peirce’s philosophy feeling becomes 
the paradoxically excluded “outside” and inaccessible basis of pragmatic thinking, its “not 
there” as Luhmann might put it. 
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This study often circle back to the primal scene of a distinction, an act that 
indicates one thing only to lose sight of the other—an act that is then in some sense 
always exceeding (or succeeding) itself. In America, this idea begins with the Calvinist 
distinction between the transcendent sovereignty of God and a fallen material creation, a 
distinction that repeats itself in its formal characteristics in the subjects to follow. This is 
not to claim that there is a direct transmission of content from Calvinism to Peirce (such a 
model of transmission is in fact under severe interrogation here) but only the recurrence 
of an intellectual problem which takes the form of a self-referential distinction. This is then 
a book about, to borrow the title of Spencer-Brown’s analysis of distinctions, the “laws of 
form.” 
The paradigmatic case throughout is Luhmann’s central distinction between a 
system and an environment of infinitely greater complexity. The system, in other words, 
functions through a reduction of the complexity of the environment. The distinction is a 
boundary, a circle that marks a line between “inside” and “outside.” But this is not the 
whole story, because the system cannot function (cannot “communicate”) unless the 
initial distinction (system/environment) is copied into the system itself. The mark of 
distinction, then, reappears inside the system and enacts a determinative oscillation: “The 
mark is repulsed and attracted by the paradox of the re-entry, as it were, and the world 
becomes ordered in this interplay of repulsion and attraction. Beginning and end are the 
same, and not the same; and in between (or: in the meantime) the world achieves its 
organized complexity” (“Paradox”18). Every end is a beginning, and every private virtue, 
every circle, every sign refers through the paradox of self-referential closure, just out of 
the corner of its eye, to the infinitely open. 
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Chapter One 
The Control of Control: Pragmatism, Humanism, and the Hidden God 
“The actual universe is a thing wide open, but rationalism makes systems, 
and systems must be closed.”  
—William James (498) 
 
 
Pragmatism, as William James declared in a lecture of 1906 that bore the title of 
the new American philosophy, calls on “the open air and possibilities of nature, as against 
dogma, artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth” (509). A few years later he 
writes, “Nature is but a name for excess; every point in her opens out and runs into the 
more” (760). These words evoke a uniquely American way of thinking, a bearing or 
“attitude of orientation” (510) towards nature inherited from the antinomian thought of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson and Jonathan Edwards. It recalls Emerson’s “original relationship 
to the universe” as opposed to the inhuman and unnatural abstractions of European 
metaphysics. For the American pragmatist ideas are not isolated representations of 
abstract truth but are in contact with a natural world—an excess, flux, or overflowing 
that surges past the confinements of conceptual thought. Thought runs up against its 
limits through contact with nature understood as a vast openness in contrast to the closed 
systems of the purely rational. Nature is then the space of abandonment, a path of flight 
from the prison of impersonal language. 
 Nature is then not relegated to an inaccessible “outside” but is in fact the most 
“inside,” the most present, an immediacy that reveals itself through the confrontation 
between thought and sensation. The turn to nature is a turn to the resources of feeling—
or more precisely an act of turning because in the completion of a turn one merely faces in 
a new form the totalizing grasp of a particular theoretical, conceptual, or philosophical 
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apparatus. Our thoughts may be inherently belated, but the thought of pragmatism 
makes disengagement possible, a way of transition through the potentially disruptive 
interface between thinking and feeling. As Giles Gunn writes, the perspective of 
pragmatism is “beyond ideology and transcendence alike not because it can escape their 
superventions but only because it can resist their simplifications” (36). The power of this 
resistance resides in the turn to the immediacy of feeling—a realm that remains defiant to 
the defacement of its expression in formal thought or language.  
“Turn your face toward sensation,” James commands in A Pluralistic Universe, “that 
flesh-bound thing which rationalism has always loaded with abuse” (746). Pragmatism 
then turns away from what James calls the “foreignness and monstrosity” (775) of 
concepts and absolutes, thoughts which heedlessly engage in a distortion of reality: “Take 
any real bit, suppress its environment and then magnify it to monstrosity, and you get 
identically the type of structure of the absolute” (766). Turning to feeling or sensation 
reconnects ideas with the environment from which they arose, finding there “a fulness of 
content that no conceptual description can equal” (760). With concepts, by contrast, one 
finds that “in the deeper sense of giving insight they have no theoretic value, for they quite 
fail to connect us with the inner life of the flux, or with the causes that govern its 
direction. Instead of being interpreters of reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality 
altogether” (740). This passage contains a number of key words and themes that James 
often opposes to the absolutes of philosophical thinking. The emphasis on insight, together 
with the use of inner and inwardness, implies a movement inside, an insistence on the 
intimate, immanent, and immediate—not as truth-values in themselves but as the means 
for resisting the imposition of truth from outside. For James, as Frank Lentricchia argues, 
“immediate experience is the single generative ground of knowing and being, the last and 
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only Garden of modern man, the Eden from which he, in his radical autonomy, can be 
expelled only by himself, by an exercise of the simultaneously redemptive and self-
damning transmutational powers of his own mind, by his desire to create a world apart 
from the one immediately, blessedly given” (“Romanticism” 108). Philosophy, in other 
words, remains opposed to the inward plenitude of immediate experiences because it 
pretends to impose truth claims from a position outside of them. 
Accordingly, pragmatism engages in a turn towards one thing and away from 
another: “A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate 
habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and 
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed 
systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and 
adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power” (509). James’s copious and 
lively writings are filled with such images, a rejection of abstraction going hand in hand 
with an intimate embrace of actual experience, a turn away from outside impositions. As 
Gunn notes, pragmatism permits “consciousness to explore what yet remained ineffable 
and undecidable but still irrepressible on its own borders. James spoke of this as the ‘re-
instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life.’ What he meant by ‘the 
vague’ was that whole mysterious shadow world of feeling, intuition, implication, 
conjunction, disjunction, and change that undergirds cognition and motivates action” 
(141). What this also means is that having an experience and thinking about it are for James 
always two different things. One must come first, must be original, while the other always 
comes after and remains helplessly retroactive. Pragmatism is a middle way, “a mediating 
way of thinking” (504) described by Isabelle Stengers as a constraint, like bumpers in the 
gutters of a bowling lane: “a thinking that accepts as a constraint the exclusion of every 
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idea that implies, among its consequences, a transmutation of our reasons into Reason” 
(“William James” 19). Reason is pluralized, de-capitalized, and removed from the heavenly 
spheres and re-embedded in the contexts from which it issues—it is given, in other words, 
what James calls an environment.  
Pragmatism revels in the original experience of concrete action as that which is 
fundamentally resistant to a descriptive postscript, the reality behind our conceptual 
designs, while thought, or the thinking of philosophy, remains a faceless monstrosity, a 
thoroughly impersonal reconstruction of an event that is gone as soon as it is recorded. It 
negates reality, falsifies it: “What these people experience is Reality. It gives us an 
absolute phase of the universe. It is the personal experience of those best qualified in our 
circle of knowledge to have experience, to tell us what is. Now what does thinking about the 
experience of these persons come to, compared to directly and personally feeling it as they 
feel it?” (499). Experience is always something that someone in a particular place at a 
particular time is able to have.  
In the climactic claim of the 1906 lecture James announces, “Theories thus become 
instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. We don’t lie back upon them, we move 
forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens all 
our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work” (510). Again the pragmatic 
method reveals itself as a turning between immediate experience and the mechanical 
system of the world. On one side is the instrumentality of thought, the world as workshop. 
On the other side James affirms the primacy of “sensational immediacy” (754) as a space 
apart. James thus turns away from a Platonic conception of rational thinking as a gateway 
to an absolute picture of the world. Instead of being placed under the subordination of 
inhuman and impersonal Ideas, impositions from the “outside,” man becomes a possessor 
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of beliefs which bring him into a working relationship with his world, instigating what 
James calls a kind of humanism: “In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are 
creative. We add, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands 
really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the kingdom of 
heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man engenders truths upon it” (599). The world 
is not simply a Laplacian total machine, but a machine with an extra element, a 
workshop that includes a sovereign user of tools. 
In this respect, pragmatism represents a peculiar reaction to the rising tide 
scientific determinism in the nineteenth century, what Max Weber famously called “the 
disenchantment of the world.” Consequent upon the discoveries of Newton, Darwin, and 
Clausius was the realization of the world as a faceless, even monstrous, mechanical 
system—a world that, it seemed increasingly likely, must do without the guiding hand of 
divine providence. Taking control in God’s place were the impersonal mechanisms of 
natural law, evolution, and entropy. In his study of American religious experience as a 
manifestation of counter-Enlightenment tendencies, Leigh Eric Schmidt describes the 
progress of the modern scientific viewpoint as the “devocalization” of the world, a 
privileging of sight (the objective and impersonal observational stance of science) at the 
expense of the passive or receptive qualities of hearing (one might call this knowledge of 
the unseen), in the process representing modernity’s abandonment of the “primacy of the 
living voice over the dead letter” (31). In similar fashion, James would explicitly describe 
these trends as a de-personalization of the world, and Jacques Barzun goes so far as to 
argue that James was “the man who showed that ‘personality’ is an elemental force 
among others in the cosmos” (302). James campaigned against what he called the 
“systematic denial on science’s part of personality as a condition of events,” and its belief 
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that “in its own essential and innermost nature our world is a strictly impersonal world” 
(700). John Patrick Diggins notes that James was “preoccupied with self-knowledge, 
introspection, and personal consciousness” (116). Indeed, it might be argued that the 
great majority of James’s psychological and philosophical writings are concerned with the 
inability of modern rational thought to represent the flux of private conscious experience. 
His pragmatism capitalizes on this failure in order to preserve and protect an inner space 
of feeling apart from the impersonal mechanisms of the world. 
As James often notes, science offers a means of increased control over the natural 
world that is ironically purchased at the expense of individual human agency and 
meaning: 
The scope of the practical control of nature newly put into our hand by scientific 
ways of thinking vastly exceeds the scope of the old control grounded on common 
sense. Its rate of increase accelerates so that no one can trace the limit; one may 
even fear that the being of man may be crushed by his own powers, that his fixed 
nature as an organism may not prove adequate to stand the strain of the ever 
increasingly tremendous functions, almost divine creative functions, which his 
intellect will more and more enable him to wield. He may drown in his wealth like 
a child in a bath-tub, who has turned on the water and who can not turn it off 
(568). 
Indeed, pragmatism in the hands of James simultaneously represents both the apotheosis 
of and most powerful reaction against what James Beniger has described as the 
emergence of control technologies in the late nineteenth century. In this context, James’s 
descriptions of the intellectual landscape of his day are compelling principally for their 
underlying anxiety, a sense that as such controls extend ever further they may encompass 
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and engulf even man himself. For instance, Frank Lentricchia has ingeniously argued that 
James’s model of selfhood valiantly turns the logic of private property against itself in 
order to “preserve a human space of freedom, however interiorized, from the vicissitudes 
and coercions of the marketplace” (Modernist 31). Similarly, in “The Will to Believe” 
James writes, “When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and 
sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried in its 
mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, 
what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; 
how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness—the how besotted and 
contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-
wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream!” (461). The “icy 
laws of outer fact” are in fact the corollary of pragmatism’s turn to feeling, even its 
precondition. That is, the primacy of feeling implies and depends upon an emphasis on 
thought as an instrument or tool that presages something resembling what is now called 
information: “There can be no difference anywhere that does n’t make a difference 
elsewhere—no difference in abstract truth that does n’t express itself in a difference in 
concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, 
somehow, somewhere, and somewhen” (508). This passage pointedly demonstrates the 
distinction between thinking and feeling at work in James’s pragmatism because the 
outside of “abstract” truth runs concomitant with the inside represented by concrete facts 
and conducts, the specific, unique, and personal. A double gesture prevails: an 
instrumentalization of thought in turn preserving an interior space of personal feeling, a 
kind of purification or purging of the impersonal, foreign, and monstrous. Control, in this 
sense, is then controlled. 
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As far as James is concerned there is thus no possibility of retreat to the old 
rationalisms and religions, those traditional bulwarks against the rising waters of 
determinism: “You escape indeed the materialism that goes with the reigning empiricism; 
but you pay for your escape by losing contact with the concrete parts of life” (494). 
Pragmatism attempts to do both sides justice: “I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism 
as a philosophy that can satisfy both kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the 
rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the richest 
intimacy with facts” (500). This intimacy is accomplished through an observation of the 
limits of rationalism and science by gesturing towards the falsification or negation of the 
flux of immediate experience: “to understand life by concepts is to arrest its movement, 
cutting it up into bits as if with scissors, and immobilizing these in our logical herbarium 
where, comparing them as dried specimens, we can ascertain which of them statically 
includes or excludes which other” (739). Within and against the looming impersonal 
machinations of the universe James affirms the reality of feeling as opposed to the 
impersonal abstractions of philosophical or scientific systems; systems that, James reminds 
us, are always closed and free from any relation to an environment. “Nothing real,” he 
claims, “escapes from having an environment” (775).  
 
Perry Miller and the Hidden God 
 
As noted at the outset, James’s notion of an environment revealed through a turn 
towards sensation or feeling as the corollary to nature was not an entirely novel 
development in American thought. It derives from a distinctly American tradition of 
religious experience that runs counter to Enlightenment rationalisms. As Schmidt 
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observes, “Enlightenment epistemologies (whether Lockean, Common-Sense, or Kantian) 
demanded the disciplining of religious enthusiasm, a confinement of those ‘ungrounded 
fancies of a man’s own brain’ within a secure domain from which reason and the state 
might avoid contamination” (191). Along these lines, James’s response to the intellectual 
and spiritual dilemmas of the turn of the century had deep roots that ran as far back as 
the dawning of modernity, but in strictly American terms it derived from the religious 
inheritance of Calvinism and its picture of a material world characterized by what Calvin 
quite memorably termed “total depravity”—in effect bequeathing to his followers in the 
American colonies a set of formidable intellectual difficulties. Calvin’s God, possessed of 
absolute omnipotence beyond even the formulation of natural laws, represented an 
environment of an altogether less reassuring (perhaps even threatening) sort, but one that 
nevertheless prefigures James’s understanding of the excess or flux of nature in the 
manner of an absolute chaos irreducible to scientific or rationalistic description, but one 
that James will ultimately reduce to what he called a “pantheistic field of vision” (644). As 
Diggins notes, “if James was rescuing philosophy from science, he was also liberating 
modern religion from its Protestant heritage in Calvinist determinism” (130). 
In his classic 1935 essay “The Marrow of Puritan Divinity,” Perry Miller placed 
his finger upon a tension in Puritan theology that, through the twists and turns of its 
unfolding, would become one of the central problems of American intellectual life in the 
18th and 19th centuries. It resulted, in sum, from Calvin’s intractable demand that his 
followers “contemplate, with steady, unblinking resolution, the absolute, 
incomprehensible, and transcendent sovereignty of God” (Errand 56). Faced as they were 
with the practical necessity of survival in an unfamiliar wilderness and the creation of a 
religious community that may serve as a shining example to European Christendom, the 
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Puritans found this an impossibly tall order. In actual practice, they could only attempt to 
constrain that sovereignty through a covenant that provided a stable and knowable world, 
thus “bringing God to time and reason” (Errand 51). As Miller tells it, the Puritans found 
themselves confronting a common intellectual dilemma of the seventeenth century: how 
to reconcile a material and mechanical world utterly devoid of grace with a sense of 
human agency. This is the question of the extent to which the universe is knowable, and 
how we may know it “without reducing the Divinity to a mechanism, without depriving 
Him of unpredictability, absolute power, fearfulness, and mystery” (Errand 56). How is 
intimacy with either God or nature possible on these conditions? 
Ultimately, this tension derives from what Herschel Baker has called the 
essentially anthropocentric premises of seventeenth century theologies. As Baker puts it, 
“In the main stream of Christian humanism man’s prestige was immense; in the theology 
which Calvin had revived primarily to combat such optimism man’s degradation was 
made the pivotal fact of history. The seventeenth century, inheriting both views, spent its 
best efforts, as we shall see, in trying to resolve the antinomy” (25). With Thomas Aquinas 
representing one pole and John Calvin the other, Baker demonstrates that both take as 
their point of departure a certain form of humanism, or just as essentially its negative 
mirror image: 
By emphasizing one rather than another of its components St Thomas could 
construct his massive theology of reason, Calvin his of will – but both the Angelic 
Doctor and the Tyrant of Geneva were securely within the limits of the Christian 
epic. Their views of man were radically different, yet both derived from the 
central tradition of western thought. They appeared to be primarily concerned 
with the nature of God, and to adjust all the facts of the physical, spiritual, and 
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moral universe to God; yet at the hidden center of both their systems was man – 
essentially good or essentially bad – and the whole universe took its meaning with 
reference to him, his nature, and his needs. Their systems were of course theistic, 
but the main lines of those systems radiated from an anthropocentric hub (9).  
Baker argues that the Puritan confrontation with the antinomies of modern theology and 
philosophy was undergirded with a humanistic basis: “They wished to preserve untainted 
the sovereignty of God, yet they were reluctant to leave man and nature in the hopeless 
iniquity described by the early Reformers” (102). The Puritan could not depend for 
security on an intuitive rational consciousness that could accurately represent the world—
nor could he, as Calvin may have wished, cast himself entirely upon the whims of Divine 
providence.  
 In a succession of beautifully written and still incisive works, Miller investigated 
this dilemma and the series of compromises it entailed, sketching a vivid picture of the 
American Puritan as a hopelessly conflicted figure, one marked through the very 
foundation of his or her being with a breach—an emerging modern subject which 
nonetheless turns upon the supposed rational certainty that subjecthood guarantees as 
suspect as best and impious blasphemy at worst. Charged with the contradictory aims of 
modern philosophical humanism and providentialist Calvinism, the Puritan was in the 
unique position of being able to observe the unsustainable basis of the reductionism of 
modern science in the form God’s absolute sovereignty, a sovereignty principally 
represented as an unapproachable limit. As Baker notes,  
Though among the most zealous devotees of the doctrine of providence, the 
Puritans were not unsympathetic to science or to a Baconian scrutiny of natural 
processes. None the less, they insisted that providence be acknowledged as the 
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surest sign of God’s sovereignty, for unless they could keep inviolate the heart of 
God’s sovereignty and mystery from the claims of rationalism and natural 
philosophy, they would gut their theology and forfeit their title as Puritans. They 
never honestly met the philosophical difficulties of their Augustinian-Baconian 
position; but men who could believe simultaneously in predestination and 
Ramean logic would certainly have no trouble in assuming that, though God 
ordinarily permits nature to act by second causes, He can at any moment disrupt 
them for His own inscrutable purposes (15).  
Preserving both beliefs would require a significant degree of compartmentalization along 
with an attendant patrolling of borders to prevent an untoward passage from one side to 
the other. There could be allowed no confusion of these distinctions. It is therefore no 
great leap to read into this situation an anxiousness of existential proportions, a level of 
self-scrutiny that, as Sacvan Bercovitch demonstrated in The Puritan Origins of the American 
Self, was unprecedented.  
Miller describes the covenant of the American Puritans as an ingenious attempt to 
overcome the difficulties that Baker describes above, yet one marked inexorably by a 
“fundamental distrust” (Errand 97). The Puritan finds himself attempting to describe and 
delineate the laws of Nature, to find what he may rely upon, while simultaneously 
pledging his faith to a fearsomely powerful and unknowable God who reserved the right 
to change those laws as He sees fit: “Most of the issues that were so hotly contested 
among seventeenth-century theologians were connected with attempts to resolve this 
discrepancy between the God of everyday providence and the God who dispensed His 
grace according to no rule but His own pleasure” (New England Mind 33). No easy task, 
and one only exasperated by the absolute demands being made on either end. For, as 
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Miller again and again points out, “It is of the essence of this theology that God, the force, 
the power, the life of the universe, remains to men hidden, unknowable, unpredictable. 
He is the ultimate secret, the awful mystery. God’s nature ‘is capable properly of no 
definition,’ so that all that one can say is that ‘God is an incomprehensible, first, and 
absolute Being.’ He cannot be approached directly; man cannot stand face to face with 
Him…” (Errand 51). This essence, Calvin’s ultimate challenge to the prevailing religious 
order and the driving force and heart of the Reformation by Miller’s estimation, does not 
provide an alternative relationship to the political and social structures of the day so much 
as it utterly destroys them in order to pave the way to an unadulterated (that is, purely 
spiritual) experience of grace. Delivered over to God, the Puritan returns to find a fallen 
material world stripped of all spiritual meaning. 
Nature, in this Calvinist scheme, would then perhaps unexpectedly find resonance 
with the “icy” mechanical systems of cause and effect described by modern science, 
principally because it is based on similar distinctions. As Baker points out Calvinism’s 
austere distinction between God and creation can be seen as running parallel to Cartesian 
dualism: “Obsessed with the impious claim of man’s natural faculties for achieving a life 
of rational well-being, Calvin made the whole realm of nature the sink of corruption, 
alien from the realm of grace. Theologically, he fractured the medieval synthesis as 
sharply as Descartes would fracture it philosophically” (36). By vacating the material 
world of all spiritual value, Calvinism ironically enabled a dualism that would seek to 
delineate that world as a predictable mechanical system and thus, little by little, constrain 
God’s ability to surprise us. This was in fact the unavoidable outcome of the attempt to 
preserve God’s absolute sovereignty in the face of technological and scientific progress—
God was further and further removed from the domain of material creation. In the 
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meantime the modern philosopher would take this ball and run with it into the end zone 
of the certainty of subjective intuition while the Puritan found him or herself unable to do 
so without a little (or a lot of) guilt about the matter.  
Romanticism provided an alternative to this religious predicament by seeing the 
workings of the natural world in a manner decidedly different from its descriptions by 
modern science, hewing much closer to a description of nature as representing an 
irreducible plenitude. God would represent not the other to nature but the other in 
nature, nature’s ultimate chaotic resistance to conceptual thought. For the American 
Puritans this choice carried special weight since, as Joan Richardson has observed, “A 
persistently disturbing element of this environment, observed repeatedly and variously by 
astute recorders of the American experiment, beginning with the diligent journal-keeping 
Puritans and running through to the poets of high modernism, was/is the 
incommensurability of nature, its unavailability to the categories of description embedded 
in the language of the settlers. Nature literally amazed them” (2). In other words, there is 
recourse to the concept of an environment in James’s sense. 
But again, and needless to say, this kind of irreducible complexity above and 
beyond language was anathema to those who tasked themselves with building an 
exemplary community in the wilderness of North America. In the hands of its leaders, 
“Calvinism could no longer remain the relatively simple dogmatism of its founder. It 
needed amplification, it required concise explication, syllogistic proof, intellectual as well 
as spiritual focus. It needed, in short, the one thing which, at bottom, it could not admit—
a rationale” (Errand 53). The American Puritans found themselves wrestling with the 
unadulterated force of the Calvinist God—uncannily represented in physical terms by a 
severe and unforgiving wilderness awaiting Christian civilization and populated by 
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natives who alternately represented God’s wrath or Satan’s temptations. Nature, likewise, 
is both beyond any possible description and yet also the passive object of scientific 
scrutiny. How, then, to reconcile these extremes? Miller’s seminal argument suggests that, 
from the beginning, the aim of the American Puritans was to reconcile the irreconcilable 
through a divine covenant. God would of his own free will abide by certain rules: “For all 
ordinary purposes He has transformed Himself in the covenant into a God vastly different 
from the inscrutable Divinity of pure Calvinism. He has become a God chained—by His 
own consent, it is true, but nevertheless a God restricted and circumscribed—a God who 
can be counted upon, a God who can be lived with. Man can always know where God is 
and what He intends” (Errand 63). Thus assured, the religious project of the “shining city 
on the hill” could continue unabated and unthreatened by the very same irresistible force 
that propelled it into being: “To describe this theology as ‘rationalism’ would be very 
much to overstate the case; before the triumph of Newtonian science reason did not have 
the rigid connotation it was later to carry...But in this way of thought appears an entering 
wedge of what must be called, if not rationalism, then reasonableness” (Errand 70). 
 One need not dwell long upon this bargain to determine something untenable in 
it. Inevitably, there seemed to be a missing piece in the foundation, an incompleteness or 
hole through which the irrational can always sneak back in, something lurking on the 
outside, waiting for its chance to upset the applecart of rational system building. As Miller 
notes, “the Puritan, as long as he remained a Puritan, could never banish entirely from 
his mind the sense of something mysterious and terrible, of something that leaped when 
least expected, something that upset all regularizations and defied all logic, something 
behind appearances that could not be tamed and brought to heel by men. The covenant 
thought kept this divine liberty at several removes, placed it on a theoretical plane, 
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robbed it of much of its terror, but it could not do away with it entirely” (Errand 94). This 
threat, this fundamental distrust, represents the crux of Miller’s argument, which is not so 
much about the Puritan suppression of the real force of Calvinism so much as their 
inability to do precisely that. An irreducible environment continually threatened the 
maintenance of closed systems, and it becomes clear that what Miller finds the Puritans 
attempting to do is a particularly dramatic example of the attempts of modern philosophy 
to secure an equation of the universe only to have it unbalanced by unexpected 
remainders, the frustration of fundamental incompleteness. Because of this, the Puritan 
mind is not synonymous with the Modern mind that attempts in Cartesian fashion to 
place a grid over all experience, to make the real into the ideal forms and figures of 
geometry. Instead, the Puritan recognizes that the remainder, that which passes just out 
of sight of the formal strictures of his descriptions, represents the very force and meaning 
of his entire project. The Puritan remains transfixed by what must necessarily escape the 
descriptions of his system, the “hidden God.” 
Pragmatism in its Jamesian guise enacts these same dilemmas, but with an 
important and decisive difference. James shared with the Puritan a distrust of the 
foundational claims of the modern rational subject, but his suspicion comes from the 
opposite direction. As Schmidt notes, “The construction of an autonomous modern 
subject, at once certain of an authentic voice and ever afraid of falling to pieces, turned 
the noises of an eruptive divine world into dangerous signs of inward multiplicity” (179). 
James identifies this trend and runs counter to it by embracing and possessing the 
“inward multiplicity” of feeling as a means of preserving and purifying an interior space 
apart from foreign impositions. James turns Calvin inside out. The austere and inviolable 
distinction between material creation and a transcendent Creator re-enters itself as a 
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distinction between scientific determinism (the world as machine) and the remnants of an 
irreducible human element, an encounter with a face in the machine. In this fashion, the 
world assumes the characteristic determinisms of science, but the extraneous element 
transforms from God’s sovereignty into man’s through the control afforded by science. 
Thought transitions from a mediation between God and man (or man as constituted 
through the divine thought of God) to become a tool at man’s disposal—in turn 
producing man as the user of tools. James puts the matter in decidedly suggestive 
theological terms: “The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth 
independent; truth that we find merely; truth no longer malleable to human need; truth 
incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed superabundantly—or is supposed to exist 
by rationalistically minded thinkers; but then it means only the dead heart of the living 
tree, and its being there means only that truth also has its paleontology and its 
‘prescription,’ and may grow stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in men’s 
regard by sheer antiquity” (515). Faced with a vision of the universe as an immense and 
impersonal machine, James stakes a claim for the primacy of living feeling.  
How did American thought arrive at this point? The irreducible environment 
represented by God’s sovereignty has become an environment described as “sensational 
immediacy”—a movement that James claims “redeems the nature of reality from 
essential foreignness” (652). How did what is seemingly most outside become what is most 
intimate? How did it come to the critical distinction between having an experience and 
merely thinking about it? The roots of this narrative begin with the Puritans and their 
struggle with the contradictory demands of modernity, and it culminates in the early 
chapters of A Pluralistic Universe in which James rejects the “dualism and lack of intimacy” 
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(642) of Christian Theism for a “vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the 
external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reality” (644).  
James thus emphatically rejects the impersonal God of the Puritans. “The place of 
the divine in the world,” he writes, “must be more organic and intimate” (643). In 
common understandings of American thought, this claim has roots that reach as far back 
as the Puritan minister Jonathan Edwards. In an important 1940 essay entitled “From 
Edwards to Emerson,” Miller presents Edwards as the harbinger of a distinctly American 
mystical tradition that endeavors to experience God, as it were, “face to face.” As Miller 
writes, “What is persistent, from the covenant theology (and from the heretics against the 
covenant) to Edwards and to Emerson is the Puritan’s effort to confront, face to face, the 
image of a blinding divinity in the physical universe, and to look upon that universe 
without the intermediacy of ritual, of ceremony, of the Mass and the confessional” (Errand 
185). This story, from Edwards to Ralph Waldo Emerson and beyond, forms the 
backbone of a particularly influential understanding of American thought, a humanist 
genealogy that culminates in the pragmatism of James and even, it will be argued, the 
neo-pragmatist revival initiated by Richard Rorty. At its core, or in its heart as Miller 
might say, it represents a striving to encounter God “face to face” (note the “impious” 
symmetry of that phrase) that reaches from Edwards and Emerson to Whitman and 
James, founding a familiar tradition of American individualism. 
 In a preface to “From Edwards to Emerson” written in 1956 for the publication of 
his collection Errand Into the Wilderness, Miller immediately blunts any easy comparisons 
between his subjects: “There can be no doubt that Jonathan Edwards would have 
abhorred from the bottom of his soul every proposition Ralph Waldo Emerson blandly 
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put forth in the manifesto of 1836, Nature” (Errand 184). Indeed, it would seem on the face 
of it difficult to see any progression from Edwards to Emerson at all. Miller continues,  
Could he have lived long enough to witness the appearance in New England of 
“transcendentalism,” he would have beheld in it the logical and predictable 
collapse of the “liberal” theology which, in New England, became institutionalized 
as Unitarianism. If Edwards ever laughed, then he would have laughed—along 
with the other theologians of his party, few of whom were given to laughter—over 
the discomfiture of the Unitarians upon discovering a heresy in their midst, but I 
suspect he would have seen even more vividly than did the Princeton pundits the 
threat which the gentle Emerson raised against everything Edwards stood for. In 
that strictly historical regard, then, there is no organic evolution of ideas from 
Edwards to Emerson (Errand 184).  
No organic evolution then, but Miller’s argument depends not so much on the content of 
their philosophies as their formal gestures. No identity of doctrinal belief or continuity of 
content but, to reach back to our beginning, a turn or orientation, a step outside into 
nature that begins an ineluctable progression inward: “The real difference between 
Edwards and Emerson, if they can thus be viewed as variants within their culture, lies not 
in the fact that Edwards was a Calvinist while Emerson rejected all systematic theologies, 
but in the quite other fact that Edwards went to nature, in all passionate love, convinced 
that man could receive from it impressions which he must then try to interpret, whereas 
Emerson went to Nature, no less in love with it, convinced that in man there is a 
spontaneous correlation with the received impressions” (Errand 185). Miller goes on to say 
that one might “define Emerson as an Edwards in whom the concept of original sin has 
evaporated…Edwards sought the ‘images or shadows of divine things’ in nature, but 
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could not trust his discoveries because he knew man to be cut off from full communion 
with the created order because of his inherent depravity. But Emerson, having decided 
that man is unfallen…announced that there is no inherent separation between the mind 
and the thing, that in reality they leap to embrace each other” (Errand 185).  
Leaving aside for now the implicit suggestion of a continuity of Emerson’s early 
thought with his later (of which, if nothing else, one cannot claim the absence of an 
“inherent separation”), it would seem that Miller’s claim could be easily extended. 
Edwards inaugurates a turn towards nature in search of the shadow of the divine, a turn 
that becomes in Emerson, absent the foreign imposition of original sin, a direct 
experience of the divine in nature. Finally, James places paramount value on a direct and 
personal intimacy with experience, an insistence on the presence of an environment in the 
form of an immediate experience irreducible to the descriptive claims of conceptual 
thought. In this lineage, Edwards’s search for a divine environment beyond the natural 
becomes the discovery of the environment in nature, a space that resists the foreign 
impositions of science and philosophy and proclaims the sovereignty of a “sense of the 
heart.” Following the revisions of Emerson and then James, man claims possession of the 
environment as a defensive gesture, a turning away from inhuman or impersonal 
abstractions, thus carving out a space apart that Edwards, one presumes, would prefer to 
leave strictly to divine prerogative. That which is fundamentally outside is taken inside, 
tamed and appropriated as the interior space of a turn away from the inhuman and 
impersonal tide of scientific determinism.  
This is a satisfying narrative principally because it presumes a fundamental 
identity concerning the progress of secularization in American thought in the centuries 
after Edwards, a familiar journey towards modern humanism and away from medieval 
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superstition and authority. It culminates in Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, a final 
rejection of the outside or absolute as a standard of value running concomitant with an 
explicit embrace of ethnocentrism. Joan Richardson’s exceptional study A Natural History 
of Pragmatism (2007) is an ideal recent example of this narrative. Richardson defines the 
pragmatic tradition as “the realization of thinking as a life form, subject to the same 
processes of growth and change as all other life forms” (1). Much as in Miller’s “face to 
face” encounters, this organic form of thinking depends on what Richardson calls an 
experience of the “aesthetic” involving recourse to “expressions of the feelings earlier 
embodied in purely religious forms, prayers, and rituals” (xi). Recalling James, 
Richardson imagines pragmatism as thought in relation to an environment, and her 
choice of subjects are distinguished in particular by what she says of Edwards, whose 
“faithful recording in linguistic forms mimetic of the conditions under which his 
perceptions developed provides invaluable documentation of a mind coming to know 
itself in a new relation to an environment” (13).  
What is most compelling about Richardson’s argument for the continuity of the 
tradition originally identified by Miller is the suggestion that it undergoes a change from 
religious to aesthetic experience, a process she characterizes as a naturalization: “…while 
the figures who are my subjects understood the role of the American writer to be a 
religious one, it was with a sense of religion naturalized and at the same time returned to 
its purest etymological meaning as ‘binding together’ – in this case, binding perception to 
the order of things” (11). It is possible to see Richardson’s argument as a rehearsal of the 
progression of a certain idea of religious experience, from outer and literal to inner and 
private. James presents this distinction in The Varieties of Religious Experience as the 
distinction between received religious belief and that which issues from personal 
	   34	  
experience. Speaking of a non-reflective religious type, he writes, “His religion has been 
made for him by others, communicated to him by tradition, determined to fixed forms by 
imitation, and retained by habit. It would profit us little to study this second-hand 
religious life. We must make search rather for the original experiences which were the 
pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct. These 
experiences we can only find in individuals for whom religion exists not as a dull habit, 
but as an acute fever rather” (15). Religion as fever derives from what he calls “moments 
of sentimental and mystical experience…that carry an enormous sense of inner authority 
and illumination with them when they come” (23). For her part, Richardson draws this 
idea out to express a secularized notion of “grace understood as fact informed by feeling” 
(11). 
In such heightened aesthetic moments, the recurrence of secularized, 
romanticized and organic transformations of religious feeling, Richardson observes the 
productive relationship of a life form negotiating its environment through a process of 
adaptation. As she puts it, “in America the combined threat of nature and the fragility of 
the body politic provided the occasion whereby propositions implicit in the Lockean theory 
of language became what Whitehead calls lures for feeling: in this setting, for feeling the 
anomie attendant on the breakdown of the old order of things…As Whitehead observes, 
it is the translation of the welter of emotional experience in the face of ‘stubborn 
fact’…into a private, self-conscious form that marks the aesthetic. In the case of the 
American experience, the imported theological framework inappropriately structures this 
aesthetic translation” (10). Here the emotional or aesthetic experience is irreducible to 
conceptual thought, or as she writes (quoting Emerson), “Words failed in ‘this new yet 
unapproachable America’” (2). For Richardson, it is this confrontation with an 
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irreducible environment that produces the thinking that would come to be expressed in 
pragmatism. 
As in James, I want to suggest that Richardson also writes about the experience of 
a turning, the traversal of a border or limit. It is also yet another version of the “face to 
face” encounter: “The solutions these writers found to fill the anguished space, the 
expanding void opened by the gradual disappearance of God, were, in the most primary 
sense, aesthetic” (xi). In this secularized respect the aesthetic also performs the role of a 
resource or capacity of the subject. The experience evoked by Richardson, and indeed 
evoked by the texts she writes about, is the presentation of a binding wholeness that 
represents the limits of conceptual thought, but a limit taken within and appropriated, or 
indeed represented in the texts she examines. The environment, however briefly, is fully 
observable, the difference is healed and unity is presumed as a “binding together”—and 
this would seem to be the product of a capacity to experience and then express the 
primacy of feeling in contrast to the foreign abstractions of philosophy or even language 
itself. An identity between thought and feeling is expressed in the fleeting momentary 
experience of the aesthetic, what James calls the open air and possibilities of nature. 
But it is also possible to see in this narrative a turning that rejects the foreignness 
and monstrosities of conceptual thought in the service of a construction of the self, a 
carving out of a space of interiority or negative freedom that may remain inviolable to the 
threat so vividly evoked by James’s image of a child drowning in a bathtub. Here what is 
distinctly human risks being overwhelmed by the rising waters like Pip in Moby Dick, 
shrunken to nothingness in the infinite expanse of the ocean, only to respond through the 
embrace of humanism as a kind of purification achieved in the distinction between 
thought and feeling. Most tellingly, Richardson excludes none other than Charles S. 
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Peirce from her study of pragmatism because his texts do not express or represent the 
capacity for feeling: “Peirce has not been chosen…because, while he certainly did 
describe throughout his writing the effects of Darwin’s theory on the process of thinking, 
on the refashioning of logic, on perceptual categories, his concern was not that his texts 
themselves serve as the corrective lenses through which this new universe of chance could 
be perceived” (15). Put another way, Richardson means that Peirce does not express or 
represent the relationship to an environment understood as feeling in his writing. In fact, 
Peirce quite pointedly excludes the expression of this relationship, and so the relationship 
to an environment remains unexpressed in the dry logicality of Peirce’s impersonal style 
of writing. 
Seen in a broader context, the American evolution of humanism from Edwards to 
Emerson and James runs parallel to a similar story on the European continent. In a pair 
of illuminating studies, Michael Allen Gillespie traces the fate of the “nominalist God” 
that so terrorized pre-modern intellectuals, a God with the same essential characteristics 
that Miller identifies in the hidden God of the Puritans. As Gillespie argues, “This idea of 
God came to predominance in the fourteenth century and shattered the medieval 
synthesis of philosophy and theology, catapulting man into a new way of thinking and 
being, a via moderna essentially at odds with the via antiqua. This new way was in turn the 
foundation for modernity as the realm of human self-assertion” (Nihilism xiii). Modernity, 
in Gillespie’s reading, is achieved through the construction of a fortress of selfhood that 
acts as a defense against divine whims. This is similar toJohn O. Lyons argument that the 
modern “invention of the self” abandons the medieval understanding of “man as a 
mechanically finite entity” (79) and replaces it with a cult of personality and will, 
contributing to a “general movement of eighteenth century thought which makes God 
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beneficent and tends to identify Him with nature, and also believes that man can only 
know the world through his own experience” (184). Likewise, Gillespie writes,  
It is the story of the way in which the late medieval conception of an omnipotent 
God inspired and informed a new conception of man and nature that gave 
precedence to will over reason and freedom over necessity and 
order…Scholasticism rested on the assumption that God and the cosmos are 
essentially rational. Nominalism argued that it contradicts God’s divinity to 
assume that he is subordinate to nature or reason. The intention of this critique 
was to reaffirm the importance of scripture, but its effect was to sever reason and 
revelation. It thus liberated natural science from the constraints of religion and 
opened the door for empiricism, but it also established an omnipotent divine will 
unrestrained by any rational notion of the good. The nominalist revolution thus 
fostered a growing doubt about the ground of science and morality in a cosmos 
ruled by a willful, transrational God. The rise of natural science is consequently 
concomitant with the rise of universal doubt. To secure himself and his science, 
man must build ramparts against divine caprice or malevolence. The first to raise 
such ramparts was Descartes (Nihilism xiii). 
According to Gillespie, by identifying thinking with willing, Descartes initiated “the 
secularization of the idea of divine omnipotence” (Nihilism xxii). The famous foundation 
of modernity, “ego cogito ergo sum,” represents not an act of pure intellect but a seizure of 
the individual power to will: “To think, for Descartes, however, is ultimately to will. His 
fundamental principle is thus a self-confirming act of the will, made possible by the fact 
that this will, like that of God, is infinite” (xiv). Not being omnipotent, “man is thus free 
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only within the circle of his self thinking. Outside this bastion of reason, the chaos set 
loose by the possibility of a malicious God still reigns” (Nihilism xiv).  
 Gillespie traces in admirable detail the transformation of God’s sovereignty into 
man’s absolute will, from Descartes’ grounding of rationalism to German idealism and 
Romanticism and eventually Nietzsche’s will to power. In America a parallel 
development would pass from Edwards to the Emerson of “Self-Reliance” and then 
culminate with James, particularly his immensely influential essay of 1896, “The Will to 
Believe.”  There James makes a foundational claim: “There is but one indefectibly certain 
truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonistic scepticism itself leaves standing—the truth 
that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists” (467). The great theme of the essay 
concerns man’s place in an impersonal cosmos, as James insists on the necessity of feeling 
as the excluded condition of scientific and philosophical thought: “Science can tell us 
what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does not exist, we 
must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart. Science herself consults her 
heart when she lay it down that the infinite ascertainment of fact and correction of false 
belief are the supreme goods for man” (472). The argument ends with a moral: “We 
ought…delicately and profoundly to respect one another’s mental freedom” (478). Each 
man, as James vividly and even movingly contends, retains the absolute freedom of his 
own inner kingdom, a form of personal sovereignty. 
 Pragmatism, I have argued so far, represents an intellectual reaction to the tidal 
wave of emerging control technologies as detailed in James Beniger’s important study The 
Control Revolution. Through the movement of a turning, one away from conceptual and 
abstract thought and towards the flux of an irreducible and immediate experience, it 
becomes possible to understand belief, our theoretical grasping of the world, as just so 
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many tools at our disposal: “No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of 
orientation, is what the pragmatic method means” (510). James famously attributed his 
discovery of this method to his friend and fellow American philosopher Charles S. Peirce. 
As he writes in Pragmatism, the pragmatic principle “was first introduced into philosophy 
by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear,’ in 
the ‘Popular Science Monthly’ for January of that year Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that 
our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought’s meaning, we need 
only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole 
significance” (506).  James takes Peirce’s maxim to be a declaration of freedom from our 
concepts, a freedom entailing among its consequences the notion that our theories are at 
our disposal, and not the other way around. 
 But here, exactly at this point of attribution, begins a divergence in this story that 
will reverberate both forwards to the development of cybernetics in America and 
backwards to Edwards and Emerson. Despite writing its founding documents, Peirce 
rejected pragmatism as understood by James. In its place he developed his own account, 
one deeply imbued with logical themes that James characteristically found beside the 
point. If pragmatism as popularized by James consists in a turning from thinking to 
feeling, then Peirce turns in the opposite direction. Peirce turns towards concepts and 
abstractions, towards generals and away from the particular and individual. His 
philosophy dramatizes a becoming technological of the immediate flux, a movement also 
expressed by what David Wills describes as a prosthesis: “a displacement of original 
plenitude into the kinetics of working parts” (Prosthesis 33). If James sought the 
reinstatement of the vague, Peirce sought its greater determination: “Pragmatism is the 
principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood 
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is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to 
enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence with its 
apodosis in the imperative mood” (Pragmatism 110). This movement from the indicative to 
the imperative, from statements about being to statements about what shall be done, 
suggests the sense in which Peirce’s semiotics is concerned with signs as partial 
determinations of the indeterminate. The plane of immanence evoked by James as a space 
apart from the technological or mechanical workings of the world is broken up and 
differentiated into the gears and levers of a semiotic system. The following section will 
explore this turn by comparing Peirce’s understanding of “reality” to the contemporary 
anti-representational and ethnocentric pragmatism of Richard Rorty which draws its 
principal inspiration from James. If James and Peirce are both pragmatists, they face in 
opposite directions. 
 
Towards Systems: Pragmatism After Humanism 
 
Without this non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present, without that 
which secretly unhinges it, without this responsibility and this respect for 
justice concerning those who are not there, of those who are no longer or 
who are not yet present and living, what sense would there be to ask the 
question “where?” “where tomorrow?” “whither?”  
 —Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (xviii) 
 
 
 Even at the beginning, as far back as Peirce and James, there seemed to be two 
distinct pragmatist traditions, as if from the start pragmatism was denied an identity even 
with itself. In a recent example, H.O. Mounce announces, “The development of 
Pragmatism from Peirce to Rorty exhibits a movement between two sets of ideas which 
are directly opposed to each other. The former may be taken as a paradigm of Realism; 
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the latter of Anti-Realism. The two have nothing in common except that they are called 
by the same name” (229). As is well known, Richard Rorty pointedly excludes Peirce, the 
putative inventor of pragmatism, from his own tradition, because, as John Patrick Diggins 
notes, “Peirce…continued to believe in the eventual possibility of reaching truth” (12). 
Nevertheless, it is also true that Peirce, as Diggins himself notes, resists easy 
categorization: “[Peirce] often vacillated between idealism and realism, between the belief 
that objects are internal to the mind and that they exist independent of consciousness” 
(165). But these terms, idealism and realism, draw the very distinction that Peirce’s 
pragmatism is designed to overcome, and observations of the essentially dual character of 
his thought show that Peirce is perhaps not so easily placed on one side or the other. 
Both realism and idealism presume a mind which may achieve either a 
representational relationship with reality or a coherent relationship with itself. Put 
another way, knowledge must either derive from the subject or the object. For both, an 
inviolate distinction between mind and reality remains intact, a distinction that Peirce 
repeatedly made clear that he intended to do away with entirely: “Modern philosophy 
has never been able quite to shake off the Cartesian idea of the mind…everybody 
continues to think of mind in this same general way, as something within this person or 
that, belonging to him and correlative to the real world” (EP2 199). Peirce believed, by 
contrast, that mind is not the special property of an individual, but a general 
characteristic of the universe as a whole, something in fact not in anyone’s possession at 
all. As he wrote in a letter to William James, “Thought is more without us than within. It 
is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us” (CP 8.189). Or in another important 
passage: 
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…there is no element whatever of man’s consciousness which has not something 
corresponding to it in the word; and the reason is obvious. It is that the word or 
sign which man uses is the man himself. For, as the fact that every thought is a 
sign, taken in conjunction with the fact that life is a train of thought, proves that 
man is a sign; so, that every thought is an external sign, proves that man is an 
external sign. This is to say, the man and the external sign are identical…Thus my 
language is the sum total of myself; for the man is the thought” (EP1 54). 
Already it is clear that Peirce imposes on James’s fortress by reducing “man” to the sum 
total of impersonal language, and so man cannot retreat “inside” because he is already, in 
some sense, “outside.” This is a condition often elided by modern philosophies because 
man “persists in identifying himself with his will” (EP1 54). Peirce runs against the 
modern valorization of individual human will identified by Gillespie and exemplified by 
James, and because of this his notion of reality repeats in a formal sense the Puritan 
dilemmas described by Miller as means for coping with the “hidden God” of Calvinism. 
Peirce’s pragmatism insists on the determination of the indeterminate, but it also 
simultaneously insists on a remainder that eludes any ultimate determination. Feeling 
remains outside and unavailable as the condition of semiotic meaning and 
communication—it is always already becoming mechanical or technological. 
Given that both sides of the argument outlined by Mounce often repeat the very 
error Peirce complains about (in subtle or unsubtle ways) it remains to be seen what 
Peirce can contribute to a posthumanist reading of pragmatism; or conversely, in what sense 
the pragmatist turn away from Peirce simultaneously founds a humanism that can no 
longer be sustained. The turn away from Peirce inaugurates a turn towards self-presence, 
towards a reality and grounding of feeling, and so his thought represents the 
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encroachment of a foreign, technological, inauthentic, theoretical, or material other that 
must be resisted in the formation of the humanist subject.  
It is appropriate then that the birth of pragmatism in America was the 
establishment of a split within itself. Christened by James but disowned by its supposed 
father, pragmatism finds itself from the beginning to be the product of a division within 
and against itself. It was a word, as Louis Menand notes, no one wanted to claim: 
It is a minor peculiarity…that none of the principal figures who became identified 
with pragmatism much liked the name. James used it only because it was the term 
he remembered Peirce coining back in their Metaphysical Club days; he would 
have preferred “humanism”…Peirce himself, who had never used the world in 
print until James’s lecture, saw the chance he had been given to repackage his 
views with a label publicized by a celebrity; but he soon realized that the 
resemblance between his own thought and what James and Dewey were doing 
was not deep…(351). 
In response, Peirce would coin “pragmaticism”—a term he claimed was “ugly enough to 
be safe from kidnappers” (EP2 335). Posterity has proven him right in that assessment, 
but the word retains some fascination for imposing a certain ugliness on its parent: 
pragmat(ic)ism. It certainly does not roll off the tongue. It interrupts the ease of 
expression by involving a kind of stutter or intrusive foreignness. Even here, from the very 
moment of its inception, pragmatism’s attention to the personal, the singular, and the 
individual is disrupted from within by a hiccup or interruption, a changing of tracks or 
reversal that inaugurates the reign of the impersonal, foreign, prosthetic, mechanical, or 
technological.  
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This hiccup also represents Peirce’s difference with Richard Rorty’s neo-
pragmatism which draws its inspiration from James and Dewey. There is thus a clear 
distinction to be drawn between Rorty’s embrace of the full consequences of thought’s 
embeddedness in the myriad determinative contexts in which it arises, and Peirce’s 
perhaps quixotic quest to provide a logical “proof” for his own pragmatism. This is, 
again, a question of inside and outside—but one not so easily solved by choosing one side 
or the other. For Rorty, “Peirce himself remained the most Kantian of thinkers—the 
most convinced that philosophy gave us an all-embracing ahistorical context in which 
every other species of discourse could be assigned its proper place and rank” (Consequences 
161).  Rorty’s Peirce, in other words, remained committed to a form of philosophy that 
seeks self-transcendence, a leaping out of the world—a commitment that belies the 
instrumentalist formulations of his early pragmatism in essays such as “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear.” In this view, Peirce violates what could be called the Rortyan maxim: “It is 
impossible to attempt to step outside our skins—the traditions, linguistic and other, within 
which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something 
absolute” (Consequences xix). But if we take this form of pragmatism seriously (and we 
should) then what remains is not simply a turn to the inside but a returning or turning 
back to theory, a “third way” that negotiates the foundational instability of both inside and 
outside. 
Rorty seeks a pragmatism that can surpass representationalism or the hope for a 
truth beyond time and culture and seeks accomplish this by foregrounding interpretative 
communities rather than individuals. But for Rorty such communities are the end of the 
line, enforcing by necessity a kind of “ethnocentrism”—there is no access to the “outside” 
of a particular community’s beliefs, no standard of evaluation beyond one’s communal 
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preferences. As Rorty writes, “If one reinterprets objectivity as intersubjectivity, or as 
solidarity…then one will drop the question of how to get in touch with ‘mind-
independent and language-independent reality.’ One will replace it with questions like 
‘What are the limits of our community?’” (Objectivity 13). The question of “limits” is 
particularly important, since Rorty’s concept of solidarity seems to task itself with the 
drawing of those limits, with the erasure or expulsion of that which is alien or other. This 
means that there are definite limits, as Rorty made well known in his dismissals of thought 
he deemed beyond the pale of Western democratic liberalism, to who may gain 
membership to the social “us” from which values and beliefs are derived. For Peirce, by 
contrast, communities are by definition “indefinite” and “unlimited” and must always 
renegotiate their borders as permeable contacts with a reality that is forever deferred. 
Communities, in other words, can never answer the question of limits, since for Peirce 
“our” community is never whole, never singular, and thus “solidarity” remains out of 
reach, and nothing remains permanently excluded. From Rorty’s perspective, Peirce’s 
philosophy represents a nostalgia for an “outside” that is inaccessible.  
Rorty’s philosophy is then ultimately most instructive as the acceptance and 
exploration of circularity, a valiant commitment to create value not from outside but 
entirely from within, resulting in an embrace of ethnocentrism as the only non-
metaphysical way forward. Rorty cannot claim to have an objective or foundational 
argument for adopting this approach, and so his work is often most intriguing at circular 
moments of tension or decision. When faced with an either/or but deprived of any 
objective criteria for decision, Rorty finds himself stranded over an abyss much in the 
manner of Buridan’s ass—as hungry as he is thirty. Near the end of Consequences of 
	   46	  
Pragmatism, there is a moment that in its candor provides one of the clearest examples of 
this approach: 
Pragmatists follow Hegel in saying that “philosophy is its time grasped in 
thought.” Anti-pragmatists follow Plato in striving for an escape from 
conversation to something atemporal which lies in the background of all possible 
conversations. I do not think one can decide between Hegel and Plato save by 
meditating on the past efforts of the philosophical tradition to escape from time 
and history. One can see these efforts as worthwhile, getting better, worth 
continuing. Or one can see them as doomed and perverse. I do not know what 
would count as a noncircular metaphysical or epistemological or semantical 
argument for seeing them in either way. So I think that the decision has to be 
made simply by reading the history of philosophy and drawing a moral…Nothing 
that I have said, therefore, is an argument in favor of pragmatism (174). 
This moment is telling because Rorty draws an important distinction but cannot find any 
objective argument for choosing one side over the other. He chooses nevertheless—a 
moment that recalls a Jamesian act of will—and finds the grounds for his decision within 
the cultural values and beliefs of his community. And having chosen, he rightly sacrifices 
any ability to justify his choice in terms of an objective or metaphysical reality. As he puts 
it elsewhere, “the pragmatist cannot justify these habits without circularity, but then 
neither can the realist” (Objectivity 29). This is a crucial point, but it also means that 
moments of decision have a familiar existential tenor. Confronted with an abyss of 
circularity in the form of an undecidable, Rorty’s finds the wherewithal to make a 
decision through a retreat back to the resources of the historical, cultural, and situational 
circumstances he finds himself in, a turn away from the universalist pretentions of 
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“theory” that in effect erases the difference made by the fact of his decision and pushes 
epistemological or ontological questions out of view as irrelevant. 
Rorty’s line in the sand leads Tom Cohen to persuasively argue that neo-
pragmatism evades its own tradition, “the very materiality (of language, of the sign) that it 
has implied from the start” (89). Cohen’s term “materiality” carries a heavy semantic 
burden as an all-encompassing term for a confluence of forces that neo-pragmatism 
designates as foreign, alien, or other:  “At stake, in short, is whether the critical politics 
mobilizing neo-pragmatism against ‘theory’ entails a misreading of its own pedigree, a 
fairly mystified attempt to return to a space of the subject or self that pragmatism was 
implicitly designed to empty or exceed, and hence, whether what it ends by evading is 
not, in a sense, America itself “ (90). Here materiality stands for what Cohen calls “the 
thing” as that which is masked, evaded, or transcended by the humanist maneuver in neo-
pragmatism. It might just as well be identified by what Theodor Adorno calls the 
“preponderance of the object” or “thingness” resisted in the affirmation of the bourgeois 
subject’s freedom (189). 
Whether intentionally or not, Cohen suggestively identifies America itself with the 
thing—as if America itself somehow threatens the protected interiority of the humanist 
subject. If the project of neo-pragmatism represents an evasion in the service of a 
“theology of the self,” then what’s being evaded is, remarkably, America. Cohen turns the 
tables on Rorty by suggesting that his recovery of pragmatism in the name of American 
nationalism is itself an evasion of pragmatism, and the deployment of this nationalism 
operates as what Cohen describes as a stark division between us and them: “here it is the 
American way that forms a certain us (the human), while the binarized other—alien, 
unhuman, theoretical—forms a them” (93). When neo-pragmatism turns “against theory” 
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toward the “pragmatic, situationist, individualist, historical, interventionist” (90) it also 
turns away from the thing, from materiality as such, from America itself and from America 
as them. 
The problem with neo-pragmatism, in short, is that it is a theory that refuses to 
account for itself as a theory. It pretends to transcend its own thing-ness or foreignness, and 
so it locates itself within a space of interiority. For Rorty, since the pragmatist is “a 
partisan of solidarity, his account of the value of cooperative human inquiry has only an 
ethical base, not an epistemological or metaphysical one” (Objectivity 24). But isn’t there an 
epistemology anyway, a blind one constituted by that very refusal of epistemology? There 
is a kind of purity at stake here, an authenticity of voice or presence that rejects the 
imposed abstractions of theory as totalitarian and inhuman. Cohen continues, “is it clear 
just how classically this ideology of neo-pragmatism is constructed: locate an 
outside…and reject it as alien, though what is being ejected, the pragma or evil ‘thing,’ 
materiality as such, in fact lies behind one’s own (American) pragmatism (in Poe, in 
Emerson, in Peirce, and so on); then refashion what is called ‘our’ pragmatism itself as 
that which, having ejected the alien or unhuman figures, can be restituted as a legitimized 
morality of the integral human subject and a seamless model for action to boot” (98). A 
simple turn back to theory, however, would represent an evasion of the very specificity 
and individuality that neo-pragmatism wants to privilege. Cohen’s response to this 
dilemma is an emphasis on a kind of machinal repetition:  
The renowned but often banally translated “Man is the measure…” could more 
interestingly be tracked, perhaps, if we did not assume “Man” as the given 
narcissistic subject, but reflected “him” back into the parameters of “measure” 
itself. Such a text might no longer be called simply relativist or humanist, since it 
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also constitutes a defacement of “man.” “Measure” could now be rendered by a 
series, not of letters but of marks, knocks, or bars that are almost possible to 
render graphically (/ / / /). Precisely such a bar series can become the emblem 
not only of repetition and narrative, but of castration, materiality, anteriority, 
allegory, exteriority, semiotic “death,” listing, the machinal, and the generative 
point of linguistic consciousness as such (103). 
If, as Cohen suggests, we turn back to the origins of American pragmatism in search of 
this graphic repetition or machine, then we return to Jonathan Edwards and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, but most decisively we return to Peirce, to his “Existential Graphs,” his 
semiotics, and finally, quite to the horror of any good neo-pragmatist, his realism. Not the 
classically metaphysical realism that proposes that the mind may represent the world as it 
is in itself within the space of a reflective transcendental consciousness, but instead an 
insistence upon the thing, the materiality as such that is evaded in neo-pragmatism and is 
built into this realism in the form of self-limitation, an acknowledgment of the real as the 
other side of a constitutive difference. This is the real as alterity, the real as them re-
entering into us, a becoming technological or prosthetic—the real, finally, as an infinitely 
deferred community.  
By contrast, Rorty’s vision of community and solidarity is not deferred but all-
consuming, already achieved, thus transforming questions of ontology and epistemology 
into questions of ethics and politics: “for now one is debating what purposes are worth 
bothering to fulfill, which are more worthwhile than others, rather than which purposes 
the nature of humanity or of reality obliges us to have. For antiessentialists, all possible 
purposes compete with one another on equal terms, since none are more ‘essentially 
human’ than others” (Objectivity 110). All well and good, but as Cary Wolfe remarks on 
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this passage, “But here, precisely at this juncture, the radically pluralist imperative of 
Rorty’s pragmatist commitment to contingency begins to break down—or more 
specifically, begins to be recontained by a more familiar, more complacent and uncritical 
sort of pluralism” (Observing 251). That sort of pluralism being, of course, the familiar 
liberal humanism of the West shorn of one of its more definitive characteristics: the quest 
for a Platonic fixture for knowledge above the endless conservation, a “God’s eye view” as 
Rorty often calls it. If the advance of liberal humanism produced a Peirce and Kant in 
the first place, then for Rorty those very same prerogatives demand that we distance 
ourselves from foundational gestures and system making philosophies. It is precisely 
within the tradition of Western liberal humanism, in the values of pluralism and 
democracy (values that, one might point out, derive from the “Kantian” tradition Rorty 
wants to abandon), that we find the resources to resist these systematic (inhuman, foreign) 
philosophies. 
Rorty admits the one-sidedness of his embrace of the Enlightenment in his 
attempt to “peel apart Enlightenment liberalism from Enlightenment rationalism” 
(“Justice” 147). But it is just this abandonment of “Enlightenment rationalism” that leads 
Rorty into trouble, not because it leads to relativism, but quite the opposite: because it 
grounds itself in itself. Ultimately, this self-grounding move is hard to distinguish from the 
very tradition of rationalism since Descartes that Rorty wants to abandon—in which the 
Rortyan “us” is equally singular, whole, and self-sustaining. In this manner, Rorty’s 
pragmatism performs the very same self-grounding of values that it is designed to 
question. The difference lies in the abandonment of any outside (rational, metaphysical, 
inhuman, theoretical) justification for that grounding beyond the preferences and beliefs 
that derive from communal solidarity.  
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In this way, Rorty reconstructs a self-present or immanent social discourse by 
papering over the difference that creates it (erasing in effect the them that gives form and 
meaning to us) and exposing itself most directly in a valorization of liberal political values 
at the expense of real social inequality. As Wolfe puts it, “…when Rorty claims that ‘we’ 
should encourage the ‘end of ideology’ (Objectivity 64), that ‘anti-ideological liberalism is, 
in my view, the most valuable tradition of American intellectual life’ (Objectivity 64), Rorty 
is staging a claim that is itself ideological through and through…What Rorty does not 
recognize, in other words, is that there is a fundamental contradiction between his 
putative desire to extend liberal advantages to an even larger community, and the fact 
that those advantages are possible for some only because they are purchased at the 
expense of others” (Observing 252). This critique locates a blindness in Rorty’s political and 
ethical vision, one that bears directly on his reading of Peirce’s supposed containment of 
contingency within a realist epistemology: “In following the pragmatic tradition and 
treating knowledge as what comes to be validated by conventional methods of validation 
(and interpretation), Rorty overlooks the poststructuralist point that what comes to be 
accepted is at the expense of what has been excluded” (Diggins 457). Rorty’s pragmatism 
excludes but cannot recognize that it excludes, let alone what. It is this refusal of 
epistemology in the service of the protection of a self-grounding interiority or 
ethnocentrism that means that it cannot simultaneously recognize (or refuses to recognize) 
its own contingency.  
Diggins arrives at a similar point: “Pragmatism advises us to try whatever 
promises to work and proves to be useful as the mind adjusts to the exigencies of events. 
Does pragmatism itself work?” (3). Can a pragmatist even ask this? After all, as Rorty 
notes, it is impossible (always? everywhere?) to leap out of our own skins, but isn’t that 
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statement embedded too? Rorty would undoubtedly answer yes, but what does it mean 
that we can make this quasi-transcendental point about contingency? Doesn’t marking 
out a space of interiority from which one cannot escape or transcend also mark an outside 
as well? Not the outside itself, but the repetition of a difference, a circular limit or aporetic 
boundary that continually returns us anew to the wholeness of an inside that is 
paradoxically founded on difference; an inside that is forever elusive as if in a repeated 
series of bars or marks (or circles) which represent the sense in which the situational, 
specific, or individual is already marked by the general, foreign, or theoretical. As if our 
own limbs did not belong to us, as if consciousness itself, seemingly the inviolate space of 
interiority, was from the beginning a prosthesis or technology? How is it that our 
communal us always seems, just out of the corner of its eye, to reference a them? 
In the face of these dilemmas both Cohen and Wolfe find a return to 
epistemological questions to be vital. As Wolfe proclaims, “We must steer a third way, I 
believe, and pursue pragmatism on the site of theory, one whose price is not the politically 
disabling repression of theory that has proved so tempting for pragmatism when its 
commitment to contingency becomes inconvenient” (Critical 21). In turn, I think that 
those looking for both pragmatism and epistemology must turn back to Peirce, whose 
semiotics and realism are built to acknowledge the exclusions that Rorty’s pragmatism 
can only leave behind. Peirce attempts, in other words, to include the excluded middle 
between Rortyan pragmatism and “theory” by understanding the individual as excluded 
from any general system of meaning, and that this exclusion is the generative condition of 
semiosis and the source of its infinite deferrals. One may draw a circle around an “inside” 
but only through the simultaneous (and continuous) reference to an “outside”—and thus 
the inside loses stability and becomes contingent and elusive, only available through the 
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repetition of its constitutive difference. In this way, Peirce’s pragmatism dramatizes the 
intrusion of materiality, the very overtaking of the voice or self by the machine of 
meaning that James and Rorty portray as the foreign abstractions of metaphysical 
philosophy, as them.  
Peirce emphatically insists on realism. To what end? If it were a realism that seeks 
a guiding transcendental principle outside itself then Peirce would indeed be disqualified 
from any pragmatism that seeks to avoid foundationalism or representationalism. But it 
may be argued that Peirce avoids these traps by grounding his realism in a conception of 
signs as partial determinations of an infinitely indeterminate reality. Signs can then 
profitably be understood as distinctions between a determinate actuality and an infinitely 
indeterminate realm of possibility—the simultaneous presentation of both actuality and 
possibility by means of a distinction, and so every actual determination automatically 
refers to infinitely further potential determinations. This is how Peirce can argue that 
truth is by definition incomplete: “Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with 
the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief, 
which concordance the abstract statement may possess by virtue of the confession of its 
inaccuracy and one-sidedness, and this confession is an essential ingredient of truth” (EP2 
395). Peirce does not place the incompleteness of truth at the feet of its inability to 
incorporate individual or personal feeling. Instead, this idea of truth avoids any recourse 
to the Jamesian turn and thus engages in something altogether more abstract, more 
impersonal.  
The meaning or truth-value of a sign is “one-sided” and in this manner it 
instigates a reversal or vacillation that resembles the stabilizing mechanisms of negative 
feedback loops. Floyd Merrell’s vital Peirce, Signs, and Meaning provides an apt description 
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of this process: “What is overdetermined (the field of all possibilities), cannot but become, 
after account has been rendered regarding that which was actualized from the possible, 
undetermined, and hence there will always be something left unknown” (143). This is the 
critical difference with Rorty, whose concept of belief cannot acknowledge the difference, 
the occlusion of other possibilities, that makes its own “solidarity” possible. As Wolfe puts 
it, for Rorty, “the ‘outside’ of belief or description…is always already inside” (Critical 15). 
Peirce turns these distinctions inside out, and so they take on the character of what David 
Wills has analyzed as “a chiasmatic or converse relation, something like a directional 
interchangeability or interchangeable directionality between what we might traditionally 
call constituent elements” (Dorsality 26). Peirce’s “vacillations” between realism and 
idealism are then not inconsistencies but the result of seeing any belief or description as 
necessarily limited or partial and therefore subject to further, infinitely further, 
determinations. The is a relationship that may then be characterized by a phrase from 
Francisco Varela and Rudolph Glanville, itself a kind of Möbius strip, “the inside of one 
is the outside of the other, and vice versa” (640). 
Peirce himself understood the terms of these debates in the decidedly old-
fashioned terms of nominalism and realism.1 When James claims, “Empiricism lays the 
explanatory stress upon the part, the element, the individual, and treats the whole as a 
collection and the universal as an abstraction” (1160) it can be read as the polar opposite 
to Peirce because his semiotic realism places emphasis on generals as real and not simply 
abstractions from individual parts. Generals are signs, and as such are understood as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See James Hoopes, Community Denied: The Wrong Turn of Pragmatic Liberalism for a short introduction to this debate in 
American philosophy. See John Deely’s The Four Ages of Understanding for an exhaustive account of the nominalism 
debate in the history of philosophy and the intervention of semiotics. 
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difference between a determinate part and an indeterminate whole.2 This inaugurates a 
semiotics that can lead us to a concept of language as what David Wills has called a “high 
technology or technology of information” (Dorsality 15) because reflective human 
consciousness is replaced with abstract information processing, a technology of signs 
negotiating a relationship with an invisible and unrepresentable outside as the noise or 
chaos irreducible to communication but which also acts as the ground of its possibility, an 
environment from which information and communication must be distinguished in order to 
be meaningful. 
As I have insisted, Peirce’s sense of the sign is to be understood as both 
determinate and indeterminate, a simultaneous presentation of both actuality and 
possibility. The sign, in other words, names the distinction as a unity but not an identity, a 
chiasmatic relationship between constitutive elements, meaning that the determination of 
either side instigates a reversal over into the other. Because of this, the moment of 
expression entails a continual foreclosure of the foundational interior space from which 
the expression supposedly issues. Peirce declared, “My pragmatism, having nothing to do 
with qualities of feeling” instead represents the argument that “concepts… essentially 
carry some implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being or 
of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, but more, 
too, than any existential fact, namely, the ‘would-acts’ of habitual behavior; and no 
agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a ‘would 
be.’” (EP2 402). Peirce’s language is characteristically difficult, showing all by itself the 
intrusion of a foreign or inhuman other, but his essential point draws a sharp distinction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Kauffman, L. H. “The Mathematics of Charles Sanders Peirce.” Cybernetics & Human Knowing, 8 1.2 (2001) : 79–110.	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between intellectual concepts and the ground of their emergence. The individual, the 
event, the voice—all are overtaken or exceeded by the machinery of semiosis.  
To avoid ethnocentrism, Peirce needs a concept of reality that does not pretend to 
transcend its own contingency. If Rorty tames contingency within a familiar liberal 
humanism, creating a homogenous social us in the process that cannot contain the 
pluralism it explicitly advocates, then Rorty’s philosophy cannot observe the non-identity 
of the social space it professes to describe. It remains blind to its own exclusions. Peirce’s 
realism avoids this fate only by refusing to claim reality for any specific individual, 
sociality, or discourse: 
That is real which has such and such characters, whether anybody thinks it to have 
those characters or not…thought, controlled by a rational experimental logic, 
tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will 
be the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations 
may cause the postponement of the ultimate fixation. If this be so, as every man of 
us virtually assumes that it is, in regard to each matter the truth of which he 
seriously discusses, then, according to the adopted definition of ‘real,’ the state of 
things which will be believed in that ultimate opinion is real (EP2 343). 
Peirce carefully stresses that the character of the real is that which has particular qualities 
independent of any particular mind. A traditional or intuitive idea of realism would 
simply state that it is the belief that the human mind is capable of grasping the world as it 
is in itself. There is no such assumption in Peirce’s formulation. As Susan Haack writes, 
“Is truth, in Peirce’s conception, mind-independent? Yes and no. Yes: what is true does 
not depend on what you, or I, anyone thinks is true. No: there could be no truth in 
principle unknowable by us” (415). There is no particular human mind in which the 
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world can appear as it is in itself, nor is there a world as it is in itself since the real is not 
independent of the “ultimate opinion” which, after all, cannot be the opinion of any 
particular person or group of people—a group being just as “individual” as a single 
person. Peirce’s reality, in other words, cannot be thought in a single idea, mind, or 
community. 
At this point notions of us and them take on a distinct importance because reality 
would seem to evade being in the possession of either. That is, reality is not in the 
possession of any unique or particular individual or class, since “individualism and falsity 
are one and the same” (CP 5.402n2). Nor is reality some noumenal object that in 
principal cannot be known, since Peirce clearly identifies it with the “ultimate opinion.” 
This can be untangled through understanding reality as the unity of a distinction, 
particularly a distinction between us (the body of knowledge present in a community) and 
them (potential future knowledge, the unknown). In other words, any particular us operates 
by means of exclusion or suppression of them, but Peirce’s concept of reality serves to 
paradoxically unite these terms as a reference towards what Emerson called 
“onwardness” and Peirce refers to as the sense in which “The rational meaning of every 
proposition lies in the future” (EP2 340). The alterity represented by them continually re-
enters into us in the form of indeterminacy—the us is always already becoming them, 
continually requiring a shifting of borders or lines of demarcation. 
Peirce’s conception of reality has certain similarities to what cyberneticist Norbert 
Weiner refers to as an Augustinian belief in the world’s incompleteness: “an element of 
incomplete determinism, almost an irrationality in the world” (11). Moreover, as Larry 
Holmes has pointed out, Peirce’s philosophy displaces the subject as the seat of rationality 
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with a quasi-machinelike understanding of the self.3 These points raise the specter of the 
cybernetic machine, a paradigm of feedback loops and information processing in place of 
the humanist subject. Peircean semiotics describes the imposition of a thing in the place of 
an autonomous self, an overtaking of the event of consciousness by the machine of 
semiotics—man is the sum total of his language. Cohen’s series of bars or marks is 
represented in the machinal operations of this semiotics just as Peirce represented them in 
his “Existential Graphs,” starkly imagining what Anne Freidman calls a semiosis without 
a subject.4 
On the terrain of the machinal Peirce’s philosophy also intersects with Jacques 
Derrida’s figure of the event-machine, a joining together of the event (singular, individual, 
non-repeatable) and machine (general, inhuman, iterative): “The new figure of an event-
machine would no longer be even a figure. It would not resemble, it would resemble 
nothing, not even what we call, in a still familiar way, a monster. But it would therefore 
be, by virtue of this very novelty, an event, the only and the first possible event, because 
im-possible That is why I ventured to say that this thinking could belong only to the 
future—and even that it makes the future possible” (Without 73). Impossible because 
thinking the event and machine at once requires seeing two sides of a distinction at the 
same time, which can only inaugurate what Floyd Merrell calls the “uncertain, vacillating 
scandal of meaning” (vii). This oscillation kicks us from one side to the other, on into the 
future: “meaning is not in the signs, the things, or the head; it is in the processual rush of 
semiosis; it is always already on the go toward somewhere and somewhen” (xi). So perhaps 
what Derrida calls the event-machine also takes on the character of the “messianic” as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Holmes, Larry. “Peirce on Self- Control.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 2.2 (1966): 113-130.	  4	  Freadman, Anne. The Machinery of Talk: Charles Peirce and the Sign Hypothesis. 1st ed. Stanford University Press, 2004.	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described in Specters of Marx, an expectation of arrival, not the arrival per se but the 
expectation of arrival built into the present, every present as an expectation of the future, 
what he calls the “irreducibility of affirmation” (112) or “a certain experience of the 
emancipatory promise; it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism, a 
messianism without religion, even a messianic without messianism” (74). 
 Peirce’s own attempt to corral this monstrous and messianic event-machine is 
represented in his semiotics—an unsightly slouching beast if there ever was one. His 
understanding of reality as an expectation or an event to come, of meaning as an 
approaching yet unapproachable horizon, may be reconciled to the vision of America 
evoked by Cohen. America as them, as those not (yet) present, as event-machine: "To 
think both the machine and the performative event together remains a monstrosity to 
come, an impossible event. Therefore the only possible event. But it would be an event 
that, this time, would no longer happen without the machine. Rather it would happen by 
the machine" (Without 74). America as a general sign: an (im)possible event, hosting the 
irruption from within itself of a parasitical foreign other. Peirce writes, “Thus, the very 
origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the 
notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase 
of knowledge” (EP1 52). Reality as community (as America) understood as forward 
motion, as them becoming us—though there will never finally be us since the concept 
makes no sense, has no meaning, without them. 
 Which brings us back to the beginning: Cohen’s suggestive identification of the 
thing, of materiality as such, the machine of semiosis or an encroaching foreign them, with 
America. Far from Rorty’s policing of boundaries, Peirce insists on their permeability. Far 
from a vision of an American ethnocentrism couched in the familiar terms of Western 
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liberal democracy, Peirce envisions an America without limits, indefinite, machinal, 
encroaching, foreign, post-human: “Individual action is a means and not our end. 
Individual pleasure is not our end; we are all putting our shoulders to the wheel for an 
end that none of us can catch more than a glimpse at—that which the generations are 
working out” (CP 5.402 n2). I cannot help but imagine that Rorty must have found this 
imagery alarming. Putting our shoulders to the wheel of what? A great machine? As if 
America is this machine, this post-human thing—an engine that pulls into the future and 
away from the presence of the situational and individual? America as a hope or futurity, 
or—with Emerson this time—an expectation: “Bear with these distractions, with this 
coetaneous growth of the parts: they will one day be members, and obey one will. On that 
one will, on that secret cause, they nail our attention and hope. Life is hereby melted into 
an expectation or a religion... And what a future it opens! I feel a new heart beating with 
the love of the new beauty. I am ready to die out of nature, and be born again into this 
new yet unapproachable America I have found in the West” (Prose 207-208). Peirce 
cannot match Emerson’s gift of expression, but his vision of community remains just as 
compelling: “This infinite hope which we all have…is something so august and 
momentous, that all reasoning in reference to it is a trifling impertinence…So this 
sentiment is rigidly demanded by logic. If its object were any determinate fact, any private 
interest, it might conflict with the results of knowledge and so with itself; but when its 
object is of a nature as wide as the community can turn out to be, it is always a hypothesis 
uncontradicted by facts and justified by its indispensibleness for making any action 
rational” (EP1 82). This raises the possibility that we are not, contra James, drowned in a 
bathtub of our own making. We die out of nature. We are swept up, dispersed in the 
machine of meaning. It is not in us, we are in it. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The “Double Consciousness” of Emerson and Peirce:  
Second-Order Observation in American Thought 
 
 
“If I don’t see I am blind, I am blind; but if I see I am blind, I see.” 
—Heinz von Foerster, Understanding Understanding (213). 
 
 
In 1903 Peirce presented a lecture series at Harvard which resulted in one of the 
more comprehensive descriptions of his mature philosophy. In the third lecture, “The 
Categories Defended,” Peirce undertakes the task of describing his categories: Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness. Given the often vague or analogous modes of description 
used to invoke them and their role in Peirce’s semiotics, it is no wonder that they are 
often the subject of considerable confusion. Indeed, as Anthony Wilden claims, “I have 
never met or heard of anyone who understood Peirce’s theory of signs” (268). Such 
statements, though amusing to anyone who has ever attempted to come to terms with 
Peirce, are symptomatic of the great difficulty attending a clear understanding of his 
thought, a difficultly not without warrant often laid at the feet of the Peirce himself. 
Nevertheless, it is precisely the issue of intelligibility or clearness (one might say the 
clearness, or lack thereof, of our ideas) that is in fact at stake in the category of Thirdness, 
a category for symbols, laws, and growth that encompasses and exceeds both Firsts (icons, 
feeling, possibilities, chaos, chance) and Seconds (indexes, facts, reaction, struggle). Given 
the materialist and determinist trends of his day, Peirce’s idea of Thirdness probably 
seemed curious at best to his contemporaries. Indeed, as Wilden notes, “Without the 
benefit of cybernetic and communication theory, his ‘law of mind,’ for example, is easily 
dismissed as idealist anthropomorphism” (265).  
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Wilden alludes to the 1892 essay “The Law of Mind,” one of the more ambitious 
descriptions of Thirdness Peirce provided for a more or less popular audience. Therein 
Peirce makes a particularly interesting claim about consciousness and begins with a 
discussion of the nature of a boundary: “Suppose a surface to be part red and part blue; 
so that every point on it is either red or blue, and, of course, no part can be both red and 
blue. What, then, is the color of the boundary line between the red and the blue?” (EP1 
322). Peirce answers that “the boundary is half red and half blue” and connects this 
notion to his theory of a consciousness: “In like manner, we find it necessary to hold that 
consciousness essentially occupies time, and what is present to the mind at any ordinary 
instant, is what is present during a moment in which that instant occurs. Thus, the 
present is half past and half to come” (EP1 322). This analogy proposes that consciousness 
involves the encounter with a boundary line, what he would characterize eleven years 
later in the Harvard lectures as “as double consciousness at once of an ego and a non-ego” 
(Pragmatism 160), or a sense in which “perception really does represent two objects to us, 
an ego and a non-ego…a past self that turns out to be nothing but a self and…a self that is 
to be faithful to the Truth in future” (Pragmatism 147). There is, all at once, a perception of 
what is supposedly immediate accompanied and undercut by its shadow, a “not” or other 
that Peirce characterizes as the future. 
 Thirdness as law entails futurity: “the being of these laws is a sort of esse in futuro” 
(Pragmatism 142). Immediate perception, or Firstness, is inevitably displaced or overturned 
by the difference made by Secondness, an “outward clash” as Peirce might put it, which 
inevitably raises the issue of the connective unity of these disparate elements, the double 
consciousness. What results is a logical recursiveness in which elements act upon one 
another in the manner of an oscillating “this then that” that not coincidentally resembles 
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the oscillating values of an imaginary number. As Peirce writes, “If two singulars A and B 
react upon one another, the action of A upon B and the action of B upon A are absolutely 
the same element of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, ordinary language makes the 
distinction of agent and patient…That is, a formal distinction is drawn between the action 
of A on B and the action of B on A although they are really the same fact” (Pragmatism 
179). What this suggests is that Thirdness, as the unity of Firstness and Secondness, 
cannot be observed as a singular phenomenon, a singular fact, but only as a general 
process or law. A acts on B and B acts on A, but only recursively or alternately, creating 
in this sense a rudimentary sense of irreversible time: “One of the most marked features 
about the law of mind is that it makes time to have a definite direction of flow from past 
to future” (EP1 323). Thirdness as such then involves what Peirce refers to as an 
irreducible complexity, and therefore any particular observation of it involves a distinction 
as its unity is again divided by Secondness, a reduction or simplification of its nature that 
it cannot help but exceed: “It is certainly hard to believe, until one is forced to the belief, 
that a conception so obtrusively complex as Thirdness is should be an irreducible 
unanalyzable conception. What, one naturally exclaims, does this man think to convince 
us that a conception is complex and simple, at the same time! I might answer this by 
drawing a distinction. It is complex in the sense that difference features may be 
discriminated in it, but the peculiar idea of complexity that it contains, although it has 
complexity as its object, is an unanalyzable idea” (Pragmatism 186). This is a complexity, 
moreover, that when displaced or reduced by a distinction re-enters as the paradoxical 
unity of that difference, thus enacting the oscillations of semiotic meaning. 
 Peirce’s notion of “double consciousness” finds an unlikely precursor in Emerson’s 
magisterial essay “Fate,” “One key, one solution to the mysteries of human condition, one 
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solution to the old knots of fate, freedom, and foreknowledge, exists, the propounding, 
namely, of the double consciousness. A man must ride alternately on the horses of his 
private and public nature, as the equestrians in the circus throw themselves nimbly from 
horse to horse, or plant one foot on the back of one, and the other foot on the back of the 
other. So when a man is the victim of his fate…he is to rally on his relation to the 
Universe, which his ruin benefits” (Prose 278). It is no great leap to suggest that Peirce 
would find much in common with this sentiment, in the leaving of the ego for the futurity 
of the non-ego, a dispersal of the present self for the sake of the future one, for the indefinite 
universal community. There is common to both a sense in which Thirdness—something 
also called Truth, Reality, Community, or the Universe—stands for categories of thought 
that are, in effect, unthinkable for the ego and so thinkable only by the “non-ego” which 
takes the side of the future against the present. Thinkable, if you will, as unthinkable. 
At this point the pursuit of clearness and intelligibility would seem to be of 
paramount importance since our understanding of Peirce and Emerson here teeters over 
the edge into an abyss of paradox. It seems that sharper theoretical tools are needed, an 
ability to make even finer distinctions. What both Peirce and Emerson are gesturing 
toward, I think, is what contemporary systems theory refers to as second-order 
observation, the observation of observation that takes place not by the ego but only by its 
other, “that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time” (EP2 338). As 
already argued, Perry Miller’s classic essay “From Edwards to Emerson” laid the 
foundations for a modern or humanist account of American thought that, once free of the 
“restraining hand” of Calvinist doctrine, places Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson within a tradition of grasping for “face to face” encounters with the divinity of 
nature. This chapter lays the groundwork for an alternative genealogy found in the 
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thought of Emerson and Peirce that will then reach back to Edwards in the following 
chapter. This account that might be said to reapply a sense of restraint or limitation 
through an insistence on what Cary Wolfe has called an emphasis on the “contingency of 
observation” in Emerson’s writings. The privileged and objective capacity for scientific 
observation is replaced with an idea of observation that is fully captive to its contingency 
or embeddedness, or what Peirce might call its one-sidedness. In contemporary thought, 
the ramifications of observational contingency are most carefully described by the 
theories of self-reference in second-order systems theory and cybernetics. Through the 
reversals or oscillations of paradoxical self-reference, Peirce and Emerson achieve what 
Niklas Luhmann has described as a “system-internal unity of self-reference and external 
reference" (Observations 17) that ultimately demonstrates an attention to process or futurity.  
Bringing systems theory to bear on these problems allows the meaning of an essay 
such as Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” to be described as something very different from an 
appropriation of the foundationalist or representationalist powers of the humanist subject. 
As Branka Arsic’s engaging book on Emerson argues, “Since nothing is but everything 
becomes, power is defined in ‘Self-Reliance’ as the capacity to endure the change of form” 
(5). What this means, more broadly, is that rather than seeking immediacy through a 
theory of the subject, through a self-grounding experience of interiority, Emerson is a 
philosopher of what Arsic calls a leaving or “a stepping out of oneself…intense becomings 
or elevation” (127). For Arsic’s Emerson, the quest for immediacy or intimacy culminates 
in a persistent leaving of well-worn customs and habits to allow for the arrival of the new, 
a change of form. However, Arsic’s emphasis on leaving involves as well as vision of “self-
renewal” in which “all is luminous, healed of demonological divides” (127). One is 
tempted to connect this momentary renewal to Joan Richardson’s sense of the aesthetic 
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or even Miller’s “sensuous apprehension of the total situation” (“Heart” 127) because 
both ideas seem to preclude the double consciousness of a more originary divide, the 
sense in which the moment of renewal is already marked by its other, or the way in which 
these events of luminous and sensuous immediacy are in some sense produced by the 
machine. This is not to take direct issue with Arsic’s (quite beautiful and illuminating) 
account but to insist on a difference in emphasis, one that does not leave behind the 
machine in the experience of the event.  
It is instructive in this respect to recall Stanley Cavell’s sense of an Emersonian 
theory of language: “the possession of language as the subjection of oneself to the 
intelligible” (Quest 124). Seen through systems theory, this subjection becomes a distinction 
between communication and a ground of consciousness that, in traditionally humanist 
accounts, was presumed to be the very substance of communication. Consciousness or 
subjective feeling is distinguished, made communication’s other, its environment, as the 
condition for communication to occur at all. In Cavell’s terms, the necessity of this 
fundamental distinction derives from the romantic problem of self-accounting deprived of 
an objective or outside (say, divine) foundation. As Cavell writes, “Emerson needs a view 
of the world, a perspective on its fallenness, in which the uncreatedness of the individual 
manifests itself, in which human life appears as the individual’s failure at self-creation, as 
a continuous loss of individual possibility in the face of some overpowering competitor” 
(Quest 111). One may read this perspective as a recognition of the failure of the romantic 
project. This continuous loss of possibility, a loss or negation of the individual, places 
philosophy along “…the path of accepting the loss of the world (you might say, accepting 
its loss of presence), accepting it as something which exists for us only in its loss (you might 
say its absence), or what presents itself as loss…And now what emerges is that what is to 
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be acknowledged is this existence as separate from me, as if gone from me. Since I lose 
the world in every impulse to philosophy, say in each of the countless ways the ordinary 
language philosophers find that I make my expressions unreadable, the world must be 
regained every day, in repetition, regained as gone” (Quest 172). For Emerson and Peirce, 
Cavell’s idea means that the experience of immanence, immediacy, or intimacy is then 
continually subjected to a kind of reversal or oscillation, a falling over into the absence of 
immanence, immediacy, and intimacy—a phenomenon systems theory understands 
through George Spencer-Brown’s concept of the “re-entry” of the original distinction 
(say, immanence/transcendence) into itself on one side. For Luhmann this reversal may 
be described as the distinction between indication and distinction, a difficult idea that 
nonetheless has bearing on pragmatism and its attempts to derive meaning from only the 
inside: “The distinction is made with the pragmatic intent to designate one side but not 
the other. What is distinguished, therefore, has to be distinguished from the distinction. 
Such a formulation might be dismissed as a mere rhetorical trifle; Spencer-Brown avoids 
this by differentiating the terms ‘indication’ (i.e., signification, designation) and 
‘distinction.’ Yet, with or without this terminology, the problem remains. We cannot 
begin with the operation as long as the distinction between distinction and indication 
(signification) is not copied into the distinction” (“Paradox” 17). What this means, much 
in the Peircean sense of a sign always and only leading to another sign, is that distinctions 
do not terminate in the form of a solid determinate indication, but always entail further 
distinctions or determinations. Much as Thirdness may only be expressed through 
Thirdness, or a sign is the figure of translation for another sign, the inside of a distinction 
presents a continuum that must be distinguished for communication to continue. As 
Luhmann gnomically puts it, “only complexity can reduce complexity” (Social Systems 26).  
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We begin with a distinction: a “sense of the heart,” “total situation,” or pure 
possible in contrast to the cold mechanisms of the actual, a universe of cause and effect 
amendable to the reductive gaze of Laplace’s demon. On one side of Emerson there is 
Jonathan Edwards, whose attention to the immediacy of feeling is in fact (as shown in the 
following chapter) an attention to its self-referential closure from the immanence of the 
divine in the same moment that it is an emanation of it. This interpretation does not 
contradict Miller’s seminal engagements with Edwards so much as it places them under 
the pressure of self-reference. It sees the “incomplete” nature of Edwards’s Calvinism, 
seemingly divided against itself, as the site of his most exciting innovations. On the other 
side is Peirce, whose semiotics is grounded in a process-oriented triadic logic that resists 
dialectical synthesis. Peirce’s semiotics reimagines Edwards’s paradoxical theological 
formulations in more formal language while retaining the sense of feeling’s self-referential 
closure being the means through which it may also be a partial (and thus limited) 
representation of the universe—what Peirce says we are accustomed to call “the Truth.”  
Peirce was particularly fond of the “map paradox”—a map so complete in its 
representation that it includes a representation of itself, which includes a further 
representation, and so on. In much the same way a sign as Thirdness is a partial or 
individual (or “abstract”) representation of the world that simultaneously acknowledges 
limitation through its difference from, or loss of, the world that then points to the future in 
the form of the necessity of further observations—in other words it includes its own 
limitation in the paradoxical form of future reference.  
Consider Peirce’s definition of the form of Thirdness known as truth: “Truth is a 
character which attaches to an abstract proposition, such as a person might utter. It 
essentially depends upon that proposition’s not professing to be exactly true” (CP 5.564). 
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Likewise, for Emerson, “He in whom love of truth predominates will keep himself aloof 
from all mooring, and afloat. He will abstain from dogmatism…He submits to the 
inconvenience of suspense and imperfect opinion…” (Essays 426). And in an even more 
Peircean spirit, “No sentence will hold the whole truth, and the only way in which we can 
be just is by giving ourselves the lie…Things are, and are not, at the same time…” (Essays 
585). Such formulations may also be comprehended as stating that all propositions 
(broadly conceived) are marked by an internal difference, by the distinction from the other 
that produces them in the first place. What both Emerson and Peirce have in common, 
then, is an idea of truth as the other or external side of a distinction. An external, 
moreover, only observable through the aporia or paradox revealed by second-order 
observation, an idea now worth exploring in greater detail. 
 
Second-Order Observation and the World as Horizon 
 
For systems theory, all observation involves the imposition of form, a kind of 
framing that individuates or actualizes one thing at the expense of another. My approach 
in this matter takes inspiration from Perry Miller’s comment that “the history of ideas—if 
it is to be anything more than a mail-order catalogue—demands of the historian not only 
a fluency in the concepts themselves but an ability to get underneath them” (Errand 185). 
Beneath ideas like Emersonian becoming or semiosis there is discovered an emphasis on 
form in contrast to the immanent content of thought, an insistence that “face to face” 
encounters are marked even from their point of origin with the iterative or mechanical 
means of their expression—which means that even the “point of origin” itself is lost in 
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Cavell’s sense, recoverable only “ironically” in the form of a repetition or re-entry of 
difference. 
The idea of form at issue draws from Luhmann and involves a transformation of 
the concept of observation: To observe is to draw a distinction, and thus the world is only 
available for observation as the product of difference. As Luhmann puts it, “A difference 
theoretical reconstruction of the concept of form shifts the emphasis from the (ordered) 
content of form to the difference it makes. It extends and places on the ‘other side’ of 
form the realm of what used to be considered chance and thereby subsumes under the 
concept of form any difference that marks a unity” (Art 27). Form is the initial severance 
of a self-referential distinction, a distinction that only indicates one side at the expense of 
the other, since “indicating both sides at once dissolves the distinction” (Art 65). This 
dissolves the notion of a distinction (say, mind/world) as a symmetrical and static dualism: 
“Forms must be articulated asymmetrically, since only one of their sides (the internal side) 
but not the other (the external side) is needed for further operations (elaborations, 
increases in complexity, and so on). Forms are generated by a rupture of symmetry” (Art 28). 
The other side, the side left unobserved and given paradigmatic expression for my 
purposes by what Miller calls the “hidden God” of the Puritans, is forever elusive, totally 
transformed through the manner of its expression, and thus not expressed at all: “The 
world remains invisible even when, and precisely when, it is laced with forms” (Art 33).  
By abandoning the possibility of a unified or “total” perception this theory 
replaces the modern ideal of observation by denying the representational powers of the 
mind. World and mind no longer exist in a symmetrical observational framework, but 
rather “mind” (in a manner of speaking) observes the world through forms produced 
internally, and this is the sense in which the distinction indicates only one side. Even the 
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world as a whole, what Bertrand Russell would call the class of all classes, is the result of 
difference: “In order to observe the world as an object, one would have to indicate the 
world as distinguished from something else; one would have to presuppose a metaworld 
containing the world and its other. What functions as world in each case resists 
observation—as does the observing operation. The retreat into unobservability leaves 
nothing behind in the world; it erases, to speak with Jacques Derrida, its own traces. At 
best metaphysics (or theology? Or the rhetorical theory of how to use rhetorical forms? 
Or a second-order observer?) may just barely catch a glimpse of ‘the trace of the erasure 
of the trace’” (Art 57). In this fashion there is an acknowledgement of that which must 
remain unseen and unknown through what Luhmann calls a second-order observation as 
distinguished from first-order or “face to face” encounters:  
The shift to a level of second-order observation radically alters what is 
presupposed as the world. The first-order observer finds his objects amidst other 
objects and events. He can assume that his observations are linked to other objects 
and events and together constitute a world. To him, the world is a universitas 
rerum….The second-order observer, by contrast, observes the distinctions that 
first-order observers (including himself) employ to emphasize and indicate 
something. This operation renders the world invisible. First, the world itself 
cannot be observed. The act of observing, which constitutes itself in the move 
from an unmarked to a marked space, does not make the unmarked space 
disappear. (It is not clear how this could happen without a prior marking of that 
space.) Rather, observation preserves that space as a necessary component of its 
capacity to distinguish. The unmarked space remains on the other side of the 
form. Second, the distinguishing operation produces a two-sided form that cannot 
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be observed as a unity (unless one employs yet another distinction) and thus 
remains invisible in the operation. In this twofold sense, the notion of a final 
unity—of an “ultimate reality” that cannot assume a form because it has no other 
side—is displaced into the unobservable (Art 91). 
Applied to the topic at hand, this theory allows for an investigation of a self-referential 
concept of form as a kind of symmetry breaking in Emerson and Peirce. Their move to 
second-order observation presents a seeming anachronism that is resolved (as already 
argued in the introduction) by noting that it draws from the Augustinian theological 
tradition of an unknowable and fundamentally mysterious God that remains 
uncontainable within worldly forms. 
Like the pre-modern theologies from which he draws inspiration, Luhmann, along 
with George Spencer-Brown, and Heinz von Foerster—among others loosely gathered 
under the heading of “second-order cybernetics”—undercuts a key lynchpin of humanist 
and modernist philosophy: the self-present objective observer who perceives reality as a 
representation in consciousness. This concept of observation, comprehensively 
dismantled by Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, cannot withstand the 
incorporation of the observing distinction into the observation. The duality of the 
humanist observational scheme (mind/reality) must remove or hide the mark of 
distinction from the field of observation, thus producing the notion of wholeness or a 
“total situation.” In other words, the difference between mind and reality must remain 
unobserved in order for a representation to be perceived in consciousness as a whole 
without difference. 
But this leads inevitably to certain familiar problems. Foucault writes that man “is 
a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be 
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attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible” (318). In other words, in modern 
scientific discourses man performs a double role, both transcendental and empirical: “he 
is at the same time at the foundation of all positivities and present, in a way that cannot 
even be termed privileged, in the element of empirical things” (344). Man is both the 
foundation of knowledge, the seat of “evident and distinct perception,” and yet the object 
of that knowledge as well. Logically speaking, it would seem that the selection of either 
option must occlude the other, and the accomplishment of this occlusion stakes out a 
foundational claim by hiding a paradoxical reliance on its contrary; a figure that vanishes, 
as Foucault might say, as if it were drawn in sand at the edge of the ocean. We are either 
fully within and thus an object captive to nature in the grasp of an immanence healed of 
all divides, or apart and forever removed from it in the form of a transcendental subject 
vulnerable to the terrors of skepticism. This is precisely the knot that humanism since 
Descartes is designed to untie through the guarantee of a full and accurate representation, 
that the categories of the world may conform to the categories of the mind through the 
conceits of scientific rationalism, synthetic a priori judgment, dialectics of the idealist or 
materialist stripe, logical positivism, fundamental ontology, and so forth.  
What this means is that a humanist and representationalist framework cannot 
cope with its own contingency. Humanism pretends to overcome its own self-referential 
distinctions. The difference is always hidden, unacknowledged, forgotten. By contrast, 
systems theory achieves a confrontation with the observational necessity of self-reference. 
Like Maxwell’s Demon, systems theory proposes that self-organizing systems operate by 
means of a primary distinction between themselves and their environment, and in this 
way they are able to overcome entropy (continue to reproduce their organization) 
through the development of internal complexity (more and more selective filters or 
	   74	  
distinctions) known as autopoiesis. As Luhmann writes, “System differentiation is nothing 
more than the repetition within systems of the difference between system and 
environment” (Social Systems 7). This reverses the humanist scheme: rather than difference 
receding from the observational frame to allow for a unified perception, the world recedes 
as the unmarked side of a distinction while the observing form is confronted with the self-
referential paradox of its own production—and therefore its lack of foundation. The 
observing form is forcefully confronted with the necessity of its own contingency, its 
difference from an environment, as the condition for it to exist at all. Luhmann’s systems 
theory does not attempt to elide or constrain self-reference, or simply disallow it like 
Russell in his theory of types, but instead assumes it as necessary and not to be avoided. 
Observations are confronted from within by their own limitations, by the differences that 
make continued self-reproduction or autopoiesis possible.  
When considered as an all-encompassing theory of modernity systems theory 
leads to the realization that, as Cary Wolfe puts it, “Enlightenment rationality is not, as it 
were, rational enough, because it stops short of applying its own protocols and 
commitments to itself” (Posthumanism xx). This point raises second-order questions about 
rationality. As Peirce might say: how do we explain explanations? What is the reason for 
reason? We cannot help but find ourselves chasing our own tails. For William Rasch, 
“The whole that is modernity is the whole that strains to see itself and thus a whole that 
forever divides itself with every observation into more and more ‘facts.’ The whole that 
we now deal with is a self-referential whole, thus an inescapably paradoxical one” (“Self-
Positing” 3). A systems theoretical approach displaces the human as the self-present site of 
an “evident and distinct perception” and instead disperses it throughout a proliferating 
network of determinative systems. Perceiving consciousness cannot function as a ground 
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devoid of difference and outside the world any longer. For Wolfe, “posthumanism names 
a historical moment in which the decentering of the human by its imbrication in 
technical, medical, informatic, and economic networks is increasingly impossible to 
ignore, a historical development that points toward the necessity of new theoretical 
paradigms (but also thrusts them on us), a new mode of thought that comes after the 
cultural repressions and fantasies, the philosophical protocols and evasions, of humanism 
as a historically specific phenomenon” (Posthumanism xvi). As both Peirce and Emerson 
both repeatedly find occasion to say, we are in it, it is not in us. 
Following from these premises, it becomes possible to argue that Emerson and 
Peirce are engaged in articulating a turn from a first-order to a second-order theory of 
observation, a posthumanist concept of subjectivity or feeling. When Peirce writes, “A 
person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that 
is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time” (EP2 338), he 
echoes Emerson: “This one fact the world hates, that the soul becomes” (Essays 271). 
Statements like these are expressions of the self-referential closure of feeling or 
subjectivity, leading to what Wolfe calls the “openness from closure” principle: “the very 
thing that separates us from the world connects us to the world, and self-referential, 
autopoietic closure, far from indicating a kind of solipsistic neo-Kantian idealism, actually 
is generative of openness to the environment” (Posthumanism xxi). This is because there is 
no observation without a distinction as a self-referential form that can only refer to the 
world in the form of its own limitation. This is, according to Luhmann in a statement 
worth quoting yet again, a “system-internal unity of self-reference and external reference" 
(Observations 17). The statements from Emerson and Peirce above recognize that the first-
order constitution of the self through feeling (an immediate self-present experience of 
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consciousness) is only observable through a second-order observation from the point of 
view of the future in which the unity of the first-order distinction becomes available for 
observation. This becoming available resembles what David Wills calls a prosthesis, the hinge 
or joint at which concepts like the animate, natural, self, or feeling meet their contrary in 
the inanimate or mechanical means of their expression. The hinge of prosthetic 
displacement will here take the form of a self-referential distinction which represents the 
driving engine of becoming and the future reference of a sign. 
 
Quasi-Transcendentalism: Deconstruction as Second-Order Observation 
 
A more familiar resource for understanding the posthumanist tradition in 
American thought comes from deconstruction. In a contribution to the volume 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism, Jacques Derrida makes some remarks concerning the notion 
of transcendental questioning, particularly Rudolph Gasche’s insistence on the 
importance of the “quasi-transcendental” for deconstructive thinking: 
Something that I learned from the great figures in the history of philosophy, from 
Husserl in particular, is the necessity of posing transcendental questions in order 
not to be held within the fragility of an incompetent empiricist discourse, and thus 
it is in order to avoid empiricism, positivism and psychologism that it is endlessly 
necessary to renew transcendental questioning. But such questioning must be 
renewed in taking account of the possibility of fiction, of accidentality and 
contingency, thereby ensuring that this new form of transcendental questioning 
only mimics the phantom of classical transcendental seriousness without 
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renouncing that which, within this phantom, constitutes an essential heritage 
(“Remarks” 82). 
The question that follows is just what the character of this “transcendental questioning” 
might be: “Do I speak of this ‘quasi’ in an ironical, comic or parodic manner, or is it a 
question of something else? I believe both. There is irony and there is something else” 
(“Remarks” 81). Derrida is alluding to what he characterizes in Positions as “an 
undecidable resource that sets the system in motion” (3). In that text he goes on to state 
that undecidables are 
…unities of simulacrum, “false” verbal properties (nominal or semantic) that can 
no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, but which, 
however, inhabit philosophical opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without 
ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form 
of speculative dialectics…In fact, I attempt to bring the critical operation to bear 
against the unceasing reappropriation of this work of the simulacrum by a 
dialectics of the Hegelian type…for Hegelian idealism consists precisely of a reléve 
of the binary oppositions of classical idealism, a resolution of contradiction into a 
third term that comes in order to aufheben, to deny while raising up, while 
idealizing, while sublimating into an anamnesic interiority (Errinnerung), while 
interning difference in a self-presence (43).  
Rather than raise a binary opposition into a Hegelian synthesis, the undecidable persists 
in its slippery oscillations, taking definitive form, the form of a decision, only if its condition 
for possibility be the condition of its impossibility: “The undecidable is not merely the 
oscillation or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable—this is the experience of 
that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the order of the calculable and the rule, 
	   78	  
must nonetheless…deliver itself over to the impossible decision while taking account of 
law and rules. A decision that would not go through the rest and ordeal of the 
undecidable would not be a free decision; it would only be the programmable application 
or the continuous unfolding of a calculable process” (Acts 252). That which is irreducible to 
the calculations of a discernable program forces a reduction in order to be expressible or 
manifest through that program, but this reduction represents in turn a self-limiting. The 
quasi-transcendental, it would seem, is a transcendental questioning that erases itself, 
kicks its own legs out from underneath itself, as means to broach or traverse the 
undecidable as a “resource” for any system of meaning. Transcendental questioning, 
conceived in this way, is the same as deconstruction itself. It is how meaning means: “This 
deconstruction does not apply itself to such a text, however. It never applies itself to 
anything from the outside. It is in some way the operation or rather the very experience 
that this text, it seems to me, first does itself, by itself, on itself” (Acts 264). Much like the 
observational necessity of self-reference, the quasi-transcendental is a self-transcending 
gesture from within, fully within, a particular text.  
 Another approach to the question of the transcendental informed by the analytic 
tradition is found in Joseph Margolis’s Pragmatism Without Foundations. As Margolis states, 
“The pivotal issue remains how to recover transcendental reflections under the 
constraints of a radically historicized pragmatism” (173). Margolis’s approach, however, is 
careful to situate itself after the “deconstructive turn” (209) that makes the traditional 
Kantian transcendental impossible. What this means, in effect, is that we must “construe 
transcendental arguments relativistically” (255). Margolis describes a transcendental 
questioning from “inside.” The transcendental gesture, on this account, relativises 
conceptual schema by indicating that they are contingent, that an other conceptual schema 
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is equally possible—and all this without suggesting what the actual content of that 
alternative schema might be. As in the deconstructive maneuver, Margolis’s pragmatism 
calls attention to an other not reducible to any system of meaning from within those 
systems of meaning. “The trick is that such transcendental reasoning provides only a 
(second-order) theory of the adequacy of theories of truth and coherence and meaning: it 
does not (and could not) provide higher-order (universal) criteria for the proper use of such 
epistemic terms” (243). 
The grounds must be internal all right, but the import of the realist claim must be 
logically stronger than any mere entailment of or induction from what those 
grounds affirm, in order to vindicate a scientific realism and not merely an 
internal realism. But that is to say, precisely, that what is needed is a 
transcendental argument, an argument that, however confined internally in 
epistemic terms, proposes and defends what (internally) appear to be the necessary 
and sufficient external conditions (or the best approximation to these that can be 
offered under the circumstances) in accord with which the realism of science can 
be sustained as an intelligible and reasonable option (242).  
Margolis sees the search for foundations as a necessary quest for external conditions 
because only on the appeal to an externality (here I pointedly resist using the phrase 
“external reality”) can alternatives arise internally: “The search for universal foundations 
of knowledge goes on as before: but that search is now seen to take the form of inspecting 
alternative, diachronically conservative, general regularities or conditions that, by 
arguments to the best explanation (themselves alternately persuasive in accord with 
different weightings of pertinent considerations) are historically judged to be among the 
best candidates that have as yet been found for such status” (153). What I hope is 
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becoming clear is that what Margolis considers under the term “relativism” represents 
again a kind of Russellian paradox or Derridean undecidable wherein all conceptual 
schemes are placed on equal footing, even the conceptual scheme which comprises the 
frame of “relativism.” Though Margolis does not adopt the dramatic existential tenor of 
Derrida’s consideration of the conditions of possibility for a decision, he does concern 
himself with how a decision leaves itself open for revision by positing itself as contingent.  
 For my purposes, both Derrida and Margolis can be considered as circling around 
the question of a self-referential distinction, in this case between mind/world, 
inside/outside, or immanent/transcendent. These distinctions are one-sided or 
asymmetrical. When Derrida notoriously proclaims that there is nothing outside the text, 
he means that there is indeed nothing but text and that outside this text is nothing, that the 
text includes this external reference internally through a demand for further distinctions. 
The phenomenon under investigation here is how the given or immanent “total 
situation” includes a reference to an other within itself, or how it seems that the distinction 
between internal and external constitutes a unity. In formal term, this works much the 
same as an imaginary value in mathematics (the square root of a negative number) or the 
liar’s paradox: “This statement is false.” Taken as true, the statement disagrees with itself. 
Taken as false, it becomes true.  Every distinction takes place only within a previous 
distinction (in this case the taken for granted distinction between true and false), and the 
“outside” (or un-indicated) half of the distinction can only re-enter or appear within and 
conditioned by the inside. This is what Spencer-Brown refers to as a re-entry of the initial 
distinction into itself. Only by means of re-entry, by copying the distinction inside the 
original distinction, can a text or system (or indeed, a mind) refer to an outside, other, or 
external transcendental. And these distinctions always require further distinctions. 
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 For these reasons Luhmann replaces perceiving human consciousness with the 
notion of an observing system. It is important to divorce this idea of systems from the 
mechanistic reductionism of modern science. It is instead what Heinz von Foerster calls a 
non-trivial machine. By contrast, a trivial machine is one in which the output is 
predictable and stable: “following a predetermined rule, the machine takes a stimulus, a 
cause, or an input and produces a corresponding response, effect, or output, reliably and 
flawlessly. For example, you give the machine an A and it outputs a 1. Give it a B, and it 
will output event 2. The trivial machine constantly delivers us a certain output. It remains 
this way without ever changing” (Understanding Systems 54). A non-trivial machine is the 
opposite, in which the output is unstable or unpredictable: “Non-trivial machines are 
always changing their internal structure and their rules of transformation…For instance, 
you might input the letter A, and the machine will output the number 1. Then you repeat 
the procedure, and this time the number 4 is output. You input an A again, and a 1 is 
output, but when you input an A again, this time it outputs another result…This type of 
machine cannot be analytically determined, because it is always varying the rules of 
transformation” (Understanding Systems 56).  
As von Foerster notes, there is in fact no such thing as a trivial machine. One may 
only “trivialize” a non-trivial machine. Your car, for instance, may seem trivial except for 
that one cold morning when it isn’t and thus defies expectations by not starting. As von 
Foerster goes on to say, “In my opinion, out Western culture has fallen head over heels in 
love with this type of [trivial] machine. It is the epitome of our yearning for certainty and 
security” (Understanding Systems 55). In fact, the entire technological sweep or gestell of 
modernity as analyzed by Heidegger in The Question Concerning Technology can be 
redescribed in this way as the attempted trivialization of non-trivial machines, as the 
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trivialization of the world itself. As von Foerster admits, this distinction is invented (as all 
distinctions are) but it is useful: “The advantage of the notion of the machine, if you 
follow me, is that you can get rid of the idea once and for all that living systems can be 
trivialized. The term ‘machine’ represents an abstract framework for speaking about 
input and output relationships and rules for transformation. The formalism that I am 
proposing here serves to argue in a disciplined manner and provides exact evidence that 
man and the universe cannot be trivialized and that the analytical problem cannot be 
solved” (Understanding Systems 59). Von Foerster freely admits to his own work being a sort 
of ethical intervention in its descriptions of modernity. There is nothing necessary about 
this description, it refers to no ontology, no is. The opposite can always be the case: “In 
fact, you can turn anything that you hear upside down” (Understanding Systems 25). Or, 
more precisely, “every statement has a finite range” (Understanding Systems 39). As William 
Rasch puts it, “We can rationally judge no longer the legitimacy of ends but only the best 
means of achieving these ends. The choice of ultimate values, therefore, is a pre- or non-
rational enterprise” (“Self-Positing” 26). All beginnings are arbitrary. Which is also to say 
that every statement and every distinction has only a first order, as in immediate, grasp of 
its own observations—but it cannot see what seeing necessarily occludes in order for it to 
see at all. 
Von Foerster’s response to this dilemma involves a second-order observation of 
the first order observation, what he refers to as the “cybernetics of cybernetics.” To 
explain, “compare a typical first-order cybernetics concept such as ‘purpose,’ (as being the 
equivalent of ‘why’) with a second-order question, ‘What is the purpose of purpose?’” 
(Understanding 301). It is easy to see that taking a second-order path involves a circularity 
that powerfully foregrounds the contingency of any particular observation or proposition. 
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In Spencer-Brown’s words, “And so on, and so on you will eventually construct the 
universe, in every detail and potentiality, as you know it now; but then, again, what you 
will construct will not be all, for by the time you will have reached what now is, the 
universe will have expanded into a new order to contain what will then be…In this sense, 
in respect of its own information, the universe must expand to escape the telescopes 
through which we, who are it, are trying to capture it, which is us. The snake eats itself, 
the dog chases its tail” (106). Such statements are echoed in the realm of quantum 
mechanics, most eloquently by David Bohm, “How are we to think coherently of a single, 
unbroken, flowing actuality of existence as a whole, containing both thought 
(consciousness) and external reality as we experience it...What could it mean for one part 
of reality to ‘know’ another, and to what extent would this be possible?” (xi). The attempt 
to answer these questions, and to discover just what the repercussions of any answer must 
be, can be seen as the impetus for what follows. 
 
The Practice of Feeling 
 
“Greatness appeals to the future.” – “Self-Reliance” (Essays 266) 
 
 What I have been calling feeling, immanence, or immediacy is inarguably one of 
the central themes of Emerson’s essays. As Sharon Cameron observes, perhaps 
unintentionally echoing Perry Miller, “It is an unmediated ‘face-to-face’ which the essays 
again and again retrieve. They can do this ‘again and again’ precisely because there is no 
rite, no symbol or authorized entity…nothing repeatable to be apprehended in these 
essays” (97). Cameron’s paradoxical statement that there is nothing repeatable about the 
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first-order experiences that Emerson pursues “again and again” already hints toward a 
second-order interpretation. In other words, Emerson’s text takes back the “face to face” 
encounters at the very moment it provides them. The essays masterfully perform second-
order observation through a relentless observation of the paradoxical unity of the 
distinctions on which first-order observations are founded. This can only reveal itself as 
something like an oscillation, a back and forth: “There is the incoming or the receding of 
God: that is all we can affirm; and we can show neither how nor why” (Essays 122).  
Sermon CLXII, known as the sermon on the Lord’s Supper and delivered in 
1832, four years before Nature, shows Emerson’s concern for discovering an immanent 
relationship with the world to be a guiding force in his thought from the beginning, but it 
also draws the fundamental distinction that is at work throughout his writings. The 
epigraph from Romans 14:17 that opens the sermon makes a distinction between habit or 
ritual and a source of feeling: “The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but 
righteousness and peace and joy in the holy ghost.” After announcing the subject of his 
sermon to be the Lord’s Supper and giving a short survey of disputes and differences in 
the practice of it, Emerson announces, “Having recently paid particular attention to this 
subject, I was led to the conclusion that Jesus did not intend to establish an institution for 
perpetual observance when he ate the Passover with his disciples” (Prose 18). He then 
proceeds to examine the scriptural foundation for the Lord’s Supper, finds it wanting, and 
concludes, “I think it was good for them. I think it is not suited to this day” (Prose 22). This 
statement announces an attempt to ground customs and practices on a living interaction 
with the world, and not merely customs abstractly transmitted across historical time and 
space. A proper comportment with the world requires an attention to living feeling: “It is 
of the greatest importance that whatever forms we use should be animated by our 
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feelings; that our religion through all its acts should be living and operative” (Prose 24). 
And more particularly, “This mode of commemorating Christ is not suitable to me. That 
is reason enough why I should abandon it” (Prose 24). Indeed, Emerson goes on to suggest 
that the true essence of Christianity consists in this resistance to “formal religion.” “That 
for which Paul lived and died so gloriously; that for which Jesus was crucified; the end 
that animated the thousand martyrs and heroes that have followed him, was to redeem us 
from a formal religion, and teach us to seek our wellbeing in the reformation of the soul” 
(Prose 25). By contrast, pre-Christian religion “was all body, it had no life” (Prose 25). And 
feeling that he must “do nothing which I cannot do with my whole heart” (Prose 25), 
Emerson resigns his position as a Christian minister at the conclusion of the sermon.  
 With the announcement of his resignation, Emerson was free to pursue his 
“original relation to the universe.” As is well known, it is possible to trace through 
Emerson’s early work a variety of different formulations of this romantic pursuit of 
momentary exultations. The infamous and much ridiculed passage in Nature is perhaps 
the most salient: “I become a transparent eye-ball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of 
the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. The name of the 
nearest friend sounds then foreign and accidental: to be brothers, to be acquaintances, -- 
master or servant, is then a trifle and a disturbance. I am the lover of uncontained and 
immortal beauty” (Essays 10). It is hard to think of a more complete description of Miller’s 
“total situation” from the inside, in which an upsurge of feeling makes all that was 
habitually familiar now empty and rote, a vision in which no other is referred or signified, 
and which allows for new relationships imbued with living feeling. “Self-Reliance,” 
written in 1841, also contains a comparable passage of what is there called the “source,” 
as that power with which we seek connection:  
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The inquiry leads us to that source, at once the essence of genius, of virtue, and of 
life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this primary wisdom as 
Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions. In that deep force, the last fact 
behind which analysis cannot go, all things find their common origin…Here is the 
fountain of action and of thought…Its presence or its absence is all we can affirm. 
Every man discriminates between the voluntary acts of his mind, and his 
involuntary perceptions, and knows that to his involuntary perceptions a perfect 
faith is due (Essays 269). 
In “Compensation,” he writes, “Under all this running sea of circumstance, whose waters 
ebb and flow with perfect balance, lies the aboriginal abyss of real Being. Essence, or 
God, is not a relation, or a part, but the whole. Being is the vast affirmative, excluding 
negation, self-balanced, and swallowing up all relations, parts, and times within itself. 
Nature, truth, virtue, are the influx from thence” (Essays 299). Similar passages can be 
produced indefinitely. Emerson’s thought up through the first series of Essays returns 
“again and again” to this seemingly first-order immanent relationship with the universe as 
a wholeness which may contain what we perceive to be opposites. 
But there is a turning in Emerson’s thought that observes these moments only in 
their withdrawal. Branka Arsic convincingly demonstrates in On Leaving that Emerson’s 
determination to ground practice in feeling is not the same as a self-grounding subjectivity 
because it is impersonal: “Power, then, belongs to the ‘it.’ It is, it works, it thinks” (162). As 
Emerson himself puts it in “Fate,” “It is not in us, but we are in it” (Essays 955)—a 
statement with an uncanny similarity to one written by Peirce: “Thought is more without 
us than within. It is we that are in it, rather than it in any of us” (CP 8.189). Power is that 
capacity for self-abandonment to the impersonal which carries us along to becoming new 
	   87	  
selves. Cary Wolfe shows that this impersonal is best understood as an orientation 
towards the future: “’Self-Recovery,’ then, is paradoxically oriented not toward some 
originary state but toward futurity, toward not being but becoming” (Posthumanism 262). 
These interpretations are complementary because an appeal to the it can only take place, 
as Arsic repeatedly states, as a passive reception—and therefore passivity becomes an 
acknowledgement of the contingency of the present situation, the sense in which we are 
given over (Cavell might say uncreated), which is to say an acknowledgement of the present 
situation’s other, its ungroundedness or onwardness. The only response is patience, 
waiting on the future that is always arriving within us, without us. This is why, as Wolfe 
notes, self-reference is such a useful concept for interpreting Emerson. It locates the latent 
blind spot even for transparent eyeballs.  
 Emerson’s “double consciousness” takes form as an oscillation between contrary 
positions, without resolving into dialectical synthesis. We may take hold of one side only 
to have the other wrap around and swallow it. Consider “Fate”—an essay in which 
nothing is asserted except for its contrary to be asserted shortly after. Or “Nominalist and 
Realist,” in which he writes “’Your turn now, my turn next,’ is the rule of the game” 
(Essays 584). Or in “Intellect,” suggesting quite forcefully the unity of self-reference and 
external-reference: “We are stung by desire for new thought; but when we receive a new 
thought, it is only the old thought with a new face, and though we make it our own, we 
instantly crave another; we are not really enriched” (Essays 425). It is new, and it is not. 
Elsewhere he points to the irreducible quality of this oscillating power: “This which I 
think and feel underlay every former state of life and circumstances, as it does underlie 
my present, and what is called life, and what is called death” (Essays 271). It is the unseen 
unity of our distinctions. “Fate” takes this logic to its limits: “This is true, and that other is 
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true. But our geometry cannot span these extreme points, and reconcile them. What to 
do? By obeying each thought frankly, by harping, or, if you will, pounding on each string, 
we learn at least its power” (Essays 943). As Wolfe points out, Emerson’s project “directs 
us not to an originary fixed self-substance but toward a power and a process: not toward the 
past but toward the future, or rather toward futurity itself, conceived as a horizon, where, 
paradoxically, the only ‘self’ to ‘recover’ is a self that one has not yet been, for the self only 
exists in its becoming” (Posthumanism 248). Power, what I propose as an Emersonian 
description of Thirdness, is continually elusive, old and new at once, underlying both 
death and life, because it is only expressed through a mechanical idea of process, and only 
then in a necessarily limited sense.  
 Along these same lines, Sharon Cameron makes an interesting and insightful 
observation in Impersonality, noting that for Emerson, “…the goal of these essays is 
generality (however it is called) and although the style is often inimitably general—
Emerson writing in no man’s voice—the point of the essays’ climactic figures is the 
representation of an encounter whose truth is somehow tied to its stylistic or rhetorical 
singularity” (99). Cameron introduces yet another pair of important terms for 
understanding Emerson: singularity and generality. The second term, generality, 
represents the mechanical or prosthetic expression of the event of singularity. For 
Cameron, Emerson’s impersonal is general, “there is characteristically vacancy in the 
place where we might expect to find a person” (94). Therefore, “the very moods that we 
might suppose to define our individual persons, when scrutinized in Emerson’s 
representations, rather contradict the idea of the personal…the impersonal calls into 
question the very idea of a self as a stable or predictable entity, for the moods which 
define our perceptions, beliefs, thoughts are in effect only contingent on circumstance” 
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(89). Cameron perceptively notes that Emerson’s philosophy of feeling fails to found a 
presence of self, and so the essays lead us by the hand from a seemingly intuitive private 
experience of feeling, a living attachment to the world, to an impersonal generality: “In 
fact ‘ravishment’ (that proprioceptive sense of what occurs at that moment when the 
personal is annihilated by the influx of the impersonal) is what the essays attempt to 
dramatize” (93). There is in Cameron’s formulation an oscillation between the personal 
and impersonal, and more broadly singularity and generality. What is going on can best 
be described by showing that these distinctions operate for Emerson as self-referential 
distinctions. Cameron suggests that Emerson’s failure to preserve a distinction between the 
impersonal and personal in fact leads to the collapse of his entire project:  
Consequently, what deprives Emerson’s voice of authority is that his statements 
are insufficiently personal, except in the passages I have discussed, and there only by 
inference. That is, their authority is neither functional nor personal. The content of 
Emerson’s impersonal implies a heroic context: an encounter, as well as an 
acknowledgement of the real or, in the language of “Character,” the “know[ing of] 
its face.” But the heroic implies a person’s contact with the real…Emerson, 
strangely, doesn’t know this. He invents a mode of discourse dissociated from the 
institutionally religious. He produces a discourse that has access to the real prior 
to the mediating symbol or rite whose necessity it obviates. The legitimacy of that 
discourse therefore depends on the visibility of the person speaking. It depends on 
the fact that an epiphanic encounter occurs to someone in particular who, by virtue 
of that particularity, is in a position to describe it. But except in the essay’s 
climactic moments—moments that, as I’ve argued, are typified by their 
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idiosyncrasy—Emerson then erodes the representation of any self-articulated 
distinction which would make his discourse legible and meaningful (102). 
But isn’t this the point? Isn’t the notion of a consummate “epiphanic encounter” meant as 
a figure for what I don’t get to have? What always slips out of my grasp? It is precisely 
Emerson’s posthumanist intervention to create a discourse in which particular “epiphanic 
encounters” are not localized in a singular self-present consciousness, that these moments 
are in fact the moments that a limited self is surpassed. Cameron argues that such 
encounters must be grounded in individual experience, whereas for Emerson it is 
precisely the individual that must give way for the impersonal “real” to encroach on the 
fortress of selfhood. The personal is constituted by the impersonal. The distinction between 
personal and impersonal takes places already within that very distinction on the side of the 
personal, which means that even the personal is not whole in itself but constituted by a 
distinction which is continually exceeded by the re-entry of the impersonal. Cameron 
already gestures towards this when she writes, “Thus Emerson is unable to represent the 
encounter for the sake of which his discourse exists—for there is ultimately no one to 
whom that encounter happens” (102). Thus when Emerson writes, “When good is near 
you, when you have life in yourself, it is not by any known or accustomed way; you shall 
not discern the foot-prints of any other; you shall not see the face of man; you shall not 
hear any name;---- the way, the thought, the good, shall be wholly strange and new” 
(Essays 271), when he suggests that the life in us is not our own, it can be understood as 
the re-entry of the impersonal, as the becoming impersonal that Cavell sees as the 
subjection to intelligibility and that Wolfe sees as the reference to the future—as the other 
side of a distinction.  
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Emerson grapples with the “other” or external side of a distinction through his 
attempts to represent that which is unrepresentable, that which can only be represented as 
unrepresentable, named as unnameable; thus encountering a figure that will take the 
form of absent grief and an unnamed son in “Experience.” Cameron’s charge that “One 
of the reasons Emerson fails to acknowledge others’ suffering, which is never very real to 
him, is that he fails to acknowledge his own suffering, which is never very real to him” 
(107) can be answered by arguing that Emerson’s failure to acknowledge suffering is in 
fact a refusal to represent it. It cannot be represented due to the singular and personal 
nature of grief, it is always transformed, de-personalized, by its mode of expression—it is 
always the other or “unmarked” side of the distinction. Emerson seems to anticipate such 
criticisms when he writes, “And yet one, who conceives the true order of nature, and 
beholds the visible as proceeding from the invisible, cannot state his thought, without 
seeming to those who study the physical laws, to do them some injustice. There is an 
intrinsic defect in the organ. Language overstates. Statements of the infinite are usually 
felt to be unjust to the finite, and blasphemous” (Essays 119). Cameron rightfully points to 
a paradox in Emerson’s thought, but rather than revealing an absent foundation or 
aporia that erodes the entire project, instead it is the driving engine of a process oriented 
philosophy, what Wolfe calls “philosophy as a writing practice” (Posthumanism 245). The 
paradox is generative. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in “Fate,” in which Emerson examines and 
enacts the self-reference of observation—the paradoxical unity of observational 
distinctions. He signals an aversion to dialectical synthesis very early in the essay, “Our 
geometry cannot span the huge orbits of the prevailing ideas, behold their return, and 
reconcile their opposition” (Essays 943). And then, “We can only obey our own polarity” 
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(Essays 261). Rather than dissolve the opposition of ideas into a teleology, Emerson does 
the reverse by undercutting the determinate meaning of statement with its opposite. 
“Fate” offers a theory of meaning without offering a foundation, teleological or otherwise, 
in which contrary meanings will coalesce.  “We are incompetent to solve the times,” 
(Essays 943) and therefore we cannot observe the unity of these oppositions except in their 
inevitable, ineluctable succession. Unity, according to this theory of meaning, means self-
referential paradox, it can only be observed as a second order phenomenon. It’s this, and 
then it’s that. 
At least part of what Emerson is up to in “Fate” is analyzing the relationship 
between thought and reality, a pair of terms given any number of different assignations in 
Emerson’s work, but perhaps most often called “power” and “fate.” The first half of the 
essay is in large part a description of the sense that “Wise men feel that there is something 
which cannot be talked or voted away,--a strap or belt which girds the world” (Essays 
944). This is the extent of Emerson’s realism—which sees reality as simply an internal 
resistance to the power of thought: “Whatever limits us, we call Fate” (Essays 952).  He 
writes, “On one side, elemental order, sandstone and granite, rock-ledges, peat-bog, 
forest, sea and shore; and, on the other part, thought, the spirit which composes and 
decomposes nature,--here they are, side by side, god and devil, mind and matter, kind 
and conspirator, belt and spasm, riding peacefully together in the eye and brain of every 
man” (Essays 953). What kind of system is this? What is the meaning of such a 
“stupendous antagonism” (Essays 953)? I’ve suggested it is the unity of self-referential 
paradox, and Emerson gestures in this direction when he writes, “Now whether, seeing 
these two things, fate and power, we are permitted to believe in unity?” (Essays 958). He 
answers his own question, “But relation and connection are not somewhere and 
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sometimes, but everywhere and always. The divine order does not stop where their sight 
stops. The friendly power works on the same rules, in the next farm, and the next planet. 
But, where they have not experience, they run against it, and hurt themselves. Fate, then, 
is a name for facts not yet passed under the fire of thought;--for causes which are yet 
unpenetrated. But every jet of chaos which threatens to exterminate us, is convertible by 
intellect into wholesome force” (Essays 958). I take this to mean that unity isn’t observable, 
but nevertheless it does not stop where sight stops. We simply “run against it” in the 
oscillations and reversals of our experience. Much as Peircean theorist and semiotician 
Floyd Merrell writes, “Everything is both affirmative and negative, pregnant with its 
contrary. The universe incessantly engages in on going agonistics” (268).  
For Emerson to say such things he has to have a theory of meaning (incompetent 
as we are to solve it) that nevertheless connects an idea to its moment and only its moment, 
thus occluding itself at the very moment of its emergence. Any other theory of meaning in 
which, say, we are competent to judge the total meaning of an idea from here to eternity 
would fatally decouple the idea from the feeling that gives it life and power. Much like the 
coupling of the personal and the impersonal, in which each is grounded in the other, 
Emerson couples power and fate—or, in fact, any pair of contrary terms you care to 
name, since in some sense Emerson’s target in “Fate” is most properly conceived to be 
the nature of antagonism itself. Having pounded on the string of fate, Emerson then 
extols its necessary contradiction: “But Fate has its lord; limitation its limits…If Fate 
follows and limits power, power attends and antagonizes Fate” (Essays 953).  And a bit 
later: “To hazard the contradiction, -- freedom is necessary. If you please to plant yourself 
on the side of Fate, and say, Fate is all; then we say, a part of Fate is the freedom of man. 
Forever wells up the impulse of choosing and acting in the soul. Intellect annuls Fate. So 
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far as a man thinks, he is free” (Essays 953). And so far as he is free, that freedom is 
grounded and granted by fate. Here Emerson makes explicit what was only implicit in the 
relation of the personal to the impersonal. Fate itself includes freedom, or the power of 
thought. And thought traces its own limits, traverses the distinction between itself and 
fate: “This insight throws us on the party and interest of the Universe, against all and 
sundry; against ourselves, as much as others. A man speaking from insight affirms of 
himself what is true of the mind: seeing its immortality, he says, I am immortal; seeing its 
invincibility, he says, I am strong. It is not in us, but we are in it. It is of the maker, not of 
what is made. All things are touched and changed by it. This uses, and is not used” (Essays 
954-955). Fate and freedom are grounded in one another in a self-referential, circular 
process, producing the generative paradoxes of succession and substitution, in which we 
“ride alternately” (Essays 966) on this then that, the back and forth, the power “not 
personal nor impersonal” (Essays 968) which creates the universe ever anew. 
 
Welded Signs and Quasi-Minds 
 
“Chance is indeterminacy, is freedom. But the action of freedom  
issues in the strictest of law.” —“Design and Chance” (EP1 222) 
 
 
Peirce’s philosophy repeats these Emersonian themes while removing to an even 
further extent the costumes of theology or romanticism. As if helpfully directing us to such 
an idea, he writes,  
I may mention, for the benefit of those who are curious in studying mental 
biographies, that I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord,--I mean 
in Cambridge,--at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were 
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disseminating the ideas that they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from 
Plotinus, from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the 
monstrous mysticism of the East. But the atmosphere of Cambridge held many an 
antiseptic against Concord transcendentalism; and I am not conscious of having 
contracted any of that virus. Nevertheless, it is probable that some cultured bacilli, 
some benignant form of the disease was implanted in my soul, unawares, and that 
now, after long incubation, it comes to the surface, modified by mathematical 
conceptions and by training in physical investigations (EP1 313).  
Following Peirce’s own insight, and in light of “Fate,” I am led to consider “Design and 
Chance,” which, because it is still from an early stage in Peirce’s philosophy, makes 
attempted comparisons with the looser and more experimental writing of Emerson a bit 
easier. It was written to be delivered as a lecture in 1884, about six years after the seminal 
work “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in which William James later discovered the 
pragmatic method.  
In “Design and Chance” Peirce ingeniously argues that the supposedly immutable 
laws of nature are themselves the product of evolution: “May not the laws of physics be 
habits gradually acquired by systems[?]” (EP1 223). This idea represents an important 
development in Peirce’s thought, and pursues a number of themes familiar from “Fate” 
and Emerson’s later work in general, yet “modified” by scientific concerns. For instance, 
when Peirce writes, “…I maintain that at one stage of inquiry it is quite right to insist 
strongly on the exactitude of established laws…while at a later stage it is proper to 
question the exactitude of those same laws when we are in possession of a guiding idea 
which shows us in what manner they may possibly be corrected” (EP1 216), it can be 
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interpreted in an Emersonian fashion as analogous to the relationship between feeling 
and habit as process. 
In particular, Peirce claims that there is an irreducible element of chance in the 
universe: “Bodies obey sensibly the laws of mechanics; but may it not be that if our means 
of measurement were inconceivably nicer, or if we were to wait inconceivable ages for an 
exception, exceptions irreducible in their own nature to any law would be found? In 
short, may it not be that chance, in the Aristotelian sense, mere absence of cause, has to be 
admitted as having some slight place in the universe” (EP1 217). Remarkably, Peirce nods 
to “Darwin’s great work” (EP1 215) but refuses to accept that the law of evolution really 
explains much unless we can explain what explanations are, thus moving from first-order 
to second-order questions: “And then the general fact that there are laws, how is that to 
be explained?” (EP1 218). And further, “Evolution is the postulate of logic, itself; for what 
is an explanation but the adoption of a simpler supposition to account for a complex state of 
things” (EP1 218). This suggests that part of what Peirce seems to be driving at is that the 
universe considered as a whole may be irreducibly complex. 
 This is not the same as saying that the world is inexplicable, as he goes on to say, 
“…the hypothesis of absolute chance is part and parcel of the hypothesis that everything 
is explicable, not absolutely, rigidly without the smallest inexactitude or sporadic 
exception, for that is a self-contradictory supposition but yet explicable in a general way. 
Explicability has no determinate & absolute limit” (EP1 219). Again, we find two contrary 
terms being welded together, grounded one in the other. In this case it is the duality of 
law, or explicability, and absolute chance, which means the absence of law. The 
irreducible complexity of the world derives from this interplay of law and chance, which 
for Peirce becomes the driving engine of evolution. In fact, Peirce suggests a distinction 
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between chance as the evolution of complexity and entropy as the dissipation of systems: 
“But although no force can counteract this tendency [to entropy], chance may and will 
have the opposite influence. Force is in the long run dissipative; chance is in the long run 
concentrative. The dissipation of energy by the regular laws of nature is by those very 
laws accompanied by circumstances more and more favorable to its reconcentration by 
chance…And from this it follows that chance must act to move things in the long run 
from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity” (EP1 221). Chance is interpreted 
from the inside of law as entropy, as the limitation of law’s explanatory power. Peirce’s 
vision here encapsulates a sophisticated philosophy of modernity as the observation of 
infinite complexity through self-reference. “Design and Chance,” again much like “Fate,” 
strives to examine the nature of antagonisms without recourse to synthesis. Peirce’s 
asymptotic realism, “the possibility of an indefinite approximation toward a complete 
explanation of nature,” (EP1 222) is how he conceptualizes how self-referential closure 
trends inevitably towards more and more complex systems as a response to chance or 
entropy—the reduction of complexity by complexity. And so physical laws, the evolution 
of which Peirce is attempting to describe in the lecture, work much like what Heinz von 
Foerster calls eigenvalues: 
When a non-trivial machine reuses what it has produced or has created an output 
as input, a circular figure is created. And when this circularity is produced and the 
machine has been in operation for a while, something very interesting takes place. 
Stable values emerge…Let’s say I take a pocket calculator and enter a number of 
your choice. I take the square root of this number, and when the calculator has 
come up with it I press on the square root button again. In so doing, a circular 
process evolves. The output becomes the input and the result of an operation is 
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used as the starting point of the same operation, the result of which in turn serves 
as the starting point of this operation. After a certain period of time and the 
continuous use of the operation of the square root, a so-called eigenvalue 
emerges…and while you can’t explain how it came to be, you are able to predict 
it (Understanding Systems 60). 
Peirce puts it in a more Darwinian framework: “Systems or compounds which have bad 
habits are quickly destroyed, those which have no habits follow the same course; only 
those which have good habits tend to survive” (EP1 223). Or more precisely put in 
another essay, “if experience in general is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro, in a manner 
to deprive the ratio sought of all definite value, we shall be able to find out approximately 
within what limits its fluctuates” (EP1 201). A system with no habits is no system, and a 
system with habits determined to the last instance is no system. Either extreme precludes 
growth or change. Good habits, then, are the best and most flexible response to entropy, 
and thus fallible and always ready for revision—for leaving themselves behind. As 
Emerson puts it, “But things are ever grouping themselves according to higher or more 
interior laws” (Essays 335). 
 “Design and Chance” provides an ideal introduction to Peirce because it invokes 
the philosophical problems that semiotics was designed to solve. Peirce’s specific 
intervention consists primarily in the replacement of the “mind” of German idealism with 
a concept of a sign, and so his philosophy can be seen as driving right past what John 
Deely calls the detour that is modern philosophy. Deely’s The Four Ages of Understanding 
argues for a revisionist history of philosophy in which the notion of the sign takes center 
stage. In his own words, 
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From the High Middle Ages down to the time of Descartes we find a lively and 
continuous discussion of sign which, through a series of important if unfamiliar 
controversies on both sides of the thirteenth century, leads to a basic split in the 
closing Latin centuries. On one side stand those who think that the general notion 
of sign is an empty name, a flatus vocis, a nominalism, no more than a ‘relation of 
reason’, an ens rationis. On the other side are those who are able to ground the 
general notion in an understanding of relation as unique, suprasubjective mode of 
being, a veritable dual citizen of the order of ens reale and ens rationis alike, 
according to shifting circumstances. 
Modern philosophy, from this point of view, appears essentially as an 
exploration of the nominalist alternative; and postmodern thought begins with the 
acknowledgement of the bankruptcy of the modern effort, combined with the 
determination pioneered by C.S. Peirce to explore the alternative, ‘the road not 
taken’, the ‘second destiny’ that had been identified in the closing Latin centuries 
but forgotten thereafter. Peirce’s postmodern resumption of premodern 
epistemological themes produces a number of immediately dramatic and 
surprising results (xxxi). 
Deely persuasively connects Peirce backwards to pre-modern thought, but Peirce’s place 
in the history of American thought, particularly American romanticism, remains 
somewhat anomalous. One gets the impression that had William James never attributed 
(maybe too generously) to Peirce the term “pragmatism” then scholars would perhaps 
have been quite content to leave Peirce all alone up in the attic of American intellectual 
history.  
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Following the fame of James’s pragmatism, Peirce was concerned with 
distinguishing himself from what he saw as errors in that popular approach. As Max Fisch 
writes, “Peirce held that his own strictly limited form of pragmatism was provable, and it 
was only within the semeiotic framework that the proof could be made evident” (338). 
The following passage from a letter Peirce wrote to Lady Welby in 1908 is particularly 
illuminating: “I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, 
called its object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its 
Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former: My insertion 
of ‘upon a person’ is a sop to Cerebrus, because I despair of making my own broader 
conception understood” (qtd. in Fisch 343). Fisch asks, “What was that broader, that 
more generalized, conception? Negatively, it is apparent that it did not involve ‘the mind 
of an interpreter’ or ‘an effect upon a person.’ Did it also not involve an utterer, a sign-
giver? In the last account of his theory of signs which Peirce had published, as a 
framework, within which to introduce his existential graphs, the place of the sign-utterer 
or sign-giver had been taken by the Graphist” (343). Fisch then points to the follow 
fascinating passage from Peirce: “Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a 
Quasi-utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e. are one mind) in 
the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. 
Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that 
every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic” (CP 4.551). As Fisch continues, 
“The sop to Cerberus was lapsing from sign-talk into psych-talk—from semeiotic into 
psychology” (343).  
 All of this of course raises the question: what, then, is a sign? As Anthony Wilden 
has already remarked, this is surprisingly difficult to answer. Peirce’s definition above is 
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interesting because it recalls the example of Thirdness offered at the beginning of this 
chapter: A causes B and B causes A. Similarly, a sign is an act of determination that has 
also already been determined, enacting a sequence of further and further determinations in 
a somewhat circular fashion. The object is always prior to the determining sign, and the 
interpretant always after: “The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two 
correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign” (EP2 
410). The interpretant, as a form of Thirdness or irreducible complexity, always calls for a 
further determination. An individual sign is thus always partial or incomplete, and always 
stands for the possibility of further determinations.  
But this merely raises our question in a different form: what is a determination? I 
want to suggest that a determining sign is a self-referential distinction from an object 
(understood as a prior sign)—a distinction, as it were, within a prior distinction. As Peirce 
puts it in a passage notable for its emphatic and confounding insistence, “Truth is the 
conformity of a representamen to its object,--its object, ITS object” (EP2 380). Why its 
object? Because, as Peirce continues, the sign must be “compelled” by its object: “There 
must be an action of the object upon the sign to render the latter true” (EP2 380). This is 
the action or “struggle” of Secondness, the category for difference which makes truth one-
sided. Conformity takes place within the sign: the object does not appear as itself, but only 
as the limited or partial determination represented by the sign. Signs do not express 
objects: “The object of a Sign, then, is necessarily unexpressed in the sign, taken by itself” 
(EP2 407). The object of the sign never appears as itself, but only through the prior 
determination of the sign. On the other hand, the interpretant (as the unity of sign and 
object) requires the compelling action of a future distinction. This is the onwardness of 
signs. 
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When understood in the terms of Peirce’s modal logic, an interpretant 
corresponds to “potentiality” while an object corresponds to “actuality,” resembling quite 
closely Luhmann’s analysis of meaning: “Something pertaining to the realm of 
potentiality must be actualized, which in turn requires that the difference between 
actuality and potentiality occur at the heart of experience and communication—formally 
speaking, the form ‘reenters’ the form” (Art 139). And much like Emerson’s vision of a 
process-oriented philosophy, Peirce’s sign as a figure for Thirdness can then be 
understood as the paradoxical unity of a distinction. This means that sign and object are, 
we may borrow the term, “welded”—they are one, but nevertheless distinct. Self-
referential vacillation, a “necessity of logic,” is what constitutes their “dialogic” nature. 
When Peirce says “we” are in “it” he means we are in Thirdness, in and 
surrounded by signs. In contrast to Ferdinand de Saussure’s signifier/signified distinction, 
there is no transcendental position which may observe the set of all signifier/signified 
couplets because such a perspective would be a metaphysical position over and above the 
action of signs—a non-semiotic position that could only be occupied by God. Even that 
all-encompassing perspective must be of the nature of a sign because it is itself the product 
of difference. Derrida argues in Of Grammatology that Saussure’s structuralist semiotics 
requires the framing action of human consciousness as a transcendental move up to a 
metaphysical perspective in order for signifiers and signifieds to be able to link up within a 
common space, thus grounding the semiotic differend in consciousness. And as Anne 
Freadman points out, “The Saussurean account of the relation between langue and parole 
not only restricts it to synchronicity, but it does so because it confines it to the space of a 
single language. Parole ‘realizes’ an ideal material form—the phonological signifier, say, in a 
phonetic approximation. If this approximation deviates too greatly from the ideal form, it 
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counts as a mistake, or even as unintelligible. Langue is therefore a rule governing that 
materiality. The most remarkable difference with Peirce lies here” (153). As Freadman 
goes on to say, Peirce’s sign is not the instance of a rule, but the figure of translation itself 
(which points to the translation of the translation, and so on). A sign is a distinction that 
demands another distinction. 
 
Love and Asymmetry 
 
“Everything is a Miracle.” 
—Heinz von Foerster (Understanding Systems 63) 
 
 
 Peirce’s text, with its often unrelenting dryness, often conceals the heart of a true 
romantic. Indeed, as Soren Brier has pointed out in Cybersemiotics, Peirce can quite easily 
be connected to hylozoism, or the belief that the universe is itself alive. Many of his works 
offer tantalizing glimpses of the sublime, yet withholding all the while any ultimate 
consummation. This effect of Peirce’s writing probably accounts for both the devotion 
bordering on obsession of his acolytes as well as the air of perplexed disinterest attending 
his thought throughout most of the previous century. One such follower, Floyd Merrell, 
still carries on brilliantly the fantasia of science, logic, philosophy, mathematics, 
psychology, and semiotics that can make Peirce’s writing such a thrilling experience for 
receptive readers. For my own more narrow purposes, this usually unnoted aspect of 
Peirce’s thought, this undercurrent of wonder and love, connects him more easily to the 
raptures of Emerson and Edwards. In particular, Peirce’s philosophy espouses an 
Emersonian theory of love marked with Peirce’s own predilections toward a formalism 
that actually places him quite close to von Foerster: “The way I see it, ‘wonder’ can be 
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provided with a solid foundation if you describe it using strict logic and very precise 
formalisms” (Understanding Systems 62). Moreover, the concept of love held by Edwards, 
Emerson, and Peirce recalls the distinction between the personal and impersonal 
analyzed above. For instance, Jonathan Edwards provides a definition of love that 
emphasizes it as a self-overcoming process: 
How soon do earthly lovers come to an end of their discoveries of each other’s 
beauty! How soon do they see all that is to be seen, are they united as near as it is 
possible and have communion as intimate as possible! How soon do they come to 
the most endearing expressions of love that it is possible to come to, so that no 
new ways can be invented, given, or received! And how happy is that love in 
which there is an eternal progress in all these things, wherein new beauties are 
continually discovered, and more and more loveliness, and in which we shall 
forever increase in beauty ourselves. When we shall be made capable of finding 
out, and giving, and shall receive more and more endearing expressions of love 
forever, our union will become more close and communion more intimate (Reader 
41).  
This idea of love is a self-referential process, the conflict of infinite and finite—which is to 
say that it sees the finitude of the finite as the very evidence of the infinite, just out of the 
corner of its eye. Likewise, for Emerson, by “separating in each soul that which is divine 
from the taint which it has contracted in the world, the lover ascends to the highest 
beauty, to the love and knowledge of the Divinity, by steps on this ladder of created souls” 
(Essays 334). The desire to confront another “face to face” provides the foundation for a 
theory of love in which the face of another only appears by eluding consummation, that 
love expresses itself most fully only in growth and evolution. 
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 In “Love,” Emerson demonstrates what we might coldly call the structural 
indeterminacy of affective relationships: “Who can analyze the nameless charm which 
glances from one and another face and form?” (Essays 332). Much like Edwards, Emerson 
understands love as its own contradiction and maintains the emptiness of material forms. 
In both, we find a contrast between faith and a more worldly sensibility. Faith is the 
transitional mode, the nameless charm that carries man from one form of life to another, 
the “visitations of that power to his heart and brain, which created all things new” (Essays 
330). In fact, Emerson, much like Edwards, sees love as the eclipse of particulars for the 
sake of an expansion of the general:  
Nature, uncontainable, flowing, forelooking, in the first sentiment of kindness 
anticipates already a benevolence which shall lose all particular regards in its 
general light. The introduction to this felicity is in a private and tender relation of 
one to one, which is the enchantment of human life; which, like a certain divine 
rage and enthusiasm, seizes on man at one period, and works a revolution in his 
mind and body; unites him to his race, pledges him to the domestic and civic 
relations, carries him with new sympathy into nature, enhances the power of the 
senses, opens the imagination, adds to his character heroic and sacred attributes, 
establishes marriage, and gives permanence to human society (Essays 327). 
“Love” even goes so far as to say that mere material facts, which is to say the actual 
experience of love for any particular person, are irrelevant to the topic: “We must leave a 
too close and lingering adherence to facts, and study the sentiment as it appeared in hope 
and not in history” (Essays 328). And explicitly, “Thus even love, which is the deification 
of persons, must become more impersonal every day” (Essays 335). What this most clearly 
resembles aside from Edwards’s Puritan injunctions against worldly love is Peirce’s 
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decidedly more modern injunctions against what he considered to be the scourge of 
philosophy: nominalism.  
Detecting and expunging the belief that general concepts have no actual reality 
from the philosophy of others and himself occupies a great deal of Peirce’s work. As he 
writes, “The question whether the genus homo has any existence except as individuals, is 
the question whether there is anything of any more dignity, worth, and importance than 
individual happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life” (EP1105). A defense of 
the idea that Thirdness or generality is real is the principle point of Peirce’s famous Monist 
series of papers that in many particulars announce his mature philosophy. As seen above, 
Thirdness represents the conjunction of opposites. In ontology, it is the union of 
possibility and actuality in the form of potentiality. In semiotics, it is the interpretant, which 
is the meaning of a sign in the conformity of representamen and object. In both cases, as I 
have argued, it represents the unity but not identity of a distinction. In this context, 
Thirdness can be understood as “Evolutionary Love,” the title of one of Peirce’s more 
famous essays. The reality of generals can then be understood in terms of potentiality, as 
the reality of a future tense, the reality of growth or evolution, of change and freedom 
being the only law. The following words from Emerson apply equally for Peirce’s 
philosophy, which sees the process of universal growth as the development of love: 
“passion rebuilds the world for the youth. It makes all things alive and significant. Nature 
grows conscious” (Essays 331). 
“Evolutionary Love” (1893) was written near the midpoint of Peirce’s 
philosophical trajectory, and it offers one of the more vivid accounts of his concept of re-
entry and self-reference apart from logical or mathematical formulations. Peirce’s 
metaphysical speculations in the latter portions of his life were often concerned with 
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proving the continuity underlying our distinctions, what he termed “synechism.” As 
Douglas Anderson ably puts it “he emphasizes the ways in which synechism envisages the 
unity, but not the identity, of oppositional moments in the architectonic” (29). Synechism 
is Peirce’s term for an attempt to think not so much outside of binary schemes but 
alongside them, finding the points at which mutual extremes merge into one another. 
Peirce writes, “There is a famous saying of Parmenides,…’being is, and not-being is 
nothing.’ This sounds plausible, yet synechism flatly denies it, declaring that being is a 
matter of more or less, so as to merge insensibly into nothing” (CP 7.569). Peirce can be 
seen in some ways as attempting to ground (not just ethically but logically) the expansion 
of modernity, not to overcome it in a Hegelian telos or Nietzschean will to power. In 
contrast, he finds the basis for modernity in a theory of love. 
If we grant that the universe desires to cut itself into parts and observe itself, we 
could also see this as a desire of the universe to commune with itself, to bring itself into 
itself, always escaping its own grasp. Put in another framework, it could be seen as love: 
“The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into 
independency and drawing them into harmony” (EP1 353). In the concept of agape or 
“cherishing love” as the love of what is different or apart, Peirce finds a way to 
conceptualize the unity of a distinction as re-entry. How else to account for the fact that 
the universe conceives a desire to cut itself into parts and then to be drawn into 
communion with those severed parts? In Peirce’s astonishing restatement of the Golden 
Rule, “Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor” (EP1 353), 
do we not find a call for second-order observation, for taking on the burden of your own 
incompleteness to contribute to another’s unity? There is no unity in individuality, but 
only in communion: “The gospel of Christ says that progress comes from every individual 
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merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors” (EP1 357). Love needs hate as 
its contrary, and according to Peirce not only do these opposites require one another for 
the purpose of differentiation, but simultaneously these distinctions desire to unify. Love is 
identified as distinct from hate, and love must take hate, its contrary, as its object. “Thus, 
the love that God is, is not a love of which hatred is the contrary; otherwise Satan would 
be a coordinate power; but it is a love which embraces hatred as an imperfect stage of it, 
an Anteros—yea, even needs hatred and hatefulness as its object. For self-love is no love; 
so if God’s self is love, that which he loves must be defect of love; just as luminary can 
light up that which otherwise would be dark” (EP1 353). How else to understand this but 
as a self-referential distinction, as the re-entry and recontainment of the opposing force?  
These reflections can just as well be understood within the context of Derrida’s 
attempt to ethically ground a modernity of difference without identity: “If you love only 
those who love you and to the extent that they love you, if you hold so strictly to this 
symmetry, mutuality, and reciprocity, then you give nothing, no love, and the reserve of 
your wages will be like a tax that is imposed or a debt that is repaid, like the acquittal of a 
debt. In order to deserve or expect an infinitely higher salary, one that goes beyond the 
perception of what is due, you have to give without taking account and love those who 
don’t love you” (106). Love is, the word insistently suggests itself, assymetrical, and through 
the imbalance of first this side then that it operates as the power behind growth and 
change, glancing from one and another face and form. And von Foerster: “There is no 
separation. We are connected with the world and the other person…Whatever happens 
to you happens to me. And whatever happens to me happens to you. And in so doing, 
someone gives you their life, and you give them yours” (Understanding Systems 159). And 
Peirce: “growth comes only from love, from—I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the 
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ardent impulse to fulfil another’s highest impulse” (EP1 354). And Edwards: “For here the 
effect is made the cause of that of which it is the effect: our happiness, consisting in the 
happiness of the person beloved, is made the cause of our love to that person. Whereas, 
the truth plainly is that our love to the person is the cause of our delighting, or being 
happy in his happiness. How comes our happiness to consist in the happiness of such as 
we love, but by our hearts being first united to them in affection, so that as it were, we 
look on them as ourselves, and so on their happiness as our own?” (Reader 260). And 
Emerson: “That which is so beautiful and attractive as these relations must be succeeded 
and supplanted only by what is more beautiful, and so on for ever” (Essays 337). And so 
on. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Seeing and Unseeing: Jonathan Edwards and the Ethics of Self-Reference 
 
“Self-reference is the infinite in finite guise” –Louis H. Kauffman (“Self-Reference” 2) 
 
Beginning with the classic texts of Perry Miller and including even the most 
sophisticated contemporary accounts, the Puritan theology of Jonathan Edwards (1703-
1758) is often found, at its heart (or in its “sense of the heart” to use Miller’s famous 
phrase) to resemble modern humanism. Miller’s seminal biography of Edwards provides 
an account that forms the basis for many subsequent interpretations: “Edwards went to 
nature and experience, not in search of the possible, but of the given, of that which 
cannot be controverted, of that to which reason has access only through perception and 
pain, that of which logic is the servant and from which dialectic receives its premises” 
(Jonathan Edwards 46). Miller describes this search as expressing a desire for “face to face” 
(Errand 185) encounters with the unaccountable God of Calvinism, a desire that directly 
links Edwards to Ralph Waldo Emerson and thus the entire tradition of American 
humanism which culminates in the “psychological empiricism” of William James. 
However, this narrative, while certainly compelling, betrays one of the central tenants of 
Edwards’s Calvinism. As Miller puts it, “It is of the essence of this theology that God, the 
force, the power, the life of the universe, remains to men hidden, unknowable, 
unpredictable. He is the ultimate secret, the awful mystery. God’s nature ‘is capable 
properly of no definition,’ so that all that one can say is that ‘God is an incomprehensible, 
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first, and absolute Being.’ He cannot be approached directly; man cannot stand face to 
face with Him…” (Errand 51). 
Of course, Miller was well aware of this inconsistency, as it forms the backbone of 
many of his most trenchant insights. As he writes, “Most of the issues that were so hotly 
contested among seventeenth-century theologians were connected with attempts to 
resolve this discrepancy between the God of everyday providence and the God who 
dispensed His grace according to no rule but His own pleasure” (New England Mind 33). 
What distinguishes Edwards is the desire, the manner of the attempt—a problem that 
interestingly enough is only resolved through the assistance of a grace that indeed, if 
fleetingly, provides the “face to face” encounters that Edwards seeks. It is at precisely this 
point—a liminal space between the grasping after self-present and self-grounding 
encounters and the “the absolute, incomprehensible, and transcendent sovereignty of 
God” (Errand 51)—that a different and potentially more accurate account of Edwards’s 
theology can emerge. 
This argument relies in part on Michael Clark’s assertion that the Puritans “never 
could accept the material world as a basis for their epistemology; such a premise would 
subordinate the rational soul to the senses and, more important, would deny the 
transcendent authority that the Puritans granted to the basic tenets of their theology” 
(282). Clark argues that “The most fundamental principle of Puritan semiology was the 
absolute discontinuity between two of the three ‘forms’ constituting any fully significant 
sign” (280). This “absolute discontinuity”—a formulation that resembles what Miller 
called a “fundamental distrust” (Errand 97) or the “discrepancy” noted above—
represented “neither a dualistic oscillation between this world and the next nor a 
continuous hierarchy connecting the two. Rather, it was much closer to a dialectic, a 
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gesture toward synthesis built out of the dramatic conflict of faith as thesis and world as 
antithesis” (291). Clark’s argument is an advance beyond the stalemate identified by 
Miller, but he also cannot help but fold Puritan thought into dialectical premises of the 
Hegelian stripe, which is to say that there is an emphasis on gestures toward dialectical 
synthesis, a premise that would seem to contradict the “absolute discontinuity” originally 
identified. Instead, the semiology that Clark outlines suggests a failure (implied by Clark’s 
use of the phrase “gesture toward”) of synthesis.  
This problem, so far indentified as a “discrepancy,” “fundamental distrust,” or 
“absolute discontinuity,” will surface again and again in scholarly accounts of Edwards’s 
theology. On one end, there are accounts which produce a kind of synthesis of the terms, 
an approach exemplified by Joan Richardson’s A Natural History of Pragmatism (2007). 
Richardson supposes, even if implicitly, some form of correspondence or relation of mind 
and environment subsumed in the “face to face” encounter with an overarching 
naturalism. She writes, “While Edwards believed his insights to have come from God, from 
our later point of view it is easy to see that his response was animal, that is, the response 
of a creature struggling to survive in an environment where ‘the squirming facts 
exceed[ed] the squamous mind’” (49); and “he embedded the divine within the 
empirical” (50); and so on. In explaining the exclusion of Hawthorne and Melville from 
her study, Richardson writes, “each was, by his own account, still too haunted by the idea 
of an ‘unnaturalized’ Calvinist deity to shed the feeling of a mind inhabited by guilt to be 
able to put on a new habit, the feeling of what happens to a mind enjoying ‘an original 
relation to the universe’” (12). But it would seem to be precisely Edwards’s fascination for 
the unnaturalized and unnaturalizable Calvinist deity that guides much of his thought. 
Richardson, by constrast, naturalizes Edwards, replaces God with Nature, as a means to 
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resolve the discrepancies of his thought and to connect him to the organicist romanticism 
she finds in Emerson and James.  
It would seem obvious that one possible means of avoiding the synthesis of such 
readings would be to simply understand Edwards as affirming the dualisms of Calvinist 
thought. This is the tack taken up in R.C. De Prospo’s Theism in the Discourse of Jonathan 
Edwards (1985). Here the “absolute discontinuity” is fundamental, as De Prospo argues 
that “modern interpretations of Edwards propose that, at least when gripped by those 
infrequent, heightened affections he hopes are gracious, Edwards senses a union between 
the visible and invisible that contradicts dualistic and anticipates romantic visionary 
experience, and this despite unmistakable evidence that when Edwards contemplates 
these emotions, both his own and those of others, in the tranquility of his theological 
writings, the dualism of his understanding is pronounced, leading him to question feeling 
in ways that seem precisely to differentiate him both from later romantic visionaries and 
from supposedly protoromantic contemporaries” (67). De Prospo’s reading of Edwards is 
especially useful because it resists the temptation to read Edwards as a synthesizer of 
dualistic terms. By distancing Edwards from the standard romantic readings of Emerson, 
De Prospo departs from the typical narrative of American intellectual history: “…the 
theist discursive pattern revealed in Edwards’s writing represents a single phenomenon 
differentiated from humanism in American literature” (187). 
De Prospo’s argument represents an important corrective, but like the humanistic 
readings it criticizes it in fact removes some of the complexity from Edwards’s thought, 
sometimes quite explicitly choosing the “dualistic” interpretation at the expense of the 
humanist one deriving from Miller. For instance, “Edwards’s inability to conceive an 
identity between Creator and Creation does not blind him to the subtle resemblance 
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between them…Although he holds lesser expectations about the experience of nature 
than do romantic writers, Edwards perceives a likeness between natural beauties and 
divine excellency sufficient to inspire a religious enjoyment of the wilderness of 
eighteenth-century New England…This enjoyment is one of Edwards’s attributes that 
most intrigues modern critics. Remove Edwards’s discussion of the logic of Creation, 
remove also the many qualifications he attaches to his idea of the visibility of divine 
beauty, and the resulting text, though short, resembles romantic discourse” (175). De 
Prospo’s characterization of humanist or romantic interpretations of Edwards in this 
passage remains incisive and is well taken, but nevertheless he repeats an error similar to 
the one he identifies, and so it would seem difficult to account for the very passages that 
(though short) have seemed to so incite the imaginations of humanist readers of Edwards. 
A way forward, a kind of middle way, would seem to be available in Stephen H. 
Daniel’s The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards (1994). The book’s subtitle, “A Study in Divine 
Semiotics,” identifies the approach taken by Daniel, one of enormous and impressive 
complexity that nevertheless smuggles in the very synthesis (and thus implicit humanism) 
that De Prospo argues against, which is to say that it lapses into yet another version of the 
“face to face” encounter. Daniel’s operative distinction is that between transcendence and 
immanence, and he argues decisively for the latter: “To describe the fall into the 
mentality of classical modernity, Edwards situates talk of subjectivity and alienation in a 
discourse that is itself neither subjective nor alien, because it does not claim to be self-
validating or to refer to any transcendent principles. The immanent system of 
signification constituted by the language of God (expressed in nature and Scripture) does 
not need to refer to itself or anything beyond itself for legitimacy, for the notion of 
legitimacy is itself a feature of classical modernity describable only in terms of the divine 
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discursive exchange” (22). In this scheme there is no place for the 
transcendence/immanence distinction that would seem to be of such paramount 
importance for Calvinism because transcendence would seem to find itself dissolved into 
the immanent systems of signification. 
Daniel thus evades the distinctions that Edwards takes for granted. For Daniel, 
“Every communication assumes a relation between that which is said and that which is 
meant, between a signifier and a signified. The disposition to communicate is the 
displacement of the signified by a signifier, and thus the designation of the signified as that 
which is other. The signifier itself identifies the signified as an absence to which the 
signifier points” (127). Here Daniel supposes an immanent “system of signification” as the 
ground of this differential field of signification, in which relations achieve a kind of 
immanent self-presence that bridges the divisions between real and ideal, mind and 
matter, and, most fundamentally for this discussion, God and Creation: “the subject and 
predicate of a proposition have no meaning apart from the proposition, and the 
proposition has no meaning apart from its function in a discourse” (134). Which is to say 
that for Daniel a discourse itself functions autonomously beyond the requirements of 
difference that the terms within a discourse operate under. The laws of discourse do not 
apply to the discourse as a whole. It is in this sense that a discourse for Daniel can be said 
to be the immanent, symmetrical, and self-present guarantor of meaning.  
It is worth comparing Daniel’s divine semiotics with Gregory Bateson’s view of 
God in Steps to An Ecology of Mind, which can be said in some respects to resemble the God 
that Daniel finds in Edwards: 
The individual mind is immanent, but not only in the body. It is immanent also in 
pathways and messages outside the body; and there is a larger Mind, of which the 
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individual is only a subsystem. This larger Mind is comparable to God and is 
perhaps what some people mean by ‘God,’ but it is still immanent in the total 
inter-connected social system and planetary ecology. Freudian psychology 
expanded the concept of mind inward to include the whole communication 
system within the body—the automatic, the habitual and the vast range of 
unconscious processes. What I am saying expands mind outward. And both of 
these changes reduce the scope of the conscious self. A certain humility becomes 
appropriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being part of something bigger. A 
part - if you will - of God (467-477). 
Such sentiments about the immanence of God are impious for the Calvinist Edwards, 
which insists on the strict division between transcendence and immanence. Daniel’s 
semiotic immanence replaces the “face to face” encounters of Miller with the immanence 
of semiotic meaning. For Edwards, such encounters would seem impossible because it 
discovers God, however indirectly, in the world itself. Niklas Luhmann’s critique of 
semiotics bears on this point: “All differences are only differences between signs…A sign 
must first and foremost distinguish itself from something that cannot be distinguished: 
from emptiness, unmarked space, the white of paper, the silence that is assumed in every 
perception of sound. And this is true especially when a sign is supposed to be nothing 
more than a distinction between signifier and signified” (Observations 109). Here Luhmann 
places semiotics itself under the pressure of what he calls a recursive self-reference. 
Daniel’s semiotic understanding of Edwards’s theology, by contrast, finds a higher unity 
in immanent “discourses” or “communicative exchanges” within which the distinction 
between signifier and signified takes place. According to Luhmann, “The function of a 
sign always requires reference to something specific, while excluding self-reference. It 
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requires the assymetrization of a basal, recursive self-reference. In other words, there is 
neither a sign for the world nor a sign that indicates itself” (Social Systems 71). For the 
system of semiotics this assumed unified discourse is necessary for its continued operation. 
It cannot, however, justify that unity on its own terms. God may be the ground of a 
distinction, the immanence in which the distinction takes place, but is it not true that even 
that designation is the product of a distinction? This is the inescapable nature of self-
reference for Luhmann, and the problems addressed here will have resonance for 
Edwards. 
Luhmann’s concept of self-reference points the way to a different understanding 
of Edwards’s theology. The “absolute discontinuity” will be transformed into a self-
referential distinction, which in another manner of speaking can be seen as a one sided 
distinction, precluding any form of synthesis. The presence of the immediate or 
unmediated (or a God that cannot be mediated), the “face to face” encounter, is 
paradoxically occluded, already given over to the material or mechanical as the condition 
of its emergence, thus recasting observation as the act of distinction, a one-sided 
distinction that can only observe one side, while the other side remains unobservable. 
Describing observation as a distinction undercuts the modern humanist concept of 
observation as a representation in the mind, a move that links Edwards to contemporary 
posthumanist theory, particularly the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and Heinz von 
Foerster, and it argues that the best way to make clear sense of the strange oscillating 
dualisms in Edwards’s thought is to analyze them as self-referential distinctions. It is in 
this capacity that Edwards can be fruitfully compared with theories of self-reference, most 
specifically Luhmann’s systems theory. We can agree with Daniel when he writes, 
“Instead of being transcendent pronouncements about the relation of God and creation, 
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Edwards’s suppositions themselves enact the same logic that governs the possibility for 
any and all meaning and existence” (110), but only by insisting that this logic retains a 
kind of quasi-transcendentalism that undercuts and occludes the self-present immanence 
of meaning by understanding it as a self-referential distinction.  
 
Self-reference 
 
“God don’t fully obtain his design in any one particular state that the 
world has been in at one time, but in the various successive states that the 
world is in, in different ages, connected in a scheme. ‘Tis evident that he 
don’t fully obtain his end, his design, in any particular state that the world 
has ever been in; for if so, we would have no change. But God is 
continually causing revolutions”—Jonathan Edwards (Works 18:92)  
 
 
 
The connections between Luhmann’s thought and traditional theology are not 
difficult to find. Luhmann himself claimed, “The partner for radical constructivism is 
therefore not traditional epistemology, but traditional theology” (“Cognition” 252). This 
is so, as Luhmann points out, because traditional theology took as its aim the twin and 
contradictory duties to simultaneously represent God and to remember that God is 
unrepresentable, and was therefore in the business of continually investigating its own 
foundations. As Luhmann writes of Nicholas of Cusa’s theology, “God is beyond all 
distinctions, even beyond the distinction between distinctions, and beyond the distinction 
between distinctiness and indistinctness. He is the non-aliud, that which is not different 
from anything different. In him, everything that transcends distinctness coincides insofar 
as it transcends distinctness—i.e., that which cannot be conceived as greater, as smaller, 
as quicker, as slower (coincidentia oppositorum)… that God in this way makes himself 
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comprehensible in his incomprehensibility; and that truth, although finally 
incomprehensible, consists for human beings in the correspondence of their distinctions 
with those of things” (“Cognition” 250). Luhmann’s observations show that the goal of 
traditional theology was not so much the rational representation of God but to perceive 
God as that which cannot be perceived. Or as Luhmann cryptically puts it in a different 
context, “Reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it” (Theories 145). 
More specifically, Luhmann’s systems theory uses self-reference as a means to 
contemplate the “oneness” beyond all distinctions, beyond the world of material creation. 
As Stefan Rossbach puts it in an important essay, “It is the systems theory itself that 
evokes a consciousness of the pre-cosmic unity…any observation is a self-limitation” 
(“Gnosis” 251). Luhmann’s self-referential theory is designed to focus on its own internal 
limitations, recalling Cusa’s “learned ignorance.” The contemplation of a blind spot, 
attempting to see that one cannot see what one cannot see (ad infinitum), is in this way a 
modern form of mysticism. Luhmann writes, “Knowledge can know only itself, although 
it can—as if out of the corner of its eye—determine that this is possible only if there is 
more than mere cognition. Cognition deals with an external world that remains unknown 
and, as a result, has to come to see that it cannot see what it cannot see” (Theories 129). It 
is this hidden and un-seeable “unknown” that recalls the Gnostic beyond in Rossbach’s 
view. And for my own purposes it reveals that systems theory is the best means of 
interpreting Edwards’s own searching self-referential theories of the beyond because 
Edwards is unusually attuned to the space outside the systems of his observations. 
Edwards gropes for something approaching a vacillation, finding the wellsprings 
of God’s presence in the sensuous unmediated wholeness of a quality of feeling, but also 
carefully distinguishes sensuous qualities from the direct presence of God. Edwards seems 
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concerned, in other words, and much like Nicholas of Cusa before him, not with God’s 
immediacy or mediation but the failure of his mediation through forms. Miller writes, 
“Holding himself by brute will power within the forms of ancient Calvinism, he filled 
those forms with a new and throbbing spirit. Beneath the dogmas of the old theology he 
discovered a different cosmos from that of the seventeenth century, a dynamic world, 
filled with the presence of God, quickened with divine life, pervaded with joy and 
ecstasy.” (Errand 195). Adding to Miller’s insight I will argue that Edwards has a keen 
sense of the distorting power of perception, and thus his idea of God has much in 
common with Luhmann’s idea of reality as the foundational blind spot of any observing 
system—the quickening of divine life is not simply God but the difference made by a self-
referential distinction coping with what it cannot see. Even the forms of Calvinism, as 
Miller perceptively notes, are not sufficient to contain the idea of God, and Edwards’s 
theology presses hard at these boundaries precisely in order to indicate divinity through 
the limitation of observing forms, demonstrating in turn God’s unlimitedness. As Rossbach 
puts it, “The infinite unity of the ‘world’ reappears in the theory in the absence of limits of 
problematization” (251). 
 
The Forms of Creation 
 
“As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God—a fullness of 
every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness—
and as this fullness is capable of communication, or emanation ad extra; so 
it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that this infinite fountain of 
good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of 
light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around” 
(Works 8:432). 
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 Two very early pieces by Edwards, “Of Being” (1721) and “The Mind” (1723), 
both show that Edwards hit upon his critical ideas at a precocious age and simply 
developed them in further complexity throughout his life. In “Of Being,” Edwards is 
concerned with what might be called the problem of continuity. How is this moment in 
time connected to the moment that immediately preceded it? What is the connecting 
thread? Only God can hold things together such that they are continuous: “We fancy 
there may be figures and magnitudes, relations and properties, without anyone’s knowing 
of it. But it is our imagination hurts us. We don’t know what figures and properties are” 
(Works 6:204). Which of course raises the question, what are figures and properties if they 
are not real existing qualities of the objects we encounter? And in answer to this question 
Edwards writes a passage worth quoting at length: 
Let us suppose the world deprived of every ray of light, so that there should not be 
the least glimmering of light in the universe. Now all will own that in such a case, 
the universe would be immediately really deprived of all its colors. One part of the 
universe is no more red, or blue, or green, or yellow, or black, or white, or light, 
or dark, or transparent or opaque than another. There would be no visible 
distinction between the world and the rest of the incomprehensible void—yea, 
there would be no difference in these respects between the world and the infinite 
void. That is, any part of that void would really be as light and as dark, as white 
and as black, as red and green, as blue and as brown, as transparent and as 
opaque as any part of the universe. Or, as there would be in such case no 
difference between the world and nothing in these respects, so there would be no 
difference between one part of the world and another. All, in these respects, is 
alike confounded with and indistinguishable from infinite emptiness (Works 6:204). 
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The gambit of this essay is that here Edwards supposes a distinction as the fundamental act 
of perception. Since the universe is continuous, there are no differences but that we make 
them so. Shapes and colors and magnitudes, therefore, are not a matter of the inherent 
qualities of a substance, but exist only in the act of an interested observation. As von 
Foerster puts it, “’out there’ there is no light and no color, there are only electromagnetic 
waves; ‘out there’ there is no sound and no music, there are only periodic variations of air 
pressure” (Understanding 214), and so on. Put most succinctly, “The environment as we 
perceive it is our invention” (Understanding 212).  
Daniel links this aspect of Edwards to a lineage of medieval suppositional logic: 
“Instead of assuming that things are significant prior to their incorporation into the 
rhetoric of creation, Edwards’s supposition theory defines each thing in terms of its 
supposition of something other than itself. In literally supposing a thing we imply the 
existence of God as the other always already removed in supposing any thing” (85-86). As 
noted earlier, Daniel’s formulation here seems to suggest that God is in some sense 
synonymous with discourse itself—that the differences and suppositions which are the 
mechanics of semiotics can only have meaning when placed within a discourse called “the 
rhetoric of creation,” something one presumes is like the class of all classes. Does this 
mean that God is responsible for connecting our signs with their meanings? This gives the 
term discourse a rather weighty theological role, for it seems to escape from its own 
suppositional logic. Does it contain itself? As if in answer Daniel later writes, “To say that 
the world exists means that it points to its displacement as that which gives it meaning. 
Accordingly, God is not that which supposes or displaces the world, for that would mean 
that the world exists independently from God. Rather, God is the supposition of the 
world, the world’s having been supposed or displaced” (108). For Daniel, God is the other 
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“always already removed” (i.e., the discourse of discourses within which the play of 
differences takes place) but when one wants to suppose the world itself as a whole (“the 
world exists”) God manages to elude us like Bertrand Russell’s barber. A binary of 
God/world subordinates God to the immanence of that distinction and suggests an 
equivalence between God and creation, an obvious fallacy for Edwards. There is no 
overriding discourse for the distinction between God and world, no discourse that gives 
that distinction any meaning. 
How then to understand God? By supposing that God is the unity of the distinction 
between the world and its other. God is not the world’s other, for the world does not exist 
independently of God (as De Prospo notes, self-creation is impossible for Edwards, and 
the continuity of the world is sustained only by the will of God). Nor is the world identical 
to God (this is impious pantheism). Awkwardly stated, God is not the world, and not the 
not-world, neither here nor there. To recall Luhmman, “He is the non-aliud, that which is 
not different from anything different.” Or Miller: “Puritan thinking on the subject of the 
Deity always confronted the initial difficulty that in one sense thinking about Him was 
impossible” (New England Mind 10). Or Derrida: “God is the name of the absolute 
metonymy, what it names by displacing the names, the substitution and what substitutes 
itself in the name of this substitution” (Acts 293). God is neither in nor out of the system. 
God is the unity of the distinction world/not-world, not anything identifiable in the 
distinction, but merely the fact of re-entry which points, mystically, paradoxically, to the 
unity of the distinction. God is the unity (but not the identity) of the distinction. This is 
self-referential paradox as religious meditation. 
Self-reference removes man from his places as an objective observer (the starting 
point for modernity) and places him squarely in the thick of things as an active participant 
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in what unfolds before him. All views are partial views. For Edwards, the human mind 
has a stake in creation. In Miller’s words, Edwards “asserted the radical conception of 
man as an active, interested, passionate being, whose relation to objective realty is factual 
to the extent that he is concerned about it, whose anxieties and not his clear thinking 
make his destiny” (Jonathan Edwards 184). A fallen human being, in other words, is a part of 
the world, fully within and not above it. The only unity is a unity beyond the makings of 
any distinctions, thus out of sight, but held together as continuous by the infinite 
observing powers of God: “God is by definition a Being who perceives not separate 
entities in succession, but the totality of being in a single, eternal glace” (Jonathan Edwards 
298). With these ideas in view, Edward’s mature theology begins to take shape as a 
sophisticated elaboration of a self-referential distinction between the act of seeing and 
what is seen—the place of a fallen mortal capable only of partial observations of the 
plenitude of God and creation. Following Heinz von Foerster’s cybernetics, the observer 
and the observed are both the same, and not the same, with the perceiving act 
distinguishing itself from the perceived in a form of self-referential closure that references 
an unseen “other” as a necessary part of the observation. It is possible, through the 
vacillations of self-reference, to catch what escapes perception through an 
acknowledgement of that very exclusion. We cannot see what we cannot see, but we can 
see that we cannot see. In religious terms this is translated into the distinction between 
immanence and transcendence. As Miller writes, “Because the source of ideas is external, 
and yet every idea is a self’s manner of conceiving, there must come a time when the 
redeemed self realizes that a sensation cannot be clutched to his bosom as a private 
luxury, but belongs to a system of impressions that has a logic deeper and more beautiful 
than any incidental advantages (or disadvantages) that accrue to him” (Jonathan Edwards 
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191). Edwards most developed version of this thesis is The Nature of True Virtue, yet the 
theme persists at varying levels of importance throughout Edwards’s writing. 
Consider for instance the “new simple idea” in A Treatise Concerning Religious 
Affections (1746). As Michael J. McClymond has noted, there are two mutually exclusive 
ways to interpret the notion of spiritual perception in Religious Affections. One may either 
argue that it is “discontinuous” with material reality and thus representing a “sixth sense,” 
or one may follow Perry Miller and argue for “continuity”: “Those who make a case for 
continuity describe Edwards’s spiritual sense as the apprehension of a content that is 
already accessible and known through everyday experience….Grace is sensible, not 
supersensible…Perry Miller originated this “continuous” interpretation of the spiritual 
sense…” (197). But of course, Miller’s work has suffered criticism, particularly for his 
enthusiastic recasting of Edwards as an empirical psychologist in the Lockean mode. As 
James Hoopes puts it, Miller made “persistent attempts to make Edwards not only 
‘modern’ but also a materialist like Miller himself” (856).  
In contrast to Miller, McClymond argues, “Edwards sought duality without 
duplicity, and it is not surprising that his later readers have tended to lay hold of one or 
the other side of his formulations…He insisted on God’s immediate presence to each 
believer and on the indispensability of divine grace. Yet, simultaneously he asserted that 
the spiritual sense was a kind of evidence for God’s reality and that the perception of 
God’s beauty and truth enabled the human mind to perceive truth and beauty wherever 
it appears” (197). Again, we find something like a synthesis of contrary terms. “Spiritual 
perception,” according to McClymond, “links idea and emotion, the cognitive and the 
affective. It meshes experiential manifestation with philosophical reflection. It brings 
together God and nature” (216). This argument solves the continuity versus discontinuity 
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debate by robbing both “idea” and “emotion” of their distinct power, their difference. 
Edwards does not simply mesh the two terms together, finding one as a reflection of the 
other, but uses their attraction and repulsion to one another as a spiritual practice in 
itself, seeing the vacillation or re-entry (the process itself) of the excluded term as a 
reference to meaning or complexity, or, in Edwards’s own terminology, as a reference to 
God. The distinctions that Edwards makes are self-referential distinctions, taking on the 
character of a dialectic that refuses synthesis and persists in a kind of oscillation, an 
understanding of change or process as a continual exclusion and re-entry of one side. 
Edwards seeks unity as a spiritual practice, but only as the byproduct of the processional 
march of worldy differentiation, or, we might say, out of the corner of his eye.  
As De Prospo notes, many commentators find in the qualities of Edwards that 
suggest a spiritual search for unity also point the way towards the view of Edwards as a 
kind of Romantic. De Prospo ably dismantles this argument, but it is in fact the echoes of 
romanticism that many scholars see in Edwards that point the way towards systems 
theory. As De Propso points out, Edwards has stark differences with the idea of “self-
generation” that comes from the Romantics such as Hegel (74). Not in spite of this 
difference, but in fact because of it, is Edwards more easily connected with Luhmann’s 
systems theory.  This is because while Luhmann’s theory is perhaps easily mistaken for 
having an identity with Romantic notions of self-generation, the entire theory is in fact 
founded on a system/environment distinction. The system, then, is not the environment, it 
is defined by this distinction, a radical difference not to be overcome by naturalism or 
organicisim, and the system in fact discovers its own lack of foundation as necessary for it 
to exist at all, which is to say that the system discovers itself as fundamentally contingent 
all the way down. This is very different from a classically Romantic idea of a self-
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grounding or self-generating whole because the system must simultaneously maintain 
both contact and difference with its environment; it is not identical even to itself.  
  Luhmann suggested that Romantic movements may be seen as grappling with a 
new understanding of autonomy, which may be better understood through the formal 
self-reference of a system/environment distinction: “The generalization of the concept 
and the structural problems of observing systems has far-reaching consequences, which 
only became apparent through mathematical analyses. This detour via mathematics frees 
us at the same time from the mystifications previously attached to concepts such as 
"meaning" (Sinn) or "mind" (Geist). They enable us to see today more clearly why and how 
something like "imagination" is required and in what sense 
construction/deconstruction/reconstruction as an ongoing process, an ongoing 
displacement of distinctions (Derrida's différance), is necessary in order to dissolve 
paradoxes in and as time” (“Redescription” 514). As Luhmann writes elsewhere, “The 
closure of the self-referential order is synonymous here with the infinite openness of the world” 
(Social 62). It is not the intent to submit Edwards as a proto-systems theorist anymore than 
a proto-Romantic, but to argue that his attempt to show that the world of creation is 
necessarily indebted to a Creator, which is to say that creation is founded upon an 
exclusion which it cannot see, can be more easily understood with the help of theories 
that deal explicitly with self-reference.   
 De Prospo writes that for Edwards, “form in nature signifies a principle of order 
both superior and opposed to matter” (78). This agrees with the idea that Edwards is 
concerned for forms, an act of distinction that makes observation of the natural world (i.e., 
matter) possible by marking itself as different from what is observed. Through self-
acknowledged limitation or closure a self-referential distinction refers to the intrinsically 
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chaotic character of nature that is reducible in itself to no forms, that is so exceedingly 
complex, so infinite, that it exists on another plain entirely from the observable world of 
forms. The infinite is not simply an extrapolation or extension of finite characteristics, but 
of another quality entirely. This suggests that the infinite, God, or the environment 
(whichever term seems most apt) can be most easily described as an undecidable state of 
pure possibility, in which multiple possibilities exist at the same time; in which, for 
instance, something can be both true and false (a God that can be the slowest, the fastest, 
the biggest and smallest). This realm, however, is not observable without a cut or 
distinction, without a form to reduce the complexity of the environment, and so it is not 
available for observation but persists, out of the corner of the observer’s eye, as the 
infinite possibilities that must be occluded in order for an observation to actualize or 
determine what it is observing. As Perry Miller writes, 
God did not create the world, said Edwards, merely to exhibit His glory; he did 
not create it out of nothing simply to show that He could: He who is Himself the 
source of all being, the substance of all life, created the world out of Himself by a 
diffusion of Himself into time and space. He made the world, not by sitting 
outside and above it, by modeling it as a child models sand, but by an extension of 
Himself, by taking upon Himself the forms of stones and trees and of man. He 
created without any ulterior object in view, neither for His glory nor for His 
power, but for the pure joy of self-expression, as an artist creates beauty for the 
love of beauty. God does not need a world or the worship of man; He is perfect in 
Himself. If He bothers to create, it is out of the fullness of His own nature, the 
overflowing virtue that is in Him (Errand 194). 
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The most ingenious aspect of this idea of Creation is that it suggests that God created the 
world as a means to actualize or further determine Himself through forms. In order for 
God to actualize the overdetermined possibilities that he represents as an omnipotent 
being he must differentiate Himself in forms as a way to realize Himself. This realization 
is not a limitation, however, because it allows for things to always be otherwise in the 
future. And it is this sense that God becomes both the first and last of Creation, the first 
cause and final actualization of the universe, “continually causing revolutions.” 
 
The Nature of True Virtue 
 
“’Tis no solid objection against God’s aiming at an infinitely perfect union 
of the creature with himself, that the particular time will never come when 
it can be said, the union now is infinitely perfect” (Works 8:536). 
 
 
 
 Edwards, and Puritan thought generally, think of the universe as a cascading 
series of “frames”—each descending frame a step further from Grace: “The being of God 
is diffused throughout Creation in regular stages, or, as Edwards terms them, ‘frames’ of 
existence. These frames ascend hierarchically according to the amount of divine being 
they contain” (De Prospo 91). This informs what Edwards understands by “excellency” 
because while some idea of excellency may be perceived down here on the lower frames 
of existence, as when Edwards writes in The Mind, “All beauty consists in similarness of 
identity of relation” (Philosophy 23), true excellency is nevertheless constituted by a more 
general identity of relation, a larger framework: “As bodies are the shadows of being, so 
their proportions are shadows of proportion” (Works 6:335). And likewise, “The more the 
consent is, and the more extensive, the greater is the excellency” (Works 6:336).  
	   130	  
How then may we perceive the greatest excellency? For Edwards this is only 
accomplished by consent to “being in general,” which is the greater harmony and 
symmetry of all being. Being in general is best understood as a self-referential concept, 
one that sees the one-sidedness of any distinction, its assymetrization or what Luhmann 
refers to as a “preference for one side over the other,” as occluding the unity of that 
distinction. As Edwards writes, “One alone without any reference to any more cannot be 
excellent; for, in such case, there can be no manner of relation no way, and therefore no 
such thing as consent. Indeed, what we call ‘one’ may be excellent because of a consent of 
parts, or some consent of those in that being that are distinguished into a plurality some 
way or other. But in a being that is absolutely without any plurality there cannot be 
excellency, for there can be no such thing as consent or agreement” (Works 6:337). One 
alone has no excellency because that quality grows only with the progress of consent, the 
relation of parts to a greater and greater whole. Edwards calls this progress “virtue” or 
“love,” which successively rises up from one frame to another, toward God: “For, so far 
as a thing consents to being in general, so far it consents to Him. And the more perfect 
created spirits are, the nearer do they come to their Creator in this regard” (Works 6:337). 
 In The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards lays out a perspective on being in general 
which, in Sharon Cameron’s reading, outstrips any possibility of virtue or love for a real 
human being, or any particular thing at all:  
When Edwards defines ‘virtuous love’ as exempt from a private system, and 
defines a ‘private system,’ no matter how expansive, as anything less than what 
comprehends ‘the universality of existence’—when he insists moreover that all 
nonuniversal love ‘put in the scales with it, has no greater proportion to it’ than 
love for a single person (W 8:554)—it is safe to say that any person’s love is 
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excluded from qualifying as virtuous. Thus while Edwards deliberates the 
differences between a private system and a common morality, with its ever-
enlarging circumference, he finally lumps these together, drawing a line between 
love based on any sense of exclusion (all love had by all persons) and that 
extended without limit everywhere. The latter—specified in this treatise by 
opposition, negation, and inference—repeatedly defined as what persons cannot 
muster, constitutes the only nontrivial principle of justice (32). 
Cameron’s interpretation of The Nature of True Virtue expertly points out what is most 
remarkable about it: Edward’s definition of virtue seems to be devoid of any practical 
content. It seems to suggest that whatever one might do, towards whatever one might give 
love, no matter how wide and general a love it may be, it is not true virtue because it is 
limited or “nonuniversal.” True virtue is forever distinct from worldly virtue. “Edwards is 
not proscribing what we can do. The impediment is part of the point” (28). The point 
being, by implication, our infinite distance from divine love: “The infinite is preserved as 
an ideal not in spite of our being unable to arrive at it, but precisely because we can’t 
empirically arrive at it” (42). 
 There is perhaps another way to interpret The Nature of True Virtue as an innovative 
response to the classic part versus whole dilemma. Instead of an unimpeachable 
impediment, perhaps the difference between worldly and true virtue, between “private 
system” and “being in general,” is something like a self-referential distinction, in which 
Edwards observes the ultimate unity of a distinction as the re-entry into the form of the 
divine, and thus the inescapable incompleteness, the onesidedness of any distinction. In 
The Mind, Edwards writes, “We have said already that it is naturally agreeable to 
perceiving being that being should consent to being, and the contrary, disagreeable. If by 
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any means, therefore, a particular and restrained love overcomes this general consent, the 
foundation of that consent yet remaining in the nature exerts itself again, so that there is 
the contradiction of one consent to another” (Works 6:365). The “foundation of that 
consent” represents the self-referential nature of a distinction, the inevitable re-entry into 
the form that exerts itself again. And in contrast to Cameron this passage suggests that for 
Edwards not only is it possible to engage in true virtue as a process, it is inevitable. We 
can’t help but do it. Following from this, it is possible to see that Edwards is defining 
virtue as a process of self-referential, self-overcoming re-entry.  
 Again it is Luhmann who can help us understand the distinction Edwards makes 
between private and general systems of virtue: 
Communication systems develop a special way to deal with complexity, i.e. 
introducing a representation of the complexity of the world into systems. I call this 
representation of complexity “meaning”—avoiding all subjective, psychological or 
transcendental connotations of this term…The function of meaning is to provide 
access to all possible topics of communication. Meaning places all concrete items 
into a horizon of further possibilities and finally into the world of all possibilities. 
Whatever shows up as an actual event refers to other possibilities, to other ways of 
related actions and experience within the horizon of further possibilities. Each 
meaningful item reconstructs the world by the difference between the actual and 
the possible. Security, however, lies only in the actual. It can be increased only by 
indirection, by passing on to other meanings while retaining the possibility of 
returning to its present position. Again, a self-referential, recursive structure is 
needed to combine complexity and security (“Society” 7). 
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Luhmann describes religion as a system which takes upon itself the task of representing 
the unity of all distinctions to itself, and so it becomes a system in which the oscillations of 
self-reference are most acute. God is continually causing revolutions: “Religious forms 
incorporate, so to speak, paradoxical meanings; they differentiate religion against other 
fields of life; they involve the risk of refusal; they inaugurate deviant reproduction, i.e. 
evolution” (8). What Cameron correctly identifies in True Virtue as an impediment, what 
might be termed an uncrossable (or one-sided) boundary, can also be seen with the aid of 
Luhmann’s systems theory as a form of openness. This is, as Cary Wolfe has observed, 
the “openness from closure” principle: “the very thing that separates us from the world 
connects us to the world, and self-referential, autopoietic closure, far from indicating a kind 
of solipsistic neo-Kantian idealism, actually is generative of openness to the environment” 
(Posthumanism xxi). The impediment, in this manner, is the point.  
 The Nature of True Virtue, then, is Edwards’s most elaborate attempt to create what 
might be called an open-ended or process oriented ethics. Edwards makes a crucial 
distinction very early in True Virtue, “There is a general and particular beauty. By a 
particular beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only 
with regard to its connection with, and tendency to, some particular things within a 
limited, and as it were a private sphere. And a general beauty is that by which a thing 
appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with 
regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing to which it stands 
related” (Works 8:540). One may read this distinction as having no value for embodied 
and particular persons, but the shear impossibly of grasping what Edwards identifies as 
general beauty can be overcome when it is indentified as what Luhmann terms 
“meaning.” General beauty, then, represents the limitedness of any particular beauty, its 
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particularity or actuality, and thus acts as a reference to further, infinitely further, 
determinations of that beauty as part of a larger system of the world, “or beautiful in a 
comprehensive view” (Works 8:540). A particular object can be beautiful in itself, but only 
insofar as it references the unrepresentable whole, a crucial analogy for understanding 
what Edwards means by “true virtue,” which consists in benevolence to being in general” (Works 
8:540). He goes on, “When I say true virtue consists in love to being in general, I shall not 
be likely to be understood, that no one act of the mind or exercise of love is of the nature 
of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great system of universal existence, for 
its direct and immediate object: so that no exercise of love, or kind affection to any one 
particular being, that is but a small part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true 
virtue” (Works 8:541). Any particular act is asymmetrical or one sided, and this imbalance 
leads it inevitably towards a larger symmetry or unity.  
Edwards explicitly understands this process as circular: “If virtue consists 
primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: so that virtue 
must consist in the love of the love of virtue—and so on in infinitum. For there is no end 
of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation; it is without 
beginning, and hangs on nothing” (Works 8:541). There is no end to the circle. Edwards 
continues, “Therefore, if the essence of virtue of beauty of mind lies in love, or a 
disposition to love, it must primarily consist in something different both from complacence, 
which is a delight in beauty, and also from any benevolence that has the beauty of its 
object for its foundation. Because ‘tis absurd to say that virtue is primarily and first of all 
the consequence of itself. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itself” (Works 8:541). 
The difference that Edwards speaks of can best be understood as a self-referential distinction, 
a kind of symmetry-breaking, which references Being by marking itself out as particular, 
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private, or individual. Particular manifestations of virtue are distinguished from true 
virtue in the manner of their singularity, which references the whole through its occlusion, 
what Luhmann calls a “system-internal unity of self-reference and external reference" 
(Observations 17).  
We come back to where we started, and self-referential closure opens out on to the 
infinite possibilities of meaning, continually causing revolutions. Derrida’s words in The 
Gift of Death, a kind of cousin to The Nature of True Virtue, offer a useful comparison: “On 
what condition does goodness exist beyond all calculation? On the condition that 
goodness forget itself, that the movement be a movement of the gift that renounces itself, 
hence a movement of infinite love…I have never been and never will be up to the level of 
this infinite goodness nor up to the immensity of the gift, the frameless immensity that 
must in general define a gift as such” (51). And also: “I cannot respond to the call, the 
request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the 
other others” (68). The frameless immensity appears within the frame as a gift for Derrida, 
an asymmetrical movement toward the other that erases itself, and for Edwards this is the 
nature of the love of virtue and thus the law of spiritual growth, raising us up towards 
grace, infinitely higher. He writes, “As to that excellence that created spirits partake of, 
that it is all to be resolved into love…that to love is to fulfill the royal law; and that all the 
law is fulfilled in this one word, love” (Works 6:364). Virtue is the unity, but not the 
identity, of the distinction between private and general systems, between part and whole. 
Virtue is the law of onwardness or futurity. It is the infinite within the finite and fallen 
systems of our love. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
Neither Here Nor There: Grief and Absence in Emerson’s “Experience” 
 
 
 
“Yesterday night, at fifteen minutes after eight, my little Waldo 
ended his life.”  
         —Ralph Waldo Emerson (Journals 65) 
 
“It seems as if I ought to call upon the winds to describe my boy,  
my fast receding boy, a child of so large & generous a nature that I 
cannot paint him by specialties, as I might another.” 
 —Ralph Waldo Emerson (Journals 67) 
 
“The movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse 
projecting creations into independency and drawing them into 
harmony.” 
             —Charles S. Peirce (EP1 353) 
  
 
  
Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote “Experience” (1844) after the death of his young 
son, a major dividing point in his life, and yet the essay is notorious for the fact that 
Emerson pointedly refuses to demonstrate his grief. Tellingly, he does not even name the 
child, preferring the generalized and even impersonal “my son” instead. It would seem, 
from his words and the cursory manner in which he treats it, that the loss does not affect 
him: “In the death of my son, now more than two years ago, I seem to have lost a 
beautiful estate,--no more” (Prose 200). He does not show the total devastation one expects 
from the death of a dear child. Instead, Emerson finds himself adrift on an ocean of 
names and signifiers that do not find their marks, and the claim in Nature that “words are 
signs of natural facts” (Prose 35) can no longer be sustained. In “Experience,” Emerson is 
principally concerned with what could be called the faultiness of language, a constitutive 
inability to refer to a real and stable world (“natural facts”) beyond the words themselves. 
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This manifests itself as a preoccupation with the act of naming, or pronouncing a name as 
an act of representation.  
Not surprisingly, “Experience” is then often linked to a decisive shift away from 
the optimistic and affirmative transcendentalism of Nature (1836), in particular the idea 
that we are fundamentally at home in the world. In fact, it would seem that Emerson’s 
stance on naming does not differ in spirit from the Calvinist philosophy regarding 
representations of the natural world as well as metaphysical concepts. This applies 
especially and above all to the concept of God, as seen in the Puritan poet Edward 
Taylor’s lament: “Whether I speake, or speechless stand…/ I faile thy Glory” (qtd. in 
Bercovitch 21). Not only are these words an expression of the inadequacy of human 
language, they are also charged with the failure of an ethical duty to accurately represent 
that which is unrepresentable. Emerson’s silence can be seen to enact similar problems, 
with his prose continually hinting at what it cannot, will not, say: “An innavigable sea 
washes with silent waves between us and the things we aim at and converse with. Grief 
too will make us idealists” (Prose 199). If we cannot speak of that which is unspeakable, 
what can we say? Systems theorist Niklas Luhmann considers the problem under very 
nearly the same terms as Taylor: “The other possibility is silence—a silence that no 
longer wants to be understood as communication (but forever understood, is 
understandable only in this way). This does not only mean to opt for silence within the 
distinction between speaking and silence, but to avoid the distinction as such, so that the 
problem does not arise in the first place...But then, doesn’t one still have the problem that 
in a world in which one speaks, silence is possible only within self-drawn boundaries, i.e., 
as the production of difference?” (“Speaking and Silence” 27). Emerson’s silence would 
have it that his son is utterly lost along with the world itself, not to be recovered as known 
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even in grief. Yet, as Sharon Cameron’s influential essay on “Experience” poignantly 
demonstrates, his silence speaks despite himself. 
However, while the arguments of the present essay would not be possible without 
Cameron’s important insights in “Representing Grief,” I wish to depart slightly from her 
analysis of “Experience” in order to take Emerson more plainly at his word. Rather than 
read “Experience” as a “testament to the pervasiveness of a loss so inclusive that it is 
inseparable from experience itself,” (Cameron 57) I take Emerson’s claim that “I cannot 
get it nearer to me” (Prose 200) in reference to the loss of his son at face value. In 
retrospect, the breakthrough of Cameron’s idea is that she provides the interpreter of 
“Experience” with the ability to see Emerson’s grief everywhere at once in the text, and 
this liberates a potential for readers of “Experience” to incorporate into their 
interpretations exactly the thing that Emerson refuses to incorporate into his own essay. 
This is significant. If it is axiomatic for criticism that “every system excludes or expels 
something which does not let itself be thought within the terms of the system, and lets 
itself be fascinated, magnetized, and controlled by this excluded term, its transcendental’s 
transcendental” (Bennington 284), then what Cameron brilliantly shows is that 
“Experience” is an essay about its excluded term.  
Yet such an analysis occurs at the expense of a confrontation with the more 
radical effects of Emerson’s denial of feeling. For Cameron, the dead son is not left 
behind or forgotten, but the reverse: grief is so substantially present that it stands behind 
every word in the essay, as if every word says the child’s name, subsuming all particulars 
under a guiding, though paradoxically excluded, term. The particular experience of grief 
“migrates so that it is recognizable as the property of all experience independent of 
particularity” (xvii). Even the title of Cameron’s essay, “Representing Grief,” assumes the 
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very thing Emerson seems at pains to question. She rescues the son from the oblivion of 
death while Emerson seems only too willing to leave him there. Some of the force of 
Emerson’s meaning is thereby lost if we accept wholesale Cameron’s re-constitution of 
Emerson’s absent grief, yet at the same time an understandable and unavoidable 
melancholic longing for the dead child persists in all subsequent readings of 
“Experience.”  In contrast to Cameron, Emerson’s refusal of grief rejects any internalized 
representation of his son in favor of accepting his son, and therefore his relationship to his 
son, as external and independent from himself—such is the lesson of death. This 
interpretation reconciles Cameron’s reading, her discovery of Emerson’s grief within or 
behind his words, with the more explicit denials of grief found in the text, thus insisting 
that the excluded term remain excluded and unknown. 
Michel Serres writes that, “Knowledge as such is a space of transformation,” (73) 
and with that statement in mind, “Experience” may be approached through Charles S. 
Peirce’s concept of Thirdness or semiosis. Peirce defines concepts or ideas as signs. That 
is, they are both real, contained within no particular mind, and becoming, thus always 
related to an undetermined future being, forever playing itself out as a relationship 
between the actual and the possible. As Peirce argued, the determinate meaning of any 
concept is always what the contingencies of our experience are moving towards: “The 
rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future” (EP2 340). Floyd Merrell puts it 
most ably, “…a sign, in order to be genuine, must be known, but in order to be known, 
the knower must have some inclination in terms of what it would be for the sign to 
remain unknown. In other words to know what a sign is entails knowing at least in part 
what it is not, but might otherwise have been. Without some inkling of the unknown and 
unactualized, whatever is known at a given moment would be no more than a self-
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sufficient, unrelated whole” (29). What this means is that ideas and concepts, when seen 
as signs or Thirdness, take on a shadowy kind of character, they are neither here nor 
there. In defining truth, Peirce memorably states, “Truth is a character which attaches to 
an abstract proposition, such as a person might utter. It essentially depends upon that 
proposition’s not professing to be exactly true” (CP 5.564). This state of affairs, in which 
propositions are confronted with their own limitations, calls for an attempt to get beyond 
the traditional being/non-being binary that inhabits Western philosophy and replace it 
with a concept of contingency, what Luhmann calls “a third value of undeterminability” 
(Observations 46). What Max H. Fisch refers to as Peirce’s “triadic logic” is an attempt to 
accomplish exactly this. As Peirce puts it, “Potentiality is the absence of Determination (in 
the usual broad sense) not of a mere negative kind but a positive capacity to be Yea and 
to be Nay; not ignorance but a state of being…” (qtd. in Fisch 177).  
From these foundations, it can be seen that “Experience” demonstrates the 
passage from a representational mode of philosophy to a semiotic one. This passage is 
mediated by a mood of intense grief for an object so conspicuous in its absence that it 
overflows and surges past the representational schemes demanded by mourning, only to 
come to rest finally as something external and independent from Emerson himself, 
forever outside his ideas of it. The idealism of a “glass prison” which permeates the 
opening pages of “Experience” gives way not to a strict classical realism but a semiotic 
understanding of the world as independent and undetermined, a realm of potential 
awaiting determination which is itself always limited and partial. Grief may make us 
idealists, but Emerson’s refusal of modern grieving practices leads us to semiotics. 
In order to make this argument I will expand upon Cameron’s breakthrough 
essay on “Experience” by introducing a Derridean reading of the term “experience” as 
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aporia, thus connecting “Experience” to a notion of the liminal, or that which exists 
between. I will also understand Emerson’s suspicion of representation following the death 
of his son to be the result of his Calvinist inheritance of a suspicion of mourning, a 
discouragement of representation or naming of the dead. In order to make this 
connection I will compare Emerson’s text to the captivity narrative of Mary Rowlandson, 
a powerful Puritan text of grief and homelessness, and in particular Mitchell Breitwieser’s 
provocative reading of it. Finally, with the framework made available by the introduction 
of the Calvinist material, I will argue that Emerson is ultimately reconciled to the loss of 
his son through an understanding of his son as a relation or sign in the Peircean sense, 
that is, both present and absent, neither mind-dependent nor mind-independent. This is 
somewhat like what Stanley Cavell observes in his essay on “Experience” as “an 
acceptance of separateness” (132) except that the separateness is itself a necessary 
condition for any attachment at all. Emerson’s loving achievement is to deny the 
introjection required by mourning (which would constitute a solipsistic idealism in regard 
to the dead) and eventually to allow his son to exist entirely separate from himself.  
This strategy of reading “Experience” involves a kind of ventriloquism, a strategy 
of putting names into Emerson’s mouth to substitute for the name he will not speak 
himself. In place of the proper name which is withheld there is offered a series of 
necessarily inadequate substitutions, in particular Nietszche, Freud, Derrida, Cameron, 
Rowlandson, and Peirce. Of course, these proper names bring along a context of 
associations and presuppositions that are less important for themselves than for their 
eventual displacement and substitution. In reading “Experience” this way, by mimicking 
Emerson’s relentless substitutions of the “Lords of Life,” it is hoped that the effect 
achieved will help to clarify the argument. Following the course of these names we will 
	   142	  
find ourselves first on one side (an internalization of the lost object) and then on the other 
(an absolute rejection of internalization) in order to better grasp the middle ground 
pursued in “Experience.” This is a strategy that admits the necessity of binaries while at 
the same time using them to indicate what the law of the excluded middle leaves out, 
namely the exclusion itself. As Emerson writes, a final mysterious proclamation in an 
essay full of them, “the true romance which the world exists to realize, will be the 
transformation of genius into practical power” (Prose 213). This is best understood as a 
conviction that the relationship between our words and concepts with the world itself is 
adequate, if only eventually. 
 
Experience as Aporia 
 
“You have no idea what you are experiencing; you run through life as if you were 
drunk and once in a while fall down a staircase. But thanks to your drunkenness, 
you don’t break your limbs in the process; your muscles are too slack and your 
head too dull for you to find the stones of these stairs as hard as the rest of us do! 
For us, life is a greater danger: we are made of glass – woe unto us if we bump 
against something! And everything is lost if we fall!” 
     —Nietzsche (132) 
 
 
What is most vivid about this passage is the comic notion of life as falling down 
stairs, an image that forcefully suggests the treacherous danger of the ground beneath our 
feet. Very early in “Experience” there is a similar idea: “We wake and find ourselves on a 
stair; there are stairs below us, which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, 
many a one, which go upward and out of sight” (Prose 198). A staircase evokes 
homelessness or tension because it represents a space without foundations. Staircases are 
liminal spaces, always between, areas of transition in which rest or stasis is impossible. 
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They are relational, as a line may be diagonal only in comparison to the straight or 
horizontal. They are temporary, as a staircase only begins on one level ground and ends 
on another, suspended in mid-air just as the staircase suspends, or places in suspense, 
those that traverse it. 
 Nietzsche’s passage characteristically casts metaphysical confusion in terms of 
physical pain. Emerson, also characteristically, doesn’t seem to recognize the threat of 
falling at all, and focuses instead on the dreamlike feeling that accompanies confusion: 
“All things swim and glitter. Our life is not so much threatened as our perception” (Prose 
198). Indeed, Emerson seems to see the human condition as permanently drunk: “But the 
Genius which, according to the old belief, stands at the door by which we enter, and gives 
us the lethe to drink, that we may tell no tales, mixed the cup too strongly, and we cannot 
shake off the lethargy now at noonday” (Prose 198). The lethe (notably in Greek the 
opposite of aletheia or “to uncover”) casts a shroud over all perception yet it also inebriates 
to the point that no pain is felt as we bump along our way. For Nietzsche, it is our sober 
commitment to truth that threatens our bones and our life, but Emerson’s target in 
“Experience” is not so much the problem of truth but the threat of an enervating 
skepticism. Nietzsche’s passage questions how one is to survive and navigate the 
staircases, the abyssal transitional moments between the level grounds of decision and 
action. For Emerson, the task is to cope with a permanent lack of foundation, on an 
infinite staircase with no level ground in sight. 
 Indulge me in imagining that Emerson sits dejected and sleepy on the staircase 
while Nietzsche wonders at his drunken imperviousness, his seeming invincibility, while 
passing by. Nietzsche’s plurality of levels and truths belies Emerson’s infinite transitional 
staircase. There is, however, a condition that provides for the possibility of inhabiting the 
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staircase as Emerson claims to, a state that presents the individual with the paradoxical 
situation of being between (or liminal) indefinitely. It is what Freud identifies as 
melancholia, a state closely connected to mourning. In melancholia, Freud writes, we find 
“profoundly painful dejection, abrogation of interest in the outside world, loss of capacity 
to love, inhibition of all activity” (Prose 165)—all due to an inability to detach oneself from 
a lost object. With the melancholia that occurs in mourning, the loss of a loved one 
especially, we find a “loss of a capacity to adopt any new object of love, which would 
mean a replacing of the one mourned, the same turning from every active effort that is 
not connected with thoughts of the dead” (Prose 165). The melancholic individual cannot 
yet return to the world because the lost object persists as a kind of gap that cannot be 
papered over and therefore cannot ever be fully represented: “the patient cannot readily 
perceive what it is that he has lost” (Prose 166).  
The proper course of mourning entails a finality and consummation to the project 
that finally lets go of the lost object by the accomplishment of introjection, the complete 
integration of a representation into the self. The subject may let go by taking only that 
part of the object that is known and finding the correct representation to take possession of. 
However, it is easy to imagine the loss of a young child, a being of limitless potential, as a 
loss especially difficult to mourn due to an inability to define or delimit just what was lost 
in all its future possibilities. Melancholic mourning, in contrast to successfully completed 
mourning, leads the subject to constitute the lost object as still somehow half-present, as 
conspicuous in its absence. In this case, mourning cannot be completed because there is 
no possibility for an adequate representation of the lost object, no correct name. As 
Cameron writes, “Emerson preserves the sanctity of his feeling, preserves by keeping 
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hidden or unconscious (that is, dissociated) his sorrow for the child, as if hidden the feeling 
escapes the words that debase it” (61).  
 Yet Cameron’s reading of “Experience,” while sensitive and nuanced, seems to 
me to make too strong a claim when she writes that the “…concerns in ‘Experience’ are 
all governed by Emerson’s relation to the dead child.” She claims that “Experience” is an 
elegy: “a powerful and systematic representation of grief” (56). Cameron argues that grief 
for the child is present and behind every word in the essay, and she reconciles this with 
Emerson’s explicit silence on the matter through the realm of the hidden or secret. Both 
the dead son and Emerson’s grief are present in the essay but hidden away in a secret 
place. This is a major breakthrough for understanding a notoriously difficult text, but I 
think it goes too far partly because it gives the lost object an unearned position of extreme 
prominence (though hidden, grief seems to be the main focus of “Experience” for 
Cameron) and most of all because it supposes that some form of adequate representation 
must be taking place. In fact, Emerson’s silence suggests that his grief for his son is 
definitely not in the essay but external to it—this is something other than a representation. 
 The most explicit philosophical theme of “Experience” is what Emerson calls “the 
secret of illusoriness” which derives from “the necessity of a succession of moods or 
objects.” Emerson also uses the vivid metaphor of a “glass prison” to describe a condition 
which brings a “vague guess at new fact” but “is nowise to be trusted as the lasting 
relation between that intellect and that thing” (Prose 202). He writes, “Dream delivers us 
to dream, and there is no end to illusion. Life is a train of moods like a string of beads, 
and, as we pass through them, they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the 
world their own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus. From the mountain you 
see the mountain” (Prose 200). Which is to say that from any particular mood or 
	   146	  
perspective one may only see what that mood or perspective reveals. The boundaries 
between these points of observation are uncrossable yet visible; they are, to borrow from 
Jacques Derrida, aporias. An aporia is not so much the space outside a particular 
perspective (how would one know it is there?) but instead the inside mark of the boundary 
of that perspective’s limit—an indication of the outside space. Derrida asks, “Can one 
speak—and if so, in what sense—of an experience of the aporia? An experience of the aporia as 
such? Or vice versa: Is an experience possible that would not be an experience of the 
aporia?” (Aporias 15) His questions are about the possibility of limit experiences, about the 
potential for crossing over the spaces between: “What would such an experience be? The word 
[experience] also means passage, traversal, endurance, and rite of passage, but can there 
be a traversal without line and without indivisible border?” (Aporias 15) Experience, in 
Derrida’s reading, names the act of traversing the aporia, or confronting the limit of a 
mood’s revealing powers, or holding still where one should not hold still, like a staircase: 
It had to be a matter of the nonpassage, or rather from the experience of the 
nonpassage, the experience of what happens and is fascinating in this nonpassage, 
paralyzing us in this separation in a way that is not necessarily negative: before a 
door, a threshold, a border, a line, or simply the edge or approach as such. It 
should be a matter of what, in sum, appears to block our way or to separate us in 
the very place where it would no longer be possible to constitute a problem, a project, or a 
projection, that is, at the point where the very project or the problematic task 
becomes impossible and where we are exposed, absolutely without protection, 
without problem, and without prosthesis, without possible substitution, singularity 
exposed in our absolute and absolutely naked uniqueness, that is to say, disarmed, 
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delivered to the other, incapable even of sheltering ourselves behind what could 
still protect the interiority of a secret (Aporias 12). 
The aporia exposes our absolute “singularity” which, in the terminology of Being and Time, 
is the anticipation of death. Derrida suggests an expansion of that idea: “If death names 
the very irreplacability of absolute singularity (no one can die in my place or in the place 
of the other), then all the examples in the world can precisely illustrate this singularity. 
Everyone’s death, the death of all those who can say ‘my death,’ is irreplaceable” (Aporias 
22). Emerson seemingly denies this very quality to his dead son, now no more than a lost 
“estate,--no more” (Prose 200). These seem to be callous words precisely because they 
deny Emerson’s unnamed son his singularity, his ability to say “my death.” Instead, it 
would seem Emerson is quite willing to usher his son, and his possession of whatever his 
son was, into a system of economic exchange where death is simply seen as a 
“bankruptcy”—a move which renders the child entirely replaceable, exactly the paradox 
which Derrida points to: every death is equally irreplaceable, and so any particular death 
is only as unique as every other. What is interesting about this strategy is that while it 
resists a modern approach to mourning—which creates the paradox Derrida describes—
it also closely resembles a particularly radical strain of early modernist thought: 
Calvinism, most pertinently the early American Puritans.  
 In this way, Emerson’s lack of grief reflects the social taboo on excessive mourning 
or grief in Puritan culture. Of course, Emerson never became a Calvinist after 
abandoning Unitarianism, but “Experience” shows a turning in his thought, even if it 
were only relegated to a few sentences: “It is very unhappy, but too late to be helped, the 
discovery that we have made, that we exist. That discovery is called the Fall of Man” 
(Prose 209). I take these words to be an admission that Emerson now accepts at least a 
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notion of original sin, even if only in the sense of an unbridgeable separation of man and 
nature. He writes, “I know that the world I converse with in the city and in the farms, is 
not the world I think. I observe that difference and shall observe it. One day, I shall know 
the value and law of this discrepance” (Prose 212). The question of how one can observe a 
difference (the different itself?) brings us once again to the brink of an aporia. What else is 
the sign of the discrepancy but the limit hinting at what is unrepresentable? Most of all, 
these declarations show Emerson abandoning any notion of adequate representation and 
replacing it with difference. 
 Despite Emerson’s Unitarian past, critics often cite him as an example (usually 
along with Melville) as a thinker who attempts to represent in his writing the chaotic God 
of Calvinism. Perry Miller’s influential work on Puritanism provides an ideal departure, 
then, for discovering the Puritan elements in Emerson’s suppression of mourning. As 
Miller sums up the Puritan intellectual experience in “The Marrow of Puritan Divinity”: 
Here, then, was the task which seventeenth-century Calvinists faced: the task of 
bringing God to time and to reason, of justifying His ways to man in conceptions 
meaningful to the intellect, of caging and confining the transcendent Force, the 
inexpressible and unfathomable Being, by the laws of ethics, and of doing this 
somehow without losing the sense of the hidden God, without reducing the 
Divinity to a mechanism, without depriving Him of unpredictability, absolute 
power, fearfulness, and mystery. In the final analysis this task came down to 
ascertaining the reliability of human reason and the trustworthiness of human 
experience as measurements of the divine character—in short, to the problem of 
human comprehension of this mysterious thing which we today call the universe 
(Errand 56). 
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This description of the task of Calvinism obviously shares much with the descriptions of 
“Experience” offered above. But perhaps what’s most important in this passage is the 
notion that the Puritans attempted to stay loyal to a God that surpasses human 
understanding. Human rationality can make some sense of the world, but for the Puritan 
there is always a “left over” that makes itself felt somehow. The task of Calvinism, if we 
follow Miller, was to mark the discrepancy between the world as it is and the world as we 
think it; our observations are all incomplete, and necessarily so in our sinfulness. The flaw 
in our perception, to use Emerson’s term, is reflected in our mortality, in death, the 
ultimate presence of sin according to Gordon Geddes: “In their experience of death, the 
Puritans found themselves face to face with the original curse” (155). 
 Beyond philosophical affinities, Emerson’s debt to Puritanism is most clear in his 
denial or suppression of mourning. As Ronald Bosco points out in the introduction to a 
volume of New England funeral sermons, “Owing partially to the sheer presence of death 
in the New England landscape, the Puritan was not much moved or struck by death as a 
fact. Confirming him in what may seem to twentieth-century readers to be an excessively 
cold or casual attitude toward death was the instruction in the ways of death that he 
received from the pulpit. Except to acknowledge the passing of New England’s most 
illustrious men…the Puritan ministry positively discouraged, and during the 1640s and 
1650s civil law forbade, public notice of death in any significant way” (ix). In addition, 
there was a “prohibition against speaking the name of the dead by others outside the 
family during the period of mourning” (Geddes 165). According to Bosco, the typical 
Puritan funeral went like this: “A person died, was wrapped in whatever goods might be 
available for that purpose, was carried away by a few relatives or friends, and was buried 
without ceremony in a shallow and often unmarked grave” (x). To do much more was 
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seen as blasphemous and a “misapplication of emotion” (x). In practical terms, these 
practices were in place to keep people working, since to fall into prolonged periods of grief 
would render one unable to work and so threaten the survival of the community. The 
conditions of survival, the harsh violence and natural hardships of the strange 
environment that the typical Puritan had to contend with made them acutely aware of 
the tenuousness of any intimate relationship. Furthermore, the emphasis on the survival 
of the community (the “shining city on a hill”) at the expense of any particular individual 
coupled with the overall denigration of all things “worldly” pointed out quite forcefully 
the irrelevance of any one death within the larger scheme. As Geddes and Bosco both 
repeatedly point out, to grieve too much, or too emphatically, was to publicly question 
God’s plan. 
 In Welcome Joy, Geddes writes, “In mourning, as in other areas of Puritan life, the 
goal was not repression but control, or, as they termed it, moderation…the goal of 
mourning was triumphant affirmation of God’s will, but the path began with the harsh 
reality of death as an evil” (156). Grief and mourning, to the extent that they overstep the 
bounds of moderation set by Puritan society, must be suppressed, and pushed 
underground to a private realm of sinfulness. Public rites of mourning gave little thought 
for the individual who died: “The major themes explored in these expressions of public 
mourning focused on either the blessedness to be enjoyed by saints after death or on the 
lesson that death should hold for the living” (162). There was no remembrance for the 
names of the dead. According to Mitchell Breitwieser, the Puritan approach to these 
matters was 
…In large measure an attempt to sublimate mourning, to block and then redirect 
its vigor to various social purposes: to sublimate something, one must start by 
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encouraging it to be, to consolidate its vigor, before appropriating it; but such 
cultivation risks the possibility that the sublimated thing might remain in itself, 
rather than accept transference to the proffered sublimatory surrogate; and, in the 
case of mourning, such a failure of sublimation would be antithetical to the 
ideology that seeks to appropriate it, because mourning is a project of constructing 
a personally sufficient memory of what has died, and thus tends to show a certain 
stubbornness when required to view the dead and the death clear specimens of a 
general moral type (9). 
What this suggests is that the “sublimatory surrogate” is subject to a potential for failure, 
an inability to contain or constrain its object. On this reading, Emerson’s denial of grief 
for his son, along with the refusal to name his son (and that the son is so quickly passed 
over and seemingly forgotten), is paradoxically evidence of encouragement and 
appropriation in Breitwieser’s sense. On this reading, Emerson’s unnamed son, as Stanley 
Cavell summarizes Sharon Cameron, is “not forgotten but generates the ensuing topics of 
the essay, which is thus a testament to his consuming loss” (Transcendental 116). Emerson’s 
suppression of grief would then become the force that propels “Experience” into 
existence.  
As we’ve seen, for modern psychoanalysis the goal of mourning is an introjection 
of the lost object. For Calvinism, by contrast, the goal was detachment from worldly 
things in favor of a biblical typology—a rejection of the temptations of a private 
internalized subject in favor of the shared meaning of the community. The difference is 
between a thoroughly modern idealism—which removes the world but in return provides 
the relatively stability and knowledge of one’s own mind—and a pre-modern suspicion of 
subjectivity as the seat of sin. The Puritan, on the precipice of modernity, is faced with the 
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emergence of the modern subject on the one hand, and on the other with the terrors of 
an outside world symbolically represented by the chaotic wilderness of a new uncivilized 
continent. There is literally nowhere to turn to beyond God’s grace. The individual 
Puritan was placed in a situation that encouraged and appropriated the emergence of the 
modern subject but at the same time attempted to harness and control that emergence for 
the greater community—exactly as Miller’s quotation above points out. “Experience,” 
however, embraces the Puritan suspicion of mourning without recourse to the dualisms of 
Calvinism as documented by Breitwieser, Miler, and scholars such as Sacvan Bercovitch. 
Emerson does not achieve a modern psychoanalytic catharsis as per Cameron, nor does 
he surrender himself to skepticism. What Emerson achieves, then, is a middle way. 
Perhaps the best way to make sense of this is by comparing “Experience” to an early 
American text that deals powerfully, if also indirectly, with mourning: Mary 
Rowlandson’s captivity narrative. 
In 1676, Rowlandson was taken captive by the Pocasset Indians during King 
Philip’s War, in the process losing several family members, including a six-year-old 
daughter named Sarah who is never actually named in the narrative itself. Rowlandson’s 
account of these events helped establish the genre of the American captivity narrative as 
studied so famously by Richard Slotkin, among many others. A standard interpretation of 
Rowlandson’s narrative might see it as a typically pious and homiletic Puritan text written 
under the strict direction of Puritan minister Cotton Mather. However, Breitwieser’s 
American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning seeks to reinterpret Rowlandson’s narrative as 
“among the more intense and unremitting representations of experience as a collision 
between cultural ideology and the real in American literature before Melville” (4).  
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Breitwieser argues that Rowlandson’s grief for her recently deceased daughter 
disrupts the Puritan typology she has been instructed to apply to her experience. The 
singularity of what she mourns places itself outside all systems of meaning available to 
her. This situation not only isolates and individuates Rowlandson, it also allows her to 
encounter the possibility of a space outside traditional typologies, especially in her 
encounters with Indians. Mourning unfixes the structures of Rowlandson’s perception and 
allows her to experience the Indian as a true human other “at the margin of perception” 
(132). It creates for her not a new system of meaning, but a limit or boundary (an aporia) 
for the meanings she attempts to apply to her experience. It foregrounds the lost object, 
which then becomes the unthought or unseen of every system of meaning. Strangely, this 
quality of mourning arises mostly because of the Puritan injunction against it; it is already 
“outside” any accepted code of right behavior, and thus, when it arises of its own accord, 
it bears witness to that outside. Again, the aim of the Puritans was not to eliminate 
mourning but to control it, to erect a boundary not to be crossed. The inevitable outcome 
of this strategy is that mourning will bring into view the boundary and therefore indicate 
an outside, thereafter identified with sin and death. Breitwieser writes, “With the 
assistance of narratives such as Rowlandson’s, Puritanism could once again govern by 
virtue of explanatory cogency, the entire range of human experience: nothing was outside 
of it; there was nothing that happened that was not a clear example” (8). None of this is 
possible, of course, if there is not that which can be targeted as something that is not an 
example, something clearly anomalous which can then be assimilated and brought into 
the fold of Puritan typology. “For the Puritan’s themselves, there was an other-to-the-type 
that, though it could be labeled sin or error, was nonetheless a real factor in signification, 
and had considerable force” (24). In other words, Puritan hermeneutics was the 
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systematic detection and elimination of singularity, but with the existence of such 
singularities (objects outside systematized meaning) being a necessary part of the typology. 
For there to be an “inside” there must be an “outside”—and from the inside the border is 
always visible. 
 What then of the ultimate singularity? “Death, then, is to be a lesson in the 
protocols of perception: it teaches that the gross is really a shadow, that the lost object is 
not in itself of note, an embodiment of value, but rather an accommodation (commodity) 
of a transcendental value, a luminescence, certainly, to the rude mind, but, from the 
highest perspective, a color laid over truth” (22). This is the ultimate task of Puritan 
hermeneutics, and Emerson’s essay as well. How does one take the death of the other, the 
ultimate singularity, and bring it into the fold of generalized, systematized, and iterable 
meaning? This is the heart of Rowlandson’s narrative purpose as well as the aporetic limit 
upon which Puritanism defines its boundaries. As Rowlandson writes near the end of her 
story, by way of conclusion: “Our family being now gathered together (those of us that 
were living)…” (Vaughn & Clark 74). The clause divides itself in two, one part typical of 
the redemptive typology she assigns to her narrative, the other tellingly a parenthetical 
(and so outside the official meaning), indicating what is left out or passed over. It does not, 
however, name what is left out; it uses the incompleteness of what’s included to indicate its 
own limits. 
 As Breitwieser interprets the Puritan diagnosis of human suffering: “we are 
afflicted by loving too much” (117). The only recourse in such a state of affairs is to deny 
love in order to prevent or forestall mourning. This is, in philosophical terms, a form of 
skepticism: “Skepticism, were it within range, would sacrifice happiness to gain freedom 
from fright—a bargain, it seems to a still grieving self, because the better part of 
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happiness lies back in the past anyway” (186). If, as Stanley Cavell has argued, 
“Experience” is an encounter with skeptical idealism in the Kantian tradition, then the 
bargain of skepticism would be what Emerson makes in “Experience.” Even more 
extremely, the impossibility of mourning, of remembering a singularity, would be what 
Emerson expresses, the fact that the death of his son brings home—since there is no such 
possible attachment the pain that skepticism protects one from is impossible anyway. 
Emerson cannot protect himself from the loss of his son without losing the world his son 
was a part of as well. “Experience” would then simply be a testament to the absolute 
distance of the world, where even grief is out of reach—a testament that serves to 
reinforce both modern idealism and the terrors of skepticism.  
But such a conclusion is exactly what “Experience” resists. Despite the 
overwhelming pressures of grief (“Grief too will make us idealists”), Emerson’s project, 
especially in the latter portions of the essay, is to deny idealism while acknowledging the 
distance between thought and reality. What is the measure of the discrepancy that 
Emerson speaks of? It can be expressed theoretically through Peirce’s triadic 
understanding of semiotics and its suggestion of a universe of relations that are neither 
mind-independent nor mind-dependent, but of a potential or contingent character, a 
Thirdness, or “in futuro.” Peirce writes,  
If you ask what mode of being is supposed to belong to an idea that is in no mind, 
the reply will come that undoubtedly the idea must be embodied (or ensouled; it is 
all one) in order to attain complete being, and that if, at any moment, it should 
happen that an idea,--say that of physical decency,--was quite unconcieved by any 
living being, then its mode of being (supposing that it was not altogether dead) 
would consist precisely in this, namely, that it was about to receive embodiment 
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(or ensoulment) and to work in the world. This would be a mere potential being, a 
being in futuro; but it would not be the utter nothingness which would befall matter 
(or spirit) if it were to be deprived of the governance of ideas, and thus were to 
have no regularity in its action, so that throughout no fraction of a second could it 
steadily act in any general way. For matter would thus not only not actually exist; 
but it would not have even a potential existence; since potentiality is an affair of 
ideas. It would be just downright Nothing (EP2 123). 
This suggests that the faultiness of a representation is a reflection of the fact that as an 
idea or concept it is a sign that stands for something other than itself and so its constitutive 
inadequacy is merely its defacement of itself for that which it is pointing to, and most 
importantly this process only leads, as Peirce often points out, to another sign. Thus our 
thinking takes on a developmental character, a kind of forward momentum: “So, then, 
the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It 
always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.” (EP2 225). In Emerson’s words, “This 
onward trick of nature is too strong for us” (Prose 202). 
Peirce famously wrote, “all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs,” (CP 5.448n) and this is perhaps most poetically reflected 
by the sliding, swimming, glittering words of Emerson’s prose in the opening pages of 
“Experience.” In perhaps the most quoted passage of the essay, Emerson vividly depicts a 
world of shifting appearances: “I take this evanescence and lubricity of all objects, which 
lets them slip through our fingers then when we clutch hardest, to be the most 
unhandsome part of our condition” (Prose 200). In the closing pages, however, a different 
tone is struck. Names fail, our words recede from the objects they point too, and in this 
process it can feel as if our handle on the solid, real, and graspable world is precarious or 
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even non-existent. But, if we are careful to pay attention, we find ourselves not isolated in 
innavigable seas, but interminable oceans of signification. Where words do not necessarily 
find their homes, but continually fall away from what they signify to reveal the universe.  
When contemporary semiotician John Deely writes, “…at the heart of semiotics is 
the realization that the whole of human experience, without exception, is an interpretive 
structure mediated and sustained by signs” (Basics 5) it helps to clarify the nature of the 
prose in “Experience.” Signs slip and slide around, meaning is elusive, but things happen. 
Our connection to the world is real, but not in the sense of grasping or holding something 
outside. We do not hold an adequate picture of the world in our mind, and for his part 
Emerson peers into the gap between representations and reality: “We do not see directly, 
but mediately…” (Prose 209). Only when we fail to note that ideas and concepts deface 
themselves in service of what they point to do we fall prey to idealism. Signs continually 
lead us back to the world (of signs).  
It is the sense of the sign as existing not beyond but in an aporetic sense between 
dyadic categories—neitheir ideal nor real, neither being nor non-being—that best 
describes the role of Emerson’s son in “Experience.” Emerson’s loss does not touch him 
because his idea of himself as a father is not intrinsic to his being. Indeed, if it were then 
Emerson’s self identity would be in question once this critical notion of being a father is 
removed. One might assume that if the child can die and the man still stands, then the 
child was an inessential part of the man, or “caducous” as Emerson puts it. And while 
Emerson affirms this interpretation at points, it comes across as the vestigial remnants of 
the individualism of essays like “Self-Reliance.” The death of the child serves as a 
challenge to his earlier philosophy. The question at issue is, as John Deely writes in a 
different context, “When a child dies, in what sense is the child’s parent a parent?” (Basics 
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36) In what sense are our relationships and connections to the world real if they are only 
transient? If one subscribes to a traditional view of subject and object (wherein a subject 
represents an object to itself), the only response to death is skepticism and idealism. But 
“Experience” eventually shows a transition from representationalism to Peirce’s triadic 
semiotics enacted in Emerson’s wrestling with the paradoxes of idealism. How can the 
world be in my head, and yet my head be in the world? As Emerson writes: “What help 
from thought? Life is not dialectics. We, I think, in these times, have had lessons enough 
of the futility of criticism…Intellectual tasting of life will not supersede muscular 
activity…Do not craze yourself with thinking, but go about your business anywhere. Life 
is not intellectual or critical, but sturdy” (Prose 203). The mystery continuously marveled 
at in “Experience” is the difference between the encroaching threat of idealism and the 
“sturdy” reality that seems to happen anyway. The final pages of “Experience” best 
demonstrate Emerson’s burgeoning semiotics, despite his more explicit claims to idealism 
or even solipsism: “Thus inevitably does the universe wear our color, and every object fall 
successively into the subject itself” (Prose 210). In contrast, Emerson states, “So it is with 
us, now skeptical, or without unity, because immersed in forms and effects all seeming to 
be of equal value, and now religious, whilst in the reception of spiritual law” (Prose 207). 
This vacillation that we suffer contains the pain and grief of our losses as well as the joy of 
our attachments—all transient, passing, between.  
Emerson’s refusal to grieve sets him apart even from Rowlandson. Her inability to 
openly grieve forces mourning underground, to a private place that represents the 
necessary aporia or paradox in Puritan thought—it creates a boundary with two sides, a 
dualism between private and public, man and God, and finally between ourselves and the 
world. Emerson, on the other hand, complicates these dualisms by choosing not to grieve 
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in order to preserve the singular memory of his son without representation—a present 
absence: “We must hold hard to this poverty, however scandalous,” (Prose 211) as he 
reminds us near the end of the essay. More clearly he writes, “Skepticisms are not 
gratuitous or lawless, but are limitations of the affirmative statement, and the new 
philosophy must take them in, and make affirmations outside of them, just as much as it 
must include the oldest beliefs” (Prose 209). 
If we see that Emerson states as early as Nature: “I am nothing; I see all,” (Prose 29) 
or in Circles: “I am God in Nature, I am a weed by the wall,” (Prose 176) we can already 
see him attempting to reconcile the paradoxes of idealism, the sense of all the world 
falling into the subject, yet the persistence of a sturdy reality despite that. The vacillation 
of power and powerlessness, of sight and blindness: “To-day, I am full of thoughts…but 
yesterday, I saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in which I now see so much” (Prose 176). 
In “The Poet,” he writes, “For poetry was all written before time was, and whenever we 
are so finely organized that we can penetrate into that region where the air is music, we 
hear those primal warblings, and attempt to write them down, but we lose ever and anon 
a word, or a verse, and substitute something of our own, and thus miswrite the poem” 
(Prose 185). Such sentiments express the distorting power of expression, in which every 
statement somehow “miswrites” the perfect original. In “Experience” the generative 
power of these paradoxes begins to present itself: only by observing our separateness 
(“discrepancy”) from Nature is a union with it possible. Only through a miswriting is any 
writing possible. The problem of “Experience” is not the absolute distance of the world, 
but the fact that it is sometimes near and sometimes far. That which is nearest and 
dearest to us, that which seems to be most irreducibly present, can fall away.  
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The essay itself is constructed to mirror this back-and-forth vacillation. It is a 
series of affirmations buried in negations and vice versa, with the disillusionment of the 
opening paragraphs giving way to an expectantly victorious embrace of the universe in 
the conclusion. The professions of his son’s abstractness in the early parts of “Experience” 
only serve to suggest his singularity as a shadow which trails the rest of the essay. 
Likewise, the affirmations that appear throughout the essay are haunted by their 
negation. For is not the lost object the generative condition of affirmations? Why else is 
there a need for affirmation unless something required affirming—as if it cannot stand on 
its own? And does not affirming “new creation” merely repeat the act of mourning by 
inscribing in each new creation what is lost, the originary “defeat”? Surely to designate it 
as “new” includes knowledge of what is now “old,” what is lost, left behind, yet not 
forgotten? All new philosophies “must include the oldest beliefs”, even if barely 
acknowledged. Emerson finds that “An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between 
us and the things we aim at and converse with,” but is not the infinite waters between the 
self and the other what makes the cherishing love of something beyond the self possible? 
If it were not so, Emerson would merely love his idea of his son, and not his son. And so 
love is imbued with loss and distance. It does not bind, but pushes and pulls.  
He can appropriate his son as an idea in his head, belonging alone to him and to 
perish when he perishes, or he can cast his son into an outside world which cannot ever 
be known or touched. He chooses a middle way: somewhere between, liminal, as on a 
staircase. To what extent is the parent of a dead child still a parent? Deely writes, “If the 
child dies, the physical relation between them ceases, but it remains that the erstwhile 
parents must be thought of as having been the parent of that child if the parent is to be 
understood according to the full extent of its intelligible being” (Basics 41). Who is made to 
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think about it, beyond Emerson himself? As stated above, a melancholic longing for the 
dead son persists in all readings of “Experience”—a loss is felt, and thought about, a sign 
carries an inexhaustible well of potentiality forward into the future, inhabitant of no 
particular mind. It is no secret grief that we feel at Emerson’s loss, it is more without us 
than within. “Experience,” and this is to the credit of her achievement, then becomes 
exactly the memorial Cameron proclaims it to be, but only to the extent that the reader 
connects the dots, and observes what remains outside the text. Emerson’s relation to his 
dead son survives even his own death by his refusal of introjection and representation—
and thus the relation, and the child it points to, is continuously affirmed and 
acknowledged in his absence as the absence that makes presence possible. 
Throughout the pages of “Experience” Emerson repeatedly comes back to the 
always inadequate task of naming: “In our more correct writing, we give to this 
generalization the name of Being, and thereby confess that we have arrived as far as we 
can go. Suffice it for the joy of the universe, that we have not arrived at a wall, but at 
interminable oceans” (Prose 208). This is not containment, but expansion. The 
innavigable sea has become interminable oceans, bursting out from inside itself, 
metamorphosing of its own accord from melancholy disillusionment to joyful hope, and 
back again, inevitably. An ocean of unsteady signs. And: “Illusion, Temperament, 
Succession, Surface, Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness,--these are the threads on the loom 
of time, these are the lords of life. I dare not assume to give their order, but I name them 
as I find them in my way” (Prose 212). And finally, “Fortune, Minerva, Muse, Holy 
Ghost,--these are quaint names, too narrow to cover this unbounded substance. The 
baffled intellect must still kneel before this cause, which refuses to be named, --ineffable 
cause, which every fine genius has essayed to represent by some emphatic symbol, as, 
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Thales by water, Anaximenes by air, Anaxagoras by thought, Zoroaster by fire, Jesus and 
the moderns by love: and the metaphor of each has become a national religion” (Prose 
208).  
If not one of these names, this obsession with naming, ever suffices, then perhaps 
the only name that matters, that which finally identifies what is lost—the “ineffable 
cause,” pure potential, pure absence—is that name which for the sake of a grief stricken 
love is never spoken and always withheld, always deferred as the displacement at the 
heart of signification. It is worth comparing Emerson’s words to Derrida, yet again: 
“There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being” (Margins 27). But 
eventually, as our names tend to under and overshoot their targets, there is finally 
recognition in the action of a kind of exclusion of the middle; there is recognition by 
displacement or substitution, surely the only kind of recognition that is adequate solely by 
admitting its inadequacy or failure. Then onward, “Onward and onward!” (Prose 209)—
with the next name, the next substitution, toward the name that cannot yet be said. As 
Derrida puts it in The Gift of Death, the deferral of a sign—that a sign forgets itself, erases 
itself at the same time that it gives itself—all this takes on the character of an Abrahamic 
sacrifice: “God decides to give back, to give back life, to give back the beloved son, once he 
is assured that a gift outside of any economy, the gift of death—and of the death of that 
which is priceless—has been accomplished without any hope of exchange, reward, 
circulation, or communication” (96). That is why Emerson can say in another essay, 
“With thought, with the ideal, is immortal hilarity, the rose of joy. Round it all the Muses 
sing. But grief cleaves to names, and persons, and the partial interests of to-day and 
yesterday” (Essays 328). It is in this context that Emerson’s closing sentence finally begins 
to resonate: “Never mind the ridicule, never mind the defeat: up again, old heart! -- it 
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seems to say, -- there is victory yet for all justice; and the true romance which the world 
exists to realize, will be the transformation of genius into practical power.” (Prose 213). 
And this statement resonates in turn with Peirce, using words that may console a grieving 
heart: “Thus, whether you accept the opinion or not, you must see that it is a perfectly 
Intelligible opinion that ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the 
contrary have a power of finding or creating their vehicles, and having found them, of 
conferring upon them the ability to transform the face of the earth…They have life, 
generative life” (EP2 123). 
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Chapter Five 
 
 
Every Language is Foreign: Self & Cybernetics in Peircean Semiosis 
 
 
“What distinguishes a man from a word? There is a distinction 
doubtless…Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the 
man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can 
think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn 
round and say: ‘You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and 
then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your 
thought.’ In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each 
other, each increase of a man’s information involves and is involved by, a 
corresponding increase of a word’s information.” 
—Charles S. Peirce (EP1 54).  
 
“One of the most extreme and most lamentable of my incapacities is my 
incapacity for linguistic expression…I have suffered grievously from it 
since childhood; and I cannot tell you how assiduously I have laboured to 
overcome it. I myself am conscious of the badness of my style, although I 
am probably not fully conscious of it. I can imagine one of my readers 
saying to another ‘Why can he not express himself naturally?’ I can supply 
the answer to that. It is because no linguistic expression is natural to him. 
He never thinks in words, but always in some kind of diagrams. He is 
always struggling with a foreign language; for him, every language is 
foreign.” 
—Charles S. Peirce (MS 632, 5-7; qtd in Freadman 252). 
 
 
If we take him at his word, Peirce evidently felt he lacked natural expression, a 
phrase immediately legible to his contemporaries as belonging to a metaphysical 
convention that identifies the subject with voice, that the power of having a self is the 
power of language. Jacques Derrida’s description of this tradition is most appropriate: 
“Natural writing is immediately united to the voice and to breath….There is therefore a 
good and a bad writing: the good and natural is the divine inscription in the heart and the 
soul; the perverse and artful is technique, exiled in the exteriority of the body” 
(Grammatology 17). This includes the idea that one may simply access the power of 
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expression as the consequence of having a self at all, as when one stands awkwardly on a 
dance floor and is told to “just feel it.” Peirce’s incapacity to dance the dance of language 
points then to a more fundamental incapacity of selfhood, one that surfaces again and 
again in his writing, not least in his frequent bracing pronouncements that the self is 
merely a “negation”—of no substance or value in itself but only as the other to the 
iterative formation of habits he called Thirdness: “The individual man, since his separate 
existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from 
his fellow, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation” (EP1 55). When 
Peirce looks inside himself he doesn’t find his voice, the presence of his true inner self, but 
the mechanizations of diagrams, one might say the blueprint of a machine rather than the 
evidence of a soul. Even in a moving admission of his own perceived shortcomings, a 
confession that cannot help but carry the weight of the tragedy of Peirce’s entire life and 
the unending series of missed opportunities and unfulfilled potential that mark his 
philosophy as a magnificent edifice in perpetual disarray, as if it were being built and torn 
down all at once—as I becomes He, the lament becomes the symptom, and Peirce 
manages to lose himself, to lose his self. He never thinks in words.  
Even as generous and patient a benefactor as William James would fault Peirce for 
his impersonal style of expression, and it is no wonder that an author endowed with the 
very gift that Peirce lacked would, in his exasperation for Peirce’s (lack of) style, ask Peirce 
to express himself naturally, without technical baggage: “Your intensely mathematical 
mind keeps my non-mathematical one at a distance” (Reasoning 12). Intending to steer 
Peirce towards a style that would be more conducive to having and keeping a broad 
popular audience, and thus provide him with the stable employment that eluded him for 
most of his life, James often encouraged Peirce to avoid logic and mathematics, the two 
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subjects Peirce considered himself most engaged in. Told by James that he is “teeming 
with ideas” (Reasoning 25), Peirce’s characteristically testy response is most telling: “My 
philosophy, however, is not an ‘idea’ with which I ‘brim over’; it is a serious research to 
which there is no royal road” (Reasoning 26).  It is possible to see in this exchange a conflict 
about what and where ideas are, seemingly a topic that the two fathers of pragmatism 
could be expected to agree upon. The difference is important: why is the supreme source 
of power and vitality for James seen by Peirce as a “negation?” James writes in The 
Principles of Psychology, “It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought or this 
thought or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned….On these terms the 
personal self rather than the thought might be treated as the immediate datum in 
psychology” (qtd. in Colapietro 63). A Peircean response would surely resemble the 
following: "Few things are more completely hidden from my observation than those 
hypothetical elements of thought which the psychologist finds reason to pronounce 
'immediate' in his sense" (CP 8.144). Peirce is not able to own his thoughts, they are 
foreign at the moment of inception, given over to the iterative cycles of semiosis. He 
rejects the personal self of James, and suggests instead a distinction between a thought as 
the possession of a self and “research” as the investigation of some outside, some kind of 
externality. Peirce’s research represents the “bad” kind of writing because it does not issue 
forth from the heart and soul, but in the exteriority of the body, in the interaction of a 
tool or instrument with its object. 
It is especially interesting that Peirce imagines the call to language as the call of 
the other to express or account for himself, even inhabiting the voice of that other in 
order to diagnose his own failures. As Derrida writes, “The beginning word is 
understood, in the intimacy of self-presence, as the voice of the other and as 
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commandment” (Grammatology 17). Not only that, for Peirce the call to language is seen as 
an incapacity of selfhood before the law. In “What Pragmatism Is” Peirce asserts than “a 
person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that 
is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time” (EP2 338). 
Peirce does not state that the individual is this flow of consciousness or internal 
conversation, but quite clearly that the individual is nothing, error or falsity if perceived. 
The self, in this scheme, is called to being by the other, by the other others in the form of 
a community (even if it be a community of selves) or commandment in the paradoxical 
movement of a negation:  
When we come to study the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid 
and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear that 
individualism and falsity are one and the same. Meantime, we know that man is 
not whole as long as he is single, that he is essentially a possible member of society. 
Especially, one man’s experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what 
others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not “my” experience, but “our” 
experience that has to be thought of; and this “us” has indefinite possibilities (CP 
5.402 n2). 
Called to being through a call to language, perhaps even by language itself as the other, a 
commandment to respond and account for oneself, the individual only finds himself 
paradoxically through an incapacity of selfhood. He is a negation if alone, but does this 
not imply that the other cannot be an individual either? This would fully overturn the 
American tradition of what Perry Miller called a desire to confront divinity “face to face,” 
and connects Peirce with an alternative posthumanist tradition epitomized by Emerson’s 
notion of the “impersonal.” Wouldn’t this facelessness of the other in the form of 
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language or community need to be more, or less, than human? As Derrida puts it, “Must 
not this place of the Other be ahuman? If this is indeed the case, then the ahuman or at 
least the figure of some—in a word—divinanimality, even if it were to be felt through the 
human, would be the quasi-transcendental referent, the excluded, foreclosed, disavowed, 
tamed, and sacrificed foundation of what it founds, namely, the symbolic order, the 
human order, law and justice” (Animal 132). If already we have seen that sacrifice take the 
figurative form of a son (as for Emerson), or true virtue as the foundation of any actual 
virtue (as for Jonathan Edwards), then for Peirce it would seem to be the self and voice 
that is sacrificed. Could a fundamental incapacity or negation even precede the self it is 
supposed to express? It is worth quoting Derrida at length on the metaphysical tradition 
of selfhood:  
This presence to oneself, this self of the presence to itself, this universal and 
singular “I” that is the condition for the response and thus for the responsibility of 
the subject—whether theoretical, practical, ethical, juridical, or political—is a 
power, a faculty that Kant is prudent or bold enough not to identify with the power 
to speak, the literal power of uttering “I.” This personal subject is capable of its 
selfness, is capable of doing it without saying it, if I can say so; it can affirm itself in 
its selfness and in its dignity, which is to say its responsibility, its power to respond, to 
answer for itself, before others and before the law, “even when he cannot yet say 
‘I’” He has this “I” in his thinking, and that defines thinking itself as what gathers 
itself, there where it remains the same, gathered and present to itself through this 
power of the I, through the I can of this I, this I can I as an “I think” that 
accompanies every representation. Even where the ipseity of the I cannot speak 
itself and utter itself as such in the world je, Ich, I, ego, it effects itself in every 
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language, provided it is human…Every human language has at its disposal this 
self “as such,” even if the word for it is lacking (Animal 93). 
For Peirce this faculty is absent—it is an incapacity that reveals itself in and through the 
call to the impersonal machinery of language, the division of a self at the very heart of 
itself. In the place of this faculty or power is what Derrida terms a non-power or 
“nonresponse, a language that doesn’t respond because it is fixed or stuck in the 
mechanicity of its programming, and finally lack, defect, deficit, or deprivation” (Animal 
87). Why don’t you express yourself naturally? Peirce cannot respond, and his lack of 
“natural expression” represents for his imagined interlocutors an incapacity of what 
Derrida calls a “Here I am” that presents itself as responsible, “… ‘Here I am’ as 
responsibility implies this self-presentation, this autotelic, autodeictic, autobiographical 
movement, exposing oneself before the law; and second, because ‘Here I am’ as 
responsibility implies the possibility of ‘responding,’ of answering for oneself in the 
response to the appeal or command of the other” (Animal 111). Peirce finds that he cannot 
respond, at least not naturally, because his thought remains within the mechanicity of 
what he terms diagrams, and so he is keenly aware, then, of what Derrida refers to as “the 
question of how an iterability that is essential to every response, and to the ideality of 
every response, can and cannot fail to introduce nonresponse, automatic reaction, 
mechanical reaction into the most alive, most ‘authentic,’ and most responsible response” 
(Animal 112). In the Derridean formulation of this problem every response depends 
paradoxically upon nonresponse, the capacity for response entails as well a fundamental 
incapacity. For Peirce, the condition of language would seem to be that all language is 
foreign, which is to say that all language betrays the ideal of natural expression, for 
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language itself is a communicative realm that must exclude the natural expression of 
consciousness it is usually considered to represent.  
For Peirce there is no “natural expression” free from language as a technical 
instrument, no word or communicable intent not “perfused with signs.” If natural 
expression evokes a purity of intent, and subjects itself to repetition in order to function as a 
sign at all (a claim common to both Peirce and Derrida), and thus its seeming purity is a 
condition of the impurity of a copy or citation, then Derrida’s classic analysis of the effects 
of a signature bears on this point: “But the condition of possibility of those effects is 
simultaneously, once again, the condition of their impossibility, of the impossibility of 
their rigorous purity. In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must have a 
repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and 
singular intention of its production. It is its sameness which, by corrupting its identity and 
its singularity, divides its seal” (Limited 20). All language, all communicational forms, 
operate by means of iterability: “the possibility of disengagement and citational graft 
which belongs to the structure of every mark, spoken or written, and which constitutes 
every mark in writing before and outside of every horizon of semio-linguistic 
communication” (Limited 12). Even, it follows quite obviously, the citation of an “I” or 
voice: “Nothing is in fact more irreducibly singular than ‘I,’ and yet nothing is more 
universal, anonymous, and substitutable” (Without125). Every language is foreign, and the 
capacity of expression is a fundamental incapacity to express the very thing it purports to 
express. As David Wills puts it in Prosthesis, “Language inaugurates a structure of the 
prosthetic when the first word projects itself from the body into materiality, or vice versa; 
by being always already translation, constituting itself as otherness, articulation of the 
othernesses that constitute it, language as prosthesis” (300). 
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In a very important late essay titled “Typewriter Ribbon,” Derrida circles around 
a number of themes that helpfully summarize the very same issues that I will explore 
concerning Peirce. In particular, it is the thought of what Derrida referred to in Of 
Grammatology as “a double movement of protention and retention” (84) that is 
characteristic of the cybernetic machine, what Peirce might call the circular movements 
of independency and harmony. This can also be seen, in the terms used so far in this 
essay, as the simultaneous capacities for selfhood and language as an incapacity, that the 
leap into communication implies a certain foreclosure or sacrifice of the possibility of 
expression. This requires a certain kind of paradoxical logic that resists Hegelian 
synthesis, that resists moreover any identity whatsoever. A logic of the machine that refuses 
the static binary logic of reductionism: 
One of our greatest difficulties, then, would be to reconcile with the machine a 
thinking of the event, that is, a thinking of what remains real, undeniable, 
inscribed, singular, of an always essentially traumatic type, even when it is a happy 
event: an event is always traumatic, its singularity interrupts an order and rips 
apart, like every decision worthy of the name, the normal fabric of temporality or 
history. How, then, is one to reconcile, on the one hand, a thinking of the event, 
which I propose withdrawing, despite the apparent paradox, from an ontology or 
a metaphysics of presence (it would be a matter of thinking an event that is 
undeniable but without pure presence), and, on the other hand, a certain concept of 
machineness? The latter would imply at least the following predicates: a certain 
materiality, which is not necessarily a corporeality, a certain technicity, 
programming, repetition or iterability, a cutting off from or independence from 
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any living subject—the psychological, sociological, transcendental, or even human 
subject, and so forth (Without 136). 
Derrida here outlines the scope of the logic being sought, one that does not in Hegelian 
fashion repossess or recontain the excluded foundation that makes it possible, but 
sacrifices or forecloses that possibility continually. This thought of the joining of event and 
machine leads us to a consideration of the cybernetic machine, a field of study now 
gathered under the name of systems theory.  
Cary Wolfe expertly links Derrida’s deconstruction to the innovations of Niklas 
Luhmann: “Luhmann’s handling of systems theory accomplishes just the sort of 
‘conservation’ of the logic of the grammé that Derrida calls for, a conservation that is 
crucial to any posthumanism whatsoever” (Posthumanism 8). In particular, Wolfe identifies 
as one of the most salient convergences of deconstruction and systems theory a 
“disarticulation of consciousness and communication” (Posthumanism 20). In essence, the 
metaphysical construct of the human or subject is excluded from the act of 
communication. Semiosis, on this condition, can then be seen as the general mode of 
inquiry that Peirce outlined, and as such no longer requires a subject. But despite the 
abandonment of a humanist subject, Peirce’s project is in many respects different from 
Derrida’s in ways that should not be overlooked or elided, particularly Peirce’s attempt to 
recoup or consolidate the proliferation of semiosis he so presciently described (see Uwe 
Wirth on this difference with Derrida), but I will argue that in this particular case Peirce 
pursues a logic of the event-machine of semiosis through the foreclosure (“negation”) of 
the event of individuality for the machine of communication, what Anne Freadman refers 
to as “the machinery of talk.” Peirce’s semiotics, in this manner, describes in some 
respects the rudimentary characteristics of the cybernetic machine.  
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In Two Places at Once 
 
Peter Skagestad’s article “Peirce’s Inkstand as an External Embodiment of Mind” 
(1999) offers a reading of Peirce that attempts to account for the material embodiment of 
thought. Skagestad opens with the following suggestive passage from Peirce: “A 
psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alienum puto) and then, when I 
find I cannot express myself, he says, ‘You see, your faculty of language was localized in 
that lobe.’ No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been 
able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not 
come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my inkstand. It is 
localization in a sense in which a thing may be in two places at once” (CP 7.366). Peirce 
again addresses an incapacity for expression, but this time he attributes it to the lack of an 
effective technical means for communicating. He seems to suggest that mental processes 
cannot be expressed, even to himself, unless embodied or actualized through a material 
form that can work in the world. At the same time he mocks the idea that the faculty of 
language is confined or localized in the brain alone. A brain and inkstand are both 
assigned similar roles as determinative factors of expression. As Skagestad remarks: 
One thing Peirce is doing in the passage quoted is, of course, to ridicule the idea 
that the faculty of discussion, or any other mental faculty, is localized in the brain 
or anywhere else. (The context makes it clear, by the way, that it is not just the 
idea that the faculty is localized in a particular lobe that is being dismissed, but 
rather the idea that it is localized in the brain at all.) He is not saying, nor does he 
mean, that the faculty of discussion is localized in the inkstand…. We might now 
be tempted to dismiss the reference to the inkstand as only a joke: localization in 
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the sense in which a thing can be in two places at once is, of course, the same 
thing as no localization at all. So, it might be argued, what Peirce is doing is using 
the very ludicrousness of the idea of the mind being localized in an inkstand as a 
way of highlighting the equal ludicrousness of supposing the mind to be localized 
in the brain, or anywhere else (553). 
As Peirce says elsewhere, “the idea must be embodied (or ensouled; it is all one) in order 
to attain complete being” (EP2 123). The point here can be most simply stated by arguing 
that Peirce is proposing a distinction between states of feeling (inner states of consciousness) 
and rational thought or communication (even an “inner conversation”) as requiring 
embodiment (not necessarily material embodiment) in language or something like it. Even 
inner thoughts are subject to mechanization insofar as they can be communicated either 
to oneself or another. As quoted above: “thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that 
is, is saying to that other self that is just coming into life in the flow of time. When one 
reasons, it is that critical self that one is trying to persuade, and all thought whatsoever is a 
sign, and is mostly of the nature of language” (EP2 228). Following a similar line of 
argument, Skagestad goes on to say, “Peirce never denied the existence of consciousness, 
and he did not deny that we may have introspective knowledge of our conscious mental 
states, but he simply did not regard cognition as consisting of such conscious states. 
Cognition consists in the manipulation of signs which may be externally embodied; as 
each sign is what it is by virtue of its possible later interpretations - i.e. virtually - so the 
mind itself is virtual” (554). At this point one is tempted to attribute to Peirce a kind of 
mental externalism, that thought is indeed to be found in the machines of its production 
and archivization. Skagestad writes, “In Peirce's view you do not find the mind inside the 
brain, any more than you find electricity inside copper wires - an analogy explicitly cited 
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by Peirce. You find the mind where there are inkstands or other means of expressing 
thoughts, paper or other vehicles for preserving and conveying thoughts, and of course 
brains capable, through the intermediary of eyes and hands or the equivalent, of 
interacting with external tools and media” (553). The mind is in two places at once, then, 
in the sense in which it the production of an interaction between a possible thought and 
its material embodiment. “To conclude, in Peirce's view, to be a reasoner is to be a user 
of machines, be they soft machinery, like alphabets, numerals, logical notations, and 
typefaces, or hard machinery, like logic machines, alembics, cucurbits, and inkstands” 
(559).  
While remarkably insightful, Skagestad’s interpretation leaves some lingering 
questions because the means (or perhaps the mechanization) of expressing thoughts seems 
to be left untheorized. How do inkstands and logical notations express thoughts? Like a 
copper wire conducting electricity? Indeed, though Skagestad rightly claims that Peirce 
does not deny the existence of conscious mental states, he does, as quoted above, deny 
knowledge of what is “immediate,” pronouncing these senses to be “hidden” (CP 8.144). 
Skagestad, it seems to me, imports a representationalism into Peirce’s thought by 
suggesting that we are “users of machines” and so implies that our relationship to these 
machines is one of a transparent means of expressing thought, that we express thought 
through machines. In a similar discussion of Daniel Dennett’s theories of consciousness and 
language as prosthesis, Cary Wolfe writes, “The problem is that it is not clear how such 
prosthetic processes and devices can be said to constitute—to ‘store, process, and re-
present’ (in Dennett’s words)—‘our’ thinking. After all, if we pay attention to the material, 
social, technical, and cultural complexities of such devices, then in what sense can the 
internal psychic states Dennett calls ‘our thinking’ be said to be ‘re-presented’ by such 
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devices?” (Posthumanism 36). This suggests that Dennett, and I wish to argue by extension 
Skagestad, “uses a fundamentally representationalist concept of language that reinstalls 
the disembodied Cartesian subject at the very heart of his supposedly embodied, 
materialist functionalism” (Posthumanism 36). When Skagestad claims that one only finds 
the mind in its technical or mechanical expression, one is tempted to reply that, rather, 
one doesn’t find it, the mind being neither here nor there. It’s always in the place you don’t 
look. As in a passage from Peirce quoted by Skagestad: “What I say is that the mind is 
virtual, not in a series of moments, not capable of existing except in a space of time - 
nothing in so far as it is at any one moment” (CP 8.248, emphasis added). Nothing because 
the mind at any one moment, any particular state of consciousness, is foreclosed, 
excluded, or sacrificed to the machine at the moment of communication. In Derridean 
terms: “The originary and pre- or meta-phonetic writing that I am attempting to conceive 
of here leads to nothing less than an ‘overtaking’ of speech by the machine” (Grammatology 
79). What this will mean is that speech, voice, or mind is captive to a fundamental incapacity 
of expression: minds cannot communicate. 
 
Bees and Crystals 
 
“I should like to write a little book on ‘the conduct of Thoughts’ in which 
the introductory chapter should introduce the reader to my existential 
graphs, which would then be used throughout as the apparent subject, the 
parable or metaphor, in terms of which everything would be said,—which 
would be far more scientific than dragging in the ‘mind’ all the time, in 
German fashion, when the mind and psychology has no more to do with 
the substance of the book than if I were to discourse of the ingredients of 
the ink I use.” 
         —Charles S. Peirce (Semiotics and Significs 195, qtd. in Freadman 218). 
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 Given these themes, it is not surprising that no less than Jürgen Habermas has 
accused Peirce of wanting to “conceptualize the interpretation of signs abstractly, 
detached from the model of linguistic communication between a speaker and a hearer, 
detached even from the basis of the human brain. Today this makes us think of the 
operations of artificial intelligence, or of the mode of functioning of the genetic code; 
Peirce had crystals and the work of bees in mind” (243). Habermas refers to the following 
passage: “Thought [i.e., the development of signs] is not necessarily connected with a 
brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical 
world” (CP 4.551). For Habermas, Peirce abandons the “philosophy of consciousness” in 
favor of a cosmology of the sign able to “encompass nature and not just our interpretation 
of nature. Only then would the topos of the ‘book of nature’ shed its metaphorical 
character, and every natural phenomenon would be transformed—if not into a letter, 
than at least into a sign that determines the series of its interpretants….This semeiotic 
idealism requires, of course, a naturalization of semeiosis. The price Peirce had to pay for 
this is the anonymization and depersonalization of the mind in which signs call forth their 
interpretants” (261). Habermas charges Peirce with the failure to have a real theory of 
communication because he pointedly neglects to theorize the moment of one mind 
meeting another, one might say he avoids theorizing a “face to face” encounter: “[Peirce] 
neglected that moment of Secondness that we encounter in communication as 
contradiction and difference, as the other individual’s ‘mind of his own’” (264). Instead, 
Peirce reverses the situation by positing that the “other” is simply the development of the 
sign itself (the “other” in this sense is an internal product of the sign’s reference) and so 
the mind is absorbed into the sign: “What remains after this abstraction are currents of 
depersonalized sequences of signs, in which every sign refers as the interpreter to the 
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previous sign, and refers as the interpretandum to the following sign. To be sure, these 
linkages are established only through the mediation of a mind in which signs are able to 
call forth interpretations: ‘intelligent consciousness must enter into the series’ (CP 2.303). 
Still, this mind remains anonymous, because it consists of nothing other than that three-
placed relation of representation in general, it is absorbed by the structure of the sign” 
(246). 
 Habermas remains intent on avoiding what he calls the anonymization of the 
interpreter because otherwise we are led to a conception of communication in which 
“universalization asserts itself, only from one side: communication is not for the sake of 
reaching initial understanding between ego and alter-ego about something in the world; 
rather, interpretation exists only for the sake of the representation and the ever more 
comprehensive representation of reality” (263). What Habermas objects to, it seems, is the 
seemingly independent development of this third between ego and alter-ego apart from 
any particular consciousness. Likewise, in reference to Peirce’s famous idea of an infinite 
series of interpretants, Habermas writes, “Yet, such an infinite regress would come about 
only if the process of interpretation were to circle from within itself, as it were, without 
continual stimulation from outside, and without discursive processing” (259). In both 
cases Habermas is exactly right, without being right that they are problems. Habermas 
takes the flaw of Peirce’s semiotics, implicit in his failure to theorize communication 
between minds, to be what can be called the internal development of a sign, the fact that it 
fails to ground an “intersubjective relationship that requires [Ego and alter-ego] to orient 
themselves toward each other as first person is oriented toward second person. That 
means, however, that each must distinguish himself from the other in the first-person 
plural from others as third persons” (264). Again, Habermas posits a “face to face” 
	   179	  
encounter as the ground of communication that still requires what Derrida has referred to 
as “voice” or “natural writing”—the “other” must present itself in “the first person.”  
Habermas’s implicit defense of a kind of humanism in communication theory 
makes itself explicit in his description of Peirce’s “naturalization” of communication 
processes: “by being absorbed into an all-encompassing nexus of communication, the 
conversation among humans loses just what is specific to it” (262). If there is nothing 
specific to the conversation among humans then the basis of an intersubjective theory of 
communication loses its bearing because it would then be forced to universalize 
intersubjectivity, and then one is left in the strange position of positing intersubjective 
communications in the natural world, of depersonalized objects or animals encountering 
each other in the “first person.” But it is hard to see how attributing specificity to human 
conversation then avoids what Habermas calls “the philosophy of consciousness” and 
“the epistemic self-relation of the representing subject” (249). As Klaus Oehler succinctly 
puts it, “[Habermas] makes intentionality depend on consciousness and reason, and 
divorces it radically from physical processes. This dualism of mind and nature is not 
merely foreign to Peirce’s thought. Peirce opposed it. He would charge Habermas with 
Cartesianism, and it is difficult to see how Habermas can survive this criticism” (270). 
Despite this, Habermas’s criticisms, particulary the charge that Peirce’s semiotics can only 
develop within or on one side are remarkably enlightening because they in fact point to the 
principle virtue of Peirce’s idea of communication: that the mind, the “first-person” or 
“Here I am,” is foreclosed or excluded from the communicative act itself. The mind and 
the communicative event are not in a relationship of transmission, representation, or 
expression, but they are in fact closed off from one another entirely, and this difference is 
what allows the communicative act and the mind to exist as separate in the first place.  
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A different, though also informative, reading of Peirce is that of Vincent 
Colapietro in Peirce’s Approach to the Self. But Colapietro still manages to import the ghost of 
Cartesianism into Peirce’s thought by supposing that a certain idea of subjectivity 
(however denuded) is not excluded from a truly universal, general, or formal theory of 
signs: “We cannot fully understand any of these fundamental dimensions of human 
subjectivity apart from an elaborate theory of semiotic processes. However, is the reverse 
true? Can we understand the nature of varieties of semiosis apart from any consideration 
of the subject?” (42). For Colapietro, the answer is a definite “no” because the subject is 
produced through semiosis as the subject of an address: “the self is alternately a speaker 
and a listener, a source from whom discourse flows and a being to whom discourse is 
addressed. The self might also be a topic of conversation, someone about whom something 
is said. Moreover, the self as speaker is never simply a speaker; in any utterance the self 
makes, there are echoes of the discourses of others. The self as speaker is someone through 
whom others speak….The subject is, among other things, a medium through which forces 
and persons other than the subject speak” (38). The subject is determined or actualized 
through an effect of semiosis, a mode of address, localization, and even embodiment:  
“The organism is the means through which the self is able to address and be addressed by 
some other” (58). The subject, in this account, seems to occupy much the same role as an 
inkstand as discussed above. Doesn’t this then mean that the self as usually understood 
isn’t able to be addressed? Colapietro advances the notion of the self as a kind of 
performative, that the self is produced through semiotic activity as the object or agent of an 
address, that the self is essentially this power or capacity for addressing and being 
addressed. To recall Derrida: “Its ink or power would here be the ‘I,’ not necessarily the 
power to say ‘I’ but the ipseity of being able to be or able to do ‘I,’ even before any 
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autoreferential utterance in a language” (Animal 92). Which is to say that this able to do is 
also in fact a not able (it is both) because the subject can only be observed or investigated as 
an originary cleft or breach. The subject is already that through which an other speaks, the 
other that calls the subject to language, that I which through its (non-)response, through 
its (in)ability to respond, its (in)capacity for language, always become a He. If Peirce 
defines the self as a “possible member of society” then that self only becomes actualized or 
determined through a community, through paradoxically effacing itself as an individual. 
Along these same lines, Colapietro also points out that Peirce connects the notion 
of self to the power of self-control. Interestingly, Colapietro’s take on the Peircean notion 
of self-control leads to an apparent paradox: “If the self can only realize itself through its 
commitments to ideals and if the commitment to ever higher ideals necessarily requires 
ever greater surrenders of the self, then the true self can emerge only when the futile ego 
dissolves” (96). This is power as non-power, despite Colapietro’s attempts to reconcile it to a 
more traditional ontological notion of the subject: “The human self is an organically 
embodied center of purpose and power” (92). Peirce’s power, though, is thoroughly 
impersonal: “not the sham power of brute force….but the creative power of 
reasonableness, which subdues all other powers, and rules over them with its sceptre, 
knowledge, and its globe, love” (CP 5.520). As Colapietro points out, “The ideal of 
reasonableness requires a radical openness to what may confront the individual, either in 
the guise of another person or of an inner thought, as utterly foreign: ‘The idea of other, 
of not, becomes a very pivot of thought’ (CP 1.324)” (93). To be radically open to the 
utterly foreign, though, undermines the subject as the seat of power and agency, and thus 
power in turn represents a kind of surrender to power, as well as a surrender to the law in 
direct opposition to a Kantian notion of giving oneself the law.  
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How, then, can the subject or mind be reconceived from the point of view of 
Peircean semiotics? Colapietro quotes an intriguing passage from the unpublished 
manuscripts: “a mind may, with advantage, be roughly defined as a sign-creator in connection 
with a reaction-machine” (qtd. in Colapietro 89). Could it be that thinking the mind, subject, 
or self entails thinking together the event and the machine? Thinking them at once as an 
originary breach or cleft, as a unity but not an identity? Colapietro writes, “However, it is 
one one thing to say that a general and formal theory of signs does not necessarily take into 
account the subject of semiosis, and it is quite another to assert that such a theory of signs 
cannot in principle investigate the subject. It is as though the investigator of semiotic 
phenomena has a form of the Midas touch in which everything touched turns to—signs, 
the object of the mind’s desire. And, in becoming a sign, it ceases to be what it was prior 
to the glance of the semiotician” (44). Colapietro’s complaint is well founded as the actual 
truth of the situation because the becoming sign of the subject, the observational moment at 
which the subject, as Peirce might put it, stands for something to some other, abandons or 
sacrifices the subject to the mechanization of language or of any general semiosis. People 
become like bees and crystals, even to themselves. 
 
A Blueprint of the Cybernetic Machine 
 
To come back to our original question: how do we begin thinking the event and 
the machine at once? What is the blueprint of an event-machine? Colapietro notes a 
fascinating essay from 1966 by Larry Holmes on Peirce’s idea of self-control. Holmes 
divests it of any need for a philosophy of the subject: “we can take self-control to mean 
not the control of a self (substantively), but simply auto-control, the control from within of 
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whatever kind of organism the human being is found to be” (121). The principle 
breakthrough of Holmes’s essay is to make explicit the connection between the Peircean 
account of inquiry and the self-control of reasoning with an account of feedback 
mechanisms as described in cybernetics: “In cybernetic terminology, there is a corrective 
feedback, which tends, as the action is considered and repeated, to reduce the oscillations 
- one's violent wayward impulses - and to bring the action closer to the ideal. There is also 
a similar process with respect to norms or ideals, until a stable one emerges; although 
Peirce appears to hold that in the overall development of reason no norm is entirely 
stable, which indeed seems consistent with an evolutionary pragmatism applied to a 
developing organism. As Norbert Wiener writes, ‘The stable state of a living organism is 
to be dead’”  (118). Indeed, Peirce often pronounces the ultimate end of semiosis, the 
stable reference of a sign, to be a “dead” sign. And Peirce often explicitly described his 
own theory of inquiry as a quest for stability within vacillating limits: “if experience in 
general is to fluctuate irregularly to and fro, in a manner to deprive the ratio sought of all 
definite value, we shall be able to find out approximately within what limits its fluctuates” 
(EP1 201).  
On this account there is no need for a subject of semiosis since it describes the 
automatic functioning of a machine. There is no reflexive “self” because there is “no 
commitment about anything there at which the reflexive is aimed” (121). Holmes points 
to the following passage from the unpublished manuscripts as particularly suggestive for 
his thesis: 
Assuming that all of each man's actions are those of a machine, as is indubitably, 
at least approximately, the case, he is a machine with an automatic governor, like 
any artificial motor; and moreover, somewhat, though not quite, as the governor 
	   184	  
on an engine, while it automatically begins to turn off steam as soon as the 
machinery begins to move too fast, is itself automatically controlled for the sake of 
avoiding another fault, that of too sudden a change of speed, so, and more than 
so, man's machinery is provided with an automatic governor upon every governor 
to regulate it by a consideration not otherwise provided for. For while an 
automatic governor may be attached to any governor to prevent any given kind of 
excess in its action, each such attachment complicates the machine…. [But] in the 
human machine,—or, at least, in the cortex of the brain, or in whatever part it be 
whose action determines of what sort the man's conduct shall be,—there seems, as 
far as we can see no limit to the self-government that can and will be brought to 
bear upon each such determining action, except the lack of time before the 
conduct which was to be determined must come into actual play (MS 649, 19-21; 
qtd. in Holmes 122). 
Somewhat, approximately, though not quite, an automatic machine. Why the 
qualifications? Why these quasi-machines? In one sense, Peirce is surely attempting to 
avoid the reductionism of modern science, the trivialization of input-output schemes in 
order to make them more predictable, and gesturing instead towards what cyberneticist 
Heinz von Foerster has called a non-trivial machine, which is to say a machine capable of 
changing its outputs. But in another more fundamental sense, Peirce is pursuing the logic 
of the Derridean event-machine. As Holmes goes on to say, 
The "control of control” that Peirce describes here and in many other passages is 
what is known as second-order feedback. It is of particular interest because it can 
be shown that such a system is self-correcting (ordinarily without requiring further 
higher orders of control) in a manner essentially free from disruptive feedback (to 
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use Ross Ashby's term) - the wild oscillation or "hunting" that throws any system, 
cybernetic or moral, out of whack (5.440). Moreover, the self-correction takes 
place by a means that is self- structuring, and consistent with Peirce's pragmatic 
method of inquiry: a point with some relevance to the question of whether a 
substantive self is needed to explain self-control (122-123). 
Holmes opens the door to a consideration of the cybernetic machine alongside semiosis, 
but stops well short of describing how the mechanisms of feedback and self-corrective 
behavior may operate in Peircean semiosis, and particularly how they operate in 
communication systems. How, in other words, do these not-quite automatic machines 
communicate, with themselves or others? Holmes gestures towards an answer in his 
discussion of Peirce’s idea of the “review process” of action and inquiry: “The review is 
made more efficacious by breaking up the reasonings so finely, and arranging the critique 
so mechanically, that there is little chance for error or doubt. The system of existential 
graphs is designed, he says, to accomplish just this purpose” (118). These graphs are the 
diagrams that Peirce is forever alluding to as the real substance of his thought.  
Indeed, many of the trickier or more complicated passages in Peirce’s work allude 
to the graphs as where all is made (relatively) clear, and it is here that the logic of the 
event-machine takes shape. Only a few key aspects need concern us.5 Peirce’s graphs are 
a diagrammatic effort to break reasoning down into the most minute parts possible. As 
Don D. Roberts writes in The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce, “What are the smallest 
steps into which a reasoning can be dissected? Insertions and omissions. According to 
Peirce, if each elementary operation of a symbolic logic is either an insertion or an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For a more complete and mathematically minded discussion of Peirce and Spencer-Brown, see Louis H. Kauffman’s essay “The 
Mathematics of Charles S. Peirce.”	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omission, then the operations of that logic are ‘as analytically represented as possible’ 
(4.374)” (111). The graphs themselves take place on a “Sheet of Assertion,” the universe 
of all that may be said to be true. Drawing a single circle, or “cut”, on the Sheet of 
Assertion makes the assertion or indication represented by that cut, the space inside of the 
circle, “false.” This difference or distinction belongs to the category of Secondness or the 
indexical, what Peirce sometimes called the “not” and what Anne Freadmen takes to be 
for Peirce “the very sign of difference, and hence, the formal condition for any 
classification” (134). To represent a “true” indication as an individual proposition (rather 
than as joined with the undifferentiated Sheet of Assertion) one must then draw another 
circle inside the first one, indicating in the fashion of a double-negative that the original 
false indication is itself false, thus true.  
Indicating truth as the function of a kind of double-negative (“it’s not not true!”) 
may seem exasperating but it is in fact is the critical move of the graphs. The two circles 
cancel each other out, suggesting that what is indicated as true is continuous with the 
undifferentiated Sheet (insofar as it is true), but also differentiated from it (insofar as it is 
false). In other words, truth is a function of contingency. To indicate any individual 
proposition as true one must keep drawing circles within the first. This has the effect of 
redescribing truth as a process of making distinctions—that the “real” is only revealed 
paradoxically through the progressive enfolding of distinctions. As Louis H. Kauffman 
points out, “As a Sign of itself, the circle has only itself as a part. That part, equal to the 
whole, makes the distinction that is the referent of the Sign” (“Mathematics” 31). That is, 
the circle indicates itself as different from itself. Consequently, we have a determinative 
oscillation—just as in the cybernetic machine. This also has much in common with 
Derrida’s description of a “cut” in “Typewriter Ribbon”: “This cut assures it a sort of 
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archival independence or autonomy that is quasi-machinelike (not machinelike but quasi-
machinelike), a power of repetition, repeatability, iterability, serial and prosthetic 
substitution of self for self” (Without 133). The cut represents, if you will, the quasi of the 
quasi-machine, the hyphen we encounter in “event-machine,” a sort of abyss we fall into 
and cannot escape except by taking shovel in hand and digging infinitely deeper, circles 
within circles. 
One of the more immediately interesting aspects of the Existential Graphs 
concerns what happens when one draws just one circle, indicating “false.” This is 
equivalent to the famous Liar’s Paradox: “This statement is false.” What follows of course 
are the familiar oscillations of a self-referential paradox. This suggests that the very 
foundation of any indication, of any statement or predication at all, can be understood as 
a self-referential distinction, a distinction that indicates only one side and not the other. 
The initial cut which defines any particular indication must first distinguish itself as false to 
the Sheet of Assertion, and only then may it established its “truth” in a series of insertions 
and omissions. In other terms, the cut may represent an irruption of symmetry breaking 
or disequilibrium. Given Peirce’s own terminology, it is just as appropriate to describe this 
cut as falsity or negation. Can it be that the negation or falsity of individual existence 
refers, in some strict abstract way, to this other falsity? If so, the “cut” or distinction would 
seem to be synonymous with what Peirce means by individual existence, and it points the 
way towards a Peircean account of the subject. The subject is chopped in half as the very 
condition for it to exist at all; the event of consciousness is already from the start taken up 
by the machine of semiosis. 
The work of eccentric British mathematician George Spencer-Brown clarifies the 
relevance of cybernetics and systems theory for interpreting Peirce’s work. Spencer-
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Brown’s Laws of Form presents a system of diagrams for understanding how distinctions 
work that is in many functional respects “isomorphic” to the Existential Graphs 
(Kauffman “Mathematics” 2), an observation brilliantly drawn out by Floyd Merrell’s 
Signs Becoming Signs. Like Peirce, Spencer-Brown begins by suggesting that any act of 
observation is an act of distinction. As Michael Schiltz puts it, Laws of Form “is most acutely 
referred to as a protologic” (11). It is an attempt to arrive at the most fundamental or 
elementary level at which anything may be said, indicated, or reasoned about at all. 
Spencer-Brown writes, “The theme of this book is that a universe comes into being when 
a space is severed or taken apart…By tracing the way we represent such a severance, we 
can begin to reconstruct, with an accuracy and coverage that appears almost uncanny, 
the basic forms underlying linguistic, mathematical, physical and biological science, and 
can begin to see how the familiar laws of our own experience follow inexorably from the 
original act of severance” (xxix). Part of what Laws of Form is attempting to do is justify 
and legitimize the use of imaginary values, values that can be both positive and negative, 
if not at the same time, then at least sequentially: “For Spencer-Brown, the question is thus 
purely a mathematical one. His interests lie with showing the validity of imaginary 
values…the use of which has been common…As they can be used meaningfully for the 
solution of equations which cannot be solved otherwise, we must accept ‘imaginary’ as a 
‘third’ category independent from (1) true (tautology: x =x) and (2) untrue (contradiction: 
x = -x)” (Schiltz 16). It begins with a command to act: “Draw a distinction!” Make 
something different from something else—or more precisely, make something different 
from itself. 
As an immediate consequence of a distinction one part of the world can now 
indicate another. As Schiltz puts it, “The notation…thereby expresses that topological 
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asymmetry as well. Simultaneously with the drawing of a distinction, one of the sides is 
indicated” (13). Luhmann comments, “The distinction is made with the pragmatic intent 
to designate one side but not the other. What is distinguished, therefore, has to be 
distinguished from the distinction” (“Paradox” 17). Because of this the unmarked state 
which is produced with every distinction is absolutely unobservable, while the actual 
presence of the so-called marked and observable state continually slips away from any 
stable observation because of the revealing/obscuring action of making a distinction: 
“Self-referentially operating systems should thus be understood as the operational difference 
between themselves and their environment, a difference that is made through some sort 
of self-referential oscillating between the two sides of the distinction (i.e. system and 
environment)” (Schiltz 17). Spencer-Brown calls this “re-entry”—the form of the 
distinction (say, inside/outside) re-enters into the distinction. Thus, the distinction 
inside/outside will find itself on the inside of the original distinction. Luhmann writes, 
“The unmarked space is the indispensible other side, a reference to possibilities that, for 
their part, point to an infinity that cannot be contained in one place” (Art 117). There is 
an “oscillation” in the form of the distinction, as each subsequent inside/outside 
distinction switches the value of the form. As Kauffmann puts it, “Yet inevitably, there 
comes through the possibility of seeing anything at all the possibility of seeing a separate 
part. And so does the part become divided from the whole while still enfolded within it” 
(“Mathematics” 56).  
 To return full circle to our beginning (though it will not be quite the same now) 
the effects of this kind of “diagrammatic thinking” are described by Derrida in Of 
Grammatology: “Even before being determined as human (with all the distinctive 
characteristics that have always been attributed to man and the entire system of 
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significations that they imply) or nonhuman, the grammé—or the grapheme—would thus 
name the element. An element without simplicity” (Grammatology 9). Peirce’s subsitution of 
graphist for mind (and a graphist need be no more complex than Maxwell’s demon: the 
ability to make distinctions) leads to the expulsion or over-taking of voice or mind by the 
machine of writing, and thus no sense of “natural expression” can be maintained because 
it is at its point of origin marked or marred by the unnatural or technical conditions of its 
emergence. More precisely, Peirce’s graphs disrupt the “‘natural’ bond between phoné and 
the sense”—leading to what Derrida refers to a “nonintuition” that departs decisively 
from “a psychology of intuitive consciousness” (Grammatology 40).  He writes, “The empty 
symbolism of the written notation—in mathematical technique for example—is also for 
Husserlian intuitionism that which exiles us far from the clear evidence of the sense, that is 
to say from the full presence of the signified in its truth, and thus opens the possibility of 
crisis” (Grammatology 40). This crisis takes the form, we have seen, of an incapacity, a 
fundamental foreclosure of voice, mind, or consciousness—an inability to be taken up by 
semiosis. Derrida points to the necessity of an understanding of machineness that avoids the 
Cartesian fashion of reductionism, requiring what I have been calling the “blueprint” of a 
quasi-machine: 
Instead of having recourse to the concepts that habitually serve to distinguish man 
from other living beings (instinct and intelligence, absence or presence of speech, 
of society, of economy, etc. etc.), the notion of program is invoked. It must of course 
be understood in the cybernetic sense, but cybernetics is itself intelligible only in 
terms of a history of the possibilities of the trace as the unity of a double 
movement of protention and retention. This movement goes far beyond the 
possibilities of the ‘intentional consciousness.’ It is an emergence that makes the 
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grammé appear as such (that is to say according to a new structure of nonpresence) 
and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the 
narrow sense (Grammatology 84).  
 
Pragmaticism and Communication 
 
With Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory a more complete account of 
communication emerges in which consciousness is totally foreclosed from the act of 
communication. In a very strict sense, “Humans cannot communicate; not even their 
brains can communicate; not even their conscious minds can communicate. Only 
communication can communicate” (Theories 169). This is because “we have absolutely no 
idea how to comprehend that conscious minds can bring about communication” (Theories 
169). Luhmann assumes the complete self-referential closure of both consciousness and 
communication systems. Meaning and rationality are then generated from internal 
conditions of the system, and do not suppose any external reference. In this way, 
Luhmann’s grand theory attempts a revision of our understanding of rationality. It 
becomes, in a Peircean sense, one-sided. As Luhmann writes in Observations on Modernity: 
“Traditional concepts of rationality lived off of external presumptions of meaning, whether 
they were based on the copying of natural laws, given objectives, or given values for the 
choice of objectives. Such suppositions lose their foundation, as do the secularization of a 
religious ideology and the loss of the representation of uniquely correct points of 
departure. Judgments concerning rationality must therefore be separated from external 
presumptions of meaning and transferred to a consistently system-internal unity of self-reference 
and external reference” (17). Peirce’s rejection of a Cartesian or Archimedean point of 
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departure ensures that his own philosophy adopts a similar starting point. As Kauffman 
notes, “This means that the function of the mathematician is not to determine the eternal 
nature of the objects in the garden, but rather to find that they and the mathematician 
himself (or herself) are all Signs, growing together in the expansion of Language” (103). 
Peirce always starts from within semiosis, and thus signs are always partial. Anne 
Freadman writes, “Peirce’s sign is not the figure of impartial judgment; it is the figure of 
partial representation” (189).  
Freadman’s impressive account of semiosis in The Machinery of Talk offers a useful 
bridge to Luhmann’s system’s theory because she advances an account of semiosis 
without a subject: 
Peirce argues consistently throughout his career that the necessary formal 
conditions for something’s being a sign must not rest on the presuppositions of 
persons engaged in thinking. On the contrary, it has the function of explaining the 
processes of thinking: it is the “law” that underpins the “event.” My argument 
throughout this book has sought to show that Peirce’s research leads him to 
relinquish the position adopted in “On a New List of Categories” that rests on the 
assumption of human reason, and to seek an account of the events that effect 
semiosis. When Peirce describes real cases of semiosis, the thinghood and the 
eventhood of the sign, and hence of its interpretant, must be specified, and on 
occasion—particularly those occasions when he is tracing the operations of 
inquiry—this does indeed involve person in ‘conversation’—bodies, things in the 
world, the locus of experience are the sine qua non of action. This is the 
machinery of talk (219).  
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There is no detachment of semiosis “in itself” from what Freadman calls the genre of its 
production. Semiosis proceeds from the local, specific, and pragmatic. It cannot be 
separated from the technical conditions of its emergence: “If a technical apparatus is in 
principle the condition of possibility for any sign, this displaces the locus of activity from 
cerebration, from concepts, from the universal scope of the theory of knowledge in 
general, on to local contrivances, with their constraints, their limited and specific 
capacities, and their local applicability” (264). Ultimately, this leads Freadman to reject 
the necessity of a subject for semiosis because the production of a subject is entailed only 
for particular semiotic practices (219). What this means in conclusion for Freadman is 
that “thought is nothing without its instruments” and this remains the condition for 
understanding Peirce’s semiotics (273). It may be added that from the point of view of 
semiosis, thought understood as individual consciousness is indeed nothing. It is the outside 
or sacrificial condition—the body that absorbs the “cut”—for the possibility of semiosis in 
the first place. 
Likewise, Luhmann’s understanding of communication excludes consciousness. 
This distinction between consciousness and communication posits as necessary what 
Peirce laments in the epigraph to this essay: “Systems of the mind and systems of 
communication exist completely independently of each other. At the same time, however, 
they form a relationship of structural complementarity. They can actualize and specify 
only their own structures and thus can change only themselves. They use each other for a 
reciprocal initiation of these structural changes” (Theories 177). If both minds and 
communications are seen as captive to one-sidedness, to their own enfolding distinctions, 
then as Luhmann points out they can be seen inhabiting the “other side” or unmarked 
space of each others internal operations. Such complementarity reveals itself in the fact 
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that as conscious beings our relationship to consciousness supersedes our relationship to 
language: “This superiority of consciousness to communication (which, of course, 
corresponds in inverted system-reference to a superiority of communication over 
consciousness) becomes fully clear if one realizes that consciousness is occupied not only 
with worlds or with vague word-and-sentence ideas, but additionally and often more 
importantly with perception and with the imaginative construction and dismantling of 
images” (Theories 166). Immediate perception is not reducible to language. When it comes 
to minds and communication systems “We are dealing in both cases with structurally 
determined systems, that is to say, systems that orient each reproduction of their own 
operations, whatever the external causes may be, on their own structures” (Theories 171). 
How do they relate to one another then? “The mind cannot instruct communication, 
because communication constructs itself. But the mind is a constant source of impulses for 
the one or the other turn of the operative process inherent in communication. Only the 
mind is capable of perception (including the perception of communication)” (Theories 177). 
This relationship is asymmetrical. Consciousness does not require communication but 
communication cannot exist without consciousness: “How is communication possible if it 
has such a fluid, constantly changing foundation? How can communication reproduce 
itself if it must rely on a multitude of nervously vibrating brains and agitated minds?” 
(Theories 171). Communication systems do this by being closed to the “blooming, buzzing” 
confusion of consciousness and perception, which can only be felt as irritations or 
impulses from the outside that the communication system can only cope with on its own 
internal basis. 
Similarly, Peirce insists on a distinction between thought as the general property 
of a community (even a community of selves) and what he terms feeling or quality as the 
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immediate perception of consciousness. In fact, even early on Peirce suggests that feeling 
cannot be properly thought about at all: “The First must therefore be present and 
immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be initiative, original, 
spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause.  It is also something 
vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all 
synthesis and all differentiation: it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately 
thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always 
implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown!” (EP1 248). 
Feeling as perceptive consciousness is totally unrelated and unrelatable to the terms of 
semiosis and cannot engage in the actual meaning of a proposition. What is the meaning, 
then? What follows is Peirce’s mature formulation of his pragmatism: 
My pragmatism, having nothing to do with qualities of feeling, permits me to hold 
that the predication of such a quality is just what it seems, and has nothing to do 
with anything else. Hence, could two qualities of feeling everywhere be 
interchanged, nothing but feeling could be affected. Those qualities have no 
intrinsic significations beyond themselves. Intellectual concepts, however,—the 
only sign-burdens that are properly denominated “concepts,”—essentially carry 
some implication concerning the general behavior either of some conscious being 
or of some inanimate object, and so convey more, not merely than any feeling, 
but more, too, than any existential fact, namely, the “would-acts” of habitual 
behavior; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up 
the meaning of a “would be.” (EP2 402). 
What is happening here? Meaning is the distinction between pure feeling and the 
actualization of an “existential fact.” Meaning as potentiality (a “would be”) is the 
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difference between possibility and actuality, and thus requires further distinctions, further 
actualizations, none of which are final and “fill up” the meaning—possibility is never 
exhausted. Luhmann’s own account of meaning is remarkably similar: “Instead of 
presenting a world, the medium of meaning refers to a selective processing….Actualized 
meaning always comes about selectively and refers to further selections. It is therefore fair 
to say that meaning is constituted by the distinction between actuality and potentiality (or 
between the real as momentarily given and as possibility)” (Art 107). In the terms of this 
essay, consciousness or feeling is an overload of information and must be cut, must be 
distinguished from communication. Consciousness cannot be communicated: “A social 
system cannot think; a psychological system cannot communicate” (Theories 165).  
It is important to recognize that Peirce, in contrast to Luhmann and Derrida, 
often concerns himself with a consolidation or recuperation of continuity in the form of 
an asymptotic approach toward reality. The reason for this is in fact quite simple. Peirce 
starts from the position of a blank sheet, a continuum containing no actual information 
until a distinction is made. Luhmann and Spencer-Brown start with the distinction, which 
produces both a marked and unmarked space simultaneously. In effect, this allows for the 
use of an unmarked space in a system of indications, which means that thought may 
paradoxically glimpse a necessary indefinite “other” that cannot be expressed in thought. 
As Kauffman writes, “Spencer-Brown’s work can be seen as part of a continuous 
progression that began with Peirce’s Existential Graphs. In essence what Spencer-Brown 
adds to the existential graphs is the use of the unmarked state. That is, he allows the use 
of empty space in place of a complex of Signs. This makes a profound difference and 
reveals a beautiful and simple calculus of indications underlying the existential graphs. 
Indeed Spencer-Brown’s true contribution is that he added Nothing to the Peirce theory!” 
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(2). In contrast, Peirce insisted that everything, in principle, can be expressed in thought 
eventually (“eventually” being nearly synonymous with infinity). One is tempted to follow 
this difference into the rabbit-hole (perhaps never to emerge) but short of that one may 
observe what is at stake in such a distinction. As Kauffman notes, Spencer-Brown’s 
innovation can be interpreted as a radicalization of a latent element of Peirce’s thought, 
insisting that in every single case we must accept that our beginnings are arbitrary, even 
this one. Things could always be otherwise, and this is the condition for them to be 
anything at all. 
 
Continuities 
 
In Peirce’s Approach to the Self, Vincent Colapietro observes an interesting exchange 
between Peirce and William James. In The Principles of Psychology, James proposes an idea 
that could not be more perfectly designed to annoy Peirce: “No thought event comes into 
direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute 
insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law….Each of these minds keeps its own thoughts 
to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them” (qtd. in Colapietro 62). Certainly 
it would seem that Peirce should be able sympathize with such insulation, but in response 
he wrote the following: “Is not the direct contrary nearer observed facts? Is this not pure 
metaphysical speculation? You think there must be such isolation, because you confound 
thoughts with feeling-qualities; but all observation is against you. There are some small 
particulars that a man can keep to himself. He exaggerates them and his personality 
sadly” (CP 8.81). Peirce’s point again depends on the distinction between feeling-qualities 
and thoughts. That is, one cannot even communicate within a particular consciousness 
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without making this distinction. One is always talking to that other self just coming into 
being. Peirce admits what James cannot allow—that there is no insulation because there 
is no indivisible self which can be insulated. As Pierce puts it, “no present actual thought 
(which is a mere feeling) has any meaning, any intellectual value; for this lies not in what 
is actually thought, but in what this thought may be connected with in representation by 
subsequent thoughts; so that the meaning of a thought is altogether something virtual” 
(CP 5.289). Our thoughts, even our deepest and most private, are marked from the 
beginning with the technical and impersonal conditions of their emergence. Peirce objects 
to James because he does not accept the principle that minds cannot barter with each 
other, and his objection is founded on the principle that minds must barter even with 
themselves. 
Luhmann writes, “Communication is only possible as an event that transcends the 
closure of consciousness: as the synthesis of more than the content of just one 
consciousness” (99). Communication systems can do this because while they do not 
represent consciousness directly, they do adapt to it on their own internal basis. As Cary 
Wolfe puts it, “In the form of meaning, then, we find that systems increase their contacts 
with their environments paradoxically by virtualizing them” (Posthumanism 18). For Peirce, 
this virtual reality constitutes the necessity of Thirdness, the re-entry of a cut made in the 
formless body of continuity—a continuity, moreover, that is only perceptible as 
imperceptible, observable as unobservable, only dimly felt before it has flown. In an 
uncharacteristically lyrical moment, Luhmann muses, “If we were to make an effort to 
really observe our own consciousness in its operations from thought to thought, we would 
certainly discover a peculiar fascination with language, but also the noncommunicative, 
purely internal use of linguistic symbols and a peculiar, background depth of the actuality 
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of consciousness, a depth on which words swim like ships chained in a row but without 
being consciousness itself, somehow illuminated, but not light itself” (Theories 166). Peirce 
construes that unseen light, that which illuminates without being illuminated, as the white 
light of the continuity of being. We cannot look but we fail to see it. 
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Chapter Six 
 
 
The Excluded Act of Creation: Religious Feeling in Peirce & Edwards 
 
 
PAGAN: Who is the God you worship? 
CHRISTIAN: I do not know. 
—Nicholas of Cusa, Dialogue on the Hidden God (209) 
 
 
On April 24, 1892, Peirce had what his biographer Joseph Brent calls a “sudden 
and overwhelming mystical experience” (209). He felt called by a force outside himself 
into church to receive communion: “I found myself carried up to the alter rail, almost 
without my own volition.” He concludes, “I have never before been mystical; but now I 
am” (Brent 210). The experience would transform Peirce and perhaps accounts in part 
for the change in his philosophy beginning with a series of papers for The Monist from 
1891 to 1893. As Brent puts it, “The Monist essays forcefully and unexpectedly 
proclaimed an objective idealist, as well as realist, metaphysics that seemed written by a 
different man” (206). Peirce would comment long after the event that the mystical 
experience forced him to recognize the importance of private intuition as opposed to 
rational intellect: “No amount of speculation can take the place of experience” (Brent 
210). Yet this seemingly Emersonian notion also follows the later Emerson (of “Fate” and 
“Experience”) in refusing to give such experiences a foundational role in knowledge, but 
instead submitting these profoundly personal feelings to impersonal scrutiny. An eventual 
outcome of Peirce’s religious experience, the famously difficult essay “A Neglected 
Argument for the Reality of God” (1908) presents a theory of what he terms Musement as 
a carefully cultivated sense of personal feeling that leads, inevitably in Peirce’s estimation, 
to an “argument” for the reality of God. Given Peirce’s penchant for disallowing qualities 
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of feeling any role in intellectual constructions, of which a rational argument for the 
reality of God would seem a paramount example, it is hard to know what to make of an 
essay which insists, on one hand, on a personal sense of universal communion, while on 
the other insisting just as strongly on a rigorous commitment to impersonal scientific 
scrutiny. The hinge or joint that connects these irreconcilable aims is obscure but can be 
glimpsed in the phenomenon of hypothetical reasoning—alternately called retroduction 
or abduction. Peirce often characterizes this kind of reasoning along the lines of Galileo’s 
il lume naturale, but such insights do not provide scientific certainty in themselves: 
“Retroduction does not afford security. The hypothesis must be tested” (EP2 441). Some 
clues for making sense of all this can be found in the more rationally argumentative 
sections of the essay, in which Peirce seems concerned with no less than the circular and 
contingent nature of reason itself.  
“A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” is, in some sense, about 
something that cannot be expressed within the systems of science or rational 
argumentation; it is about that which must be excluded in order for rational 
argumentation to proceed at all. This excluded element is not extraneous or gratuitous, 
however—because the act of exclusion itself is the necessity without which science cannot 
function. With the mystifying revelations of quantum mechanics still on the horizon, 
science in the early twentieth century began to butt its head against the constraints that 
constituted it, particularly as the discovery of entropy called into question the explanatory 
power of the modern paradigm, something Peirce took note of as early as essays such as 
“Design and Chance,” which argues for the actual non-reducible existence of chance as a 
factor in the evolution of natural laws. As Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers write, “The 
ambition of Newtonian science was to present a vision of nature that would be universal, 
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deterministic, and objective inasmuch as it contains no reference to the observer, 
complete inasmuch as it attains a level of description that escapes the clutches of time” 
(213). Dissipative or entropic systems, on the contrary, thrusts the observer back into 
time, into a universe in which change is fundamental: “irreversible processes may be 
considered as the last remnants of the spontaneous and intrinsic activity displayed by 
nature when experimental devices are employed to harness it” (120). This means scientific 
observation enacts a necessary sort of reduction, a reversible snapshot of an irreversible 
process. Furthermore, given the similarities between Peirce’s mathematical foundations 
and the calculus of distinctions proposed by George Spencer-Brown, we are led to 
consider Peirce’s “Neglected Argument” within the light of second-order cybernetics as 
demonstrating self-reference and the principles of self-organizing systems. 
If there are constraints, if there are boundaries or borders, then the all-
encompassing descriptive claims of science are faced with their own limitations. Werner 
Heisenberg demonstrates this dawning realization when he comments that there is 
“something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a 
strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality” (15). 
There is a hinge or switch-point which constitutes an observation as an actualizing 
determination. Peirce, for his part, investigates this boundary by diving right over it into 
what nearly twenty years later Sigmund Freud would call the “oceanic feeling” that often 
accompanies a belief in God. Peirce calls this feeling Musement: “There is a certain 
agreeable occupation of mind which, from its having no distinctive name, I infer is not as 
commonly practiced as it deserves to be….Because it involves no purpose save that of 
casting aside all serious purpose….In fact, it is Pure Play. Now, Play, we all know, is a 
lively exercise of one’s powers. Pure Play has no rules, except this very law of liberty. It 
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bloweth where it listeth” (EP2 436). As Floyd Merrell describes it, “Musement is a state of 
indifference, with no particular purpose or end. It is a moment of purposeful 
purposelessness, mindless awareness, passive indeterminacy, all-embracing nothingness. It 
is in the words of Blaise Pascal, suspension between zero and infinity. For Peirce it is the 
lively exercise of detached contemplation, when there is neither affirmation nor denial, 
and at the same time there is both affirmation and denial. There is everything and there is 
nothing; there is neither choice nor nonchoice, only floating dreaminess” (“Musement” 
90). Most importantly, this is a state of feeling that is unable, or without the capacity, to 
enter into a system of relations: “If one’s observations and reflections are allowed to 
specialize themselves too much, the Play will be converted into scientific study; and that 
cannot be pursued in odd half-hours” (EP2 436). A state of indifference indeed, it is a 
state that suspends, or places in suspense, the difference of what Peirce called Secondness, 
the existence of an other that inevitably brings into being the mechanisms of semiosis. 
Musement would seem to be a state prior to any particular determination, any particular 
line of thought or scientific investigation, without attaining the status of the a priori of 
metaphysical foundations. Instead, it represents the pre-semiotic ground of feeling that is 
excluded or negated by semiotics. 
However, it takes a particular kind of Musement to lead to thoughts about God. 
Peirce reminds us of his three categories, “Of the three Universe of Experience familiar to 
us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, 
pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation and a name within that 
mind….The second Universe is that of the Brute Actuality of things and facts. I am 
confident that their Being consists in reactions against Brute forces….The third Universe 
comprises everything whose Being consists in active power to establish connections 
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between different objects in different Universes. Such is everything which is essentially a 
Sign….Such, too, is a living consciousness, and such the life, the power of growth of a 
plant. Such is a living institution,—a daily newspaper, a great fortune, a social 
‘movement’” (EP2 435). Observation of the phenomenon of growth, or Thirdness, the 
very nature of a sign as a kind of living process, is what eventually leads to the hypothesis 
of God: “In growth, too, find that the three Universes conspire; and a universal feature of 
it is provision for later stages in earlier ones. This is a specimen of certain lines of 
reflection which will inevitably suggest the hypothesis of God’s Reality. It is not that such 
phenomena might not be capable of being accounted for, in one sense, by the action of 
chance with the smallest conceivable dose of a higher element; for if by God be meant 
the Ens necessarium, that very hypothesis requires that such should be the case. But the 
point is that that sort of explanation leaves a mental explanation just as needful as 
before.” (EP2 439). Scientific explanations require in turn explanations for themselves. 
There must be a reason for reason. But all attempts at such must end in tautology, 
indicating something beyond itself, something of non-reason. Peirce suggests there is an 
irreducible element in the universe (chance or chaos) as the active power of growth. 
Explanations cannot explain themselves because they must of necessity remove pure 
chance or chaos from the field of observation. Musement hovers somehow in between, a 
liminal state that resists ultimate determination in the suspension of what can be called an 
imaginary space, neither here nor there. 
A similar notion from Pierre Duhem can help clarify how this relates to science: 
“Logic provides an almost absolute freedom to the physicist who wants to choose a 
hypothesis; but the absence of any guide or rule shouldn’t disturb him for, in fact, the 
physicist doesn’t choose the hypothesis on which he builds a theory; he doesn’t choose it 
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anymore than the flower chooses the grain of pollen that will fertilize it…the physicist 
limits himself to opening his thought, through attention and meditation, to the idea that 
must take root in him, without him” (quoted in Stengers Cosmopolitics 390). For Isabelle 
Stengers, this passage suggests that Duhem “appeals to a different physics, a physics that 
would promote the values of creation –coherence, beauty, simplicity—before those of 
realism” (Cosmopolitics 225), but it can also be read as a statement about the necessarily 
arbitrary nature of beginnings. A scientist is bound by the familiar rules of scientific 
discourse (we could call those rules “realism”), but how is that discourse initiated? If the 
values of realism and creation are not reconcilable, then how are they related as Peirce 
and Duhem seem to insist? How do these feelings of creation ground scientific discourse if 
they are not expressible within it? The answer to this question, for Peirce at least, cannot 
take refuge in a transcendental principle, nor in the subjective certainty of immanent 
encounters. The answer that the “Neglected Argument” gestures toward instead is a kind 
of quasi-transcendentalism. Just as it is possible to insist with Wittgenstein that death is a 
not a part of life, it may be that creation, whether it be divine or the igniting spark of 
hypothesis, cannot be a part of reality. There is only an ironic or playful repetition of the 
transcendental move from within, a ghostly figure on the margin of perception that fades 
from view when directly observed. The paradox can only be unfolded over time, 
sequentially. We are then thrust into time, into the irreversible change of dissipative 
systems—and the world is forever created anew through an excluded act of creation. 
Feelings such as Musement point indirectly to the limits of rationalism, that which 
reason cannot glimpse except out of the corner of its eye, what it may only represent to 
itself in grief as an absence. It would seem, in the words of Derrida, that Peirce dives not 
into the fullness and infinite expanse of an ocean, but the bottomless terror of an abyss:  
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Are we obeying the principle of reason when we ask what grounds this principle 
which is itself a principle of grounding? We are not—which does not mean that 
we are disobeying it, either. Are we dealing here with a circle or with an abyss? 
The circle would consist in seeking to account for reason by reason, to render 
reason to the principle of reason, in appealing to the principle in order to make it 
speak of itself at the very point where, according to Heidegger, the principle of 
reason says nothing about reason itself. The abyss, the hole, the Abgrund, the 
empty "gorge" would be the impossibility for a principle of grounding to ground 
itself (“Principle” 9). 
As Derrida well knows this perspective is the outcome of a modernity that calls the 
excluded ground of reason an abyss, a gorge or absence that constitutes our relationship 
to what is unthought or unknown as one either of terror or grief. Our state is one of lack 
and loss, and our relationship to the world is marked by a fundamental skepticism, a 
devaluation or “rolling from the center toward X.” This tradition can be traced in the 
most obvious case to Descartes, who postulated that from the point of view of rationalism, 
the possible is merely “nothing” in contrast to the real existence of the actual. But it also 
results from a retreat of religion from the visible world initiated in some respects by the 
dualisms of John Calvin. As Mitchell Breitwieser puts it, for the Puritan “there is God and 
there is rotting meat and there is nothing in between” (70). A necessary prerequisite for 
the project of modernity is that God withdraw from the world as an active presence, that 
nature’s “intrinsic activity” be tamed by the controlling gaze of man as objective observer. 
 Peirce’s religious thought may be seen as pursuing in some particular sense the 
reverse of the modern project by inheriting a strategy of thinking that begins on American 
shores with Jonathan Edwards, continues with Ralph Waldo Emerson, and even reaches 
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back to the medieval theology of Nicholas of Cusa. If, as we have already seen, the 
individual self constituted through feeling can only be construed semiotically as “nothing” 
because it is capable of no signification in itself, then what Descartes presents as the 
foundational moment of self-presence, the most actual, is negated. Peirce’s idea is more 
passive: we do not think, we are thought: “A man is capable of having assigned to him a role 
in the drama of creation, and so far as he loses himself in that role,—no matter how 
humble it may be,—so far he identifies himself with its Author” (CP 7.572). The 
fundamental act of an individual scientific observation is marked from its origin with a 
lack or abyss as the condition of its possibility. What this means, in other words, is that 
actuality is only possible as in some part the negation of pure possibility—that the 
actualization or embodiment of thought requires a sacrifice. Descartes’ elevation of the 
actual over the possible is in fact fully overturned, despite the fact that this creates a 
strange predicament (the possible is the real, while the actual is constituted by a negation) 
that Peirce unfolds through a concept of potentiality, a “Third” as the unity of 
actual/possible. All of this is merely a particular way of restating Peirce’s pragmaticism 
and semiotics, but this way of describing it has special resonance for the “Neglected 
Argument” because Peirce’s specific intervention in that essay cannot be fully understood 
unless it is placed in contrast to the modernity it attempts to overturn. Specifically, 
Peirce’s late philosophy remains fascinated, as Jonathan Edwards and Ralph Waldo 
Emerson before him, by the necessary exclusions that make it possible. It does not seek a 
grounding outside of itself (this beginning already within being in some sense the principle 
move of Peircean semiotics) but embraces the paradox of self-reference, what Derrida 
above calls the “circle,” as the motivating force in what Peirce sees as the most 
fundamental characteristics of the universe: growth and evolution. 
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 By briefly considering Jonathan Edwards’s theological revisions of Calvin, 
revisions often interpreted (following Perry Miller’s seminal example) as a quest for 
immanent “face to face” encounters with a divine unity that resembles in many respects 
Emerson’s infamous “transparent eyeball,” Peirce’s own religious musings can likewise be 
seen in reaction to a Puritan heritage that insists on an irreconcilable division between 
God and a fallen material world. But like Edwards and Emerson, Peirce does not rest in 
dualisms, but instead interprets them asymmetrically following in many respects the notion 
of a self-referential distinction as formulated by mathematician George Spencer-Brown and 
later incorporated into the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. In this respect, Luhmann 
offers a useful way to think about the juxtaposition of religion and science in the 
“Neglected Argument” as the result of what he calls functional differentiation. As he puts 
it, “Modem society's form of differentiation makes possible, or even enforces, the 
autonomy of separate functional areas; this is accomplished by the differentiation of 
certain operationally closed, autopoietic systems. Functional differentiation thus imposes 
on systems an obligation to reflect on their own singularity and irreplaceability, but an 
obligation which must also take into account that there are other functional systems of 
this kind in society. Knowledge - and indeed particularly demanding, advanced 
knowledge - is consequently only one form of social potency among others” (Theories 63). 
As distinct social systems, religion and science operate upon fundamentally different 
terms, different codes, but both can perform what Luhmann calls a second-order 
observation (an observation of observation) of the other’s first-order observation. In 
Spencer-Brown’s terms, this makes the paradoxical unity of a distinction available for 
observation, but only at the cost of distinguishing that unity from something else.  
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Musement is just such an example of second-order observation—it observes the 
constitutive observational act of science, and sees the unity of the distinction that science 
cannot see. When religion turns its gaze to science, it sees lurking underneath, unseen and 
unaccounted for, what Nicholas of Cusa calls the “absolute maximum” which is “free 
from all relation and contraction” (89) and thus free from the system of differences that 
makes science possible. In other words, science hides from itself its own paradoxical 
constitution, in the manner of the circle of reason identified by Derrida. It occludes the 
difference that makes it possible. Along these same lines, Peirce’s thought can also be 
connected backwards to Emerson in its pursuit of the limitations of rational thought, the 
pursuit of imaginary spaces, what Emerson describes as the sense in which “Things are, 
and are not, at the same time…” (585). Peirce embraces paradox with equal enthusiasm 
when he considers the present as “this living Death in which we are born anew” which 
constitutes “That Nascent State between the Determinate and the Indeterminate” (EP2 
358). These are attempts to include in the positive statement its own negative mirror 
image as a means to broach limitations, to attempt to observe the paradoxical unity of a 
distinction in order to gesture indirectly towards an infinite and unlimited realm of 
possibility or futurity in which we may encounter the new. Such formulations are unified 
under the notion of an originary distinction that makes any discourse possible by 
delimiting that discourse against a background of everything else. Such distinctions are 
characterized by asymmetry: they may indicate one side but not the other. This exclusion 
persists in the form of a difference that makes all other differences possible, but it cannot 
itself be incorporated into the system. 
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Observing Modern Science 
 
In The Postmodern Turn, Steven Best and Douglas Kellner write, “Modern science, 
in its classical self-conception, sharply separates ‘fact’ from ‘value,’ thereby pursuing a 
‘value-free’ study of natural systems apart from ethics and metaphysics, just as capitalism 
bifurcates the public and private sectors, disburdening private enterprise of any public or 
moral obligations” (200). The anti-capitalist sentiments in the mid-career essay 
“Evolutionary Love” demonstrate that Peirce was in part concerned with overturning the 
state of affairs described in the second part of that statement, and Peirce’s concept of the 
scientific method addresses the first part in a systematic way. As already seen in chapter 
one, Peirce’s attempts to incorporate notions of chance, chaos, or possibility into scientific 
observation mark him as far ahead of his time, as Prigogine and Stengers note in their 
classic text on dissipative systems, Order Out of Chaos. The title works just as well as an 
overarching concept for Peirce’s philosophy, particularly his critique of scientific 
reductionism. 
Niklas Luhmann offers a useful description of such critiques: “What is at stake in 
such a critique is the form of modem science - that is, the difference made by the fact that 
science exists. We are leaving aside the often heard complaint that science serves 
capitalism (and should rather serve socialism) because it is insufficiently articulated from 
the perspective of social theory. There is, however, another description of science, equally 
critical of modernity, that targets its center. It takes aim at a one-sided tendency toward 
formalization, idealization, technicalization, accounting, etc.” (Theories 68). Luhmann’s 
use of the phrase “one-sided” is particularly fortuitous since Peirce’s definition of scientific 
truth, intended as part of just such a critique, also includes it. For Peirce, truth is only true 
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insofar as it confesses its “inaccuracy and one-sidedness” as an “essential ingredient” of 
what makes it true (EP2 395). As Luhmann writes, “The factual contents of knowledge 
resist a historical as well as (for the same reason) a socio-structural classification. And 
bivalent logic, together with the epistemology based on it, does not provide any 
alternatives to this situation. If knowledge is true, it is always true” (Theories 62). Which is 
to say: the logic of modern science cannot cope with dissipative systems. Peirce’s semiotics 
is largely an attempt to build a logical foundation for a post-modernity that can get past 
these kinds of problems. It is a logic from within process or time, or a logic of change. 
It is important to recognize, however, that Peirce wasn’t interested in a 
reactionary return to pre-scientific models of inquiry. “The Fixation of Belief” decisively 
argues for science, amongst all the alternatives surveyed in that essay, as the best way 
forward for obtaining knowledge about the universe, particularly for the fact that it is self-
correcting (i.e., process oriented). Yet Peirce’s understanding of scientific method differs 
sharply from the modern template because he wanted to move past the forced choices 
that modernity imposes by offering what can be called a posthumanist redescription of 
the role of science in human inquiry: the detached objective observer is dispersed by a 
proliferating series of signs, of which the “human” observer occupies at best a set of 
shifting positions. And while Best and Kellner identify a host of modern thinkers 
interested in overturning the idea of science beholden to a “rigid subject-object 
bifurcation whereby the unbiased scientific mind confronts the cosmos in a detached 
mode of observation” (202), Peirce’s own approach to these matters is often remarkably 
rigorous in its insistence on moving past static dualisms without seeking higher ground in 
a transcendental principle. 
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Peirce’s religious thinking offers a particularly compelling case. Joseph Brent 
writes, “I believe that, for Peirce, semeiotic should be understood, after his mystical 
experience, as the working out of how the real is both immanent and transcendent and of 
how the infinite speaker may be said to practice semeiosis, the action of signs, in creating 
our universe” (212). Brent perceptively emphasizes a kind of logic that allows something 
to be both itself and its opposite, recalling the self-limiting forms deployed by Edwards and 
Emerson. Such formulations cannot be reconciled in the fashion of Hegelian synthesis, 
but require what Evan Thompson has called “the need for back-and-forth circulation 
between scientific research on the mind and disciplined phenomenologies of lived 
experience” (Emergence 78). This needs to be distinguished, however, from what 
Thompson later writes in the same essay: “Experience is irreducible not because it 
possesses metaphysically peculiar ‘properties’ that can’t be squeezed into some reified 
physicalist model of the universe, after the fashion of contemporary property dualism. It’s 
irreducible because of its ineliminable transcendental character: lived experience is always 
already presupposed by any statement, model, or theory, and the lived body is a priori 
invariant of lived experience” (Emergence 90). Thompson retreats to the high ground and 
makes the transcendental move, the humanist move that rises over and above the world 
as mechanism, over and above what Peirce calls semiosis, by positing a “lived body” as 
some mode of existence beyond difference, thus “irreducible.” It betrays, in other words, 
the conditions of its own emergence. Lived experienced is already semiotic, already 
marked through with the distinction immanent/transcendent as its very condition for 
being. There is no resolution of the constitutive distinction that Thompson wants to move 
past to the discovery of an a priori as a fixed starting point, however nuanced and 
sophisticated and denuded an a priori it turns out to be. Instead, Peirce’s program for 
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scientific investigation resembles more closely that presented by Isabelle Stengers in 
Cosmopolitics, especially the sense in which Stengers is concerned to bring about an 
“experience of here and there, the experience of a here that, by its very topology, affirms 
the existence of a there, and affirms it in a way that excludes any nostalgia for the 
possibility of erasing differences, of creating an all-purpose experience” (62). But a here 
and there that does not erase difference automatically becomes neither here nor there (a 
double negative), in the sense in which “here” may always come up against the aporetic 
boundary it cannot cross as a gesture of self-limitation, an internal reference to the other.  
This mode of thinking has special resonance for religious thought, a system that, 
as Luhmann points out, is principally fixated on its own impossibility, an inability or 
incapacity to determine its primary object of study. But religion also performs a unique role 
for society as a whole: “A God who experiences everything and is accessible through 
communication but who does not belong to society is a singular exception that exactly 
copies the recursive totality of the societal system itself, a duplication that makes it 
possible to experience the world in a religious way” (Social 409). Religious feeling, in other 
words, can accomplish a second-order observation of society as a whole, indicating the 
unity of society’s constitutive distinction through a repetition of it, what Spencer-Brown 
calls a “re-entry” of the distinction on only one side. This is a second-order observation. It 
is no wonder, then, that critiques of science may center, as Freud noted, in a personal 
(i.e., non-social) experience of an “oceanic feeling.” But a figure more directly pertinent 
for Peirce and the “Neglected Argument” is the Puritan minister Jonathan Edwards. In 
his very intriguing book Strands of System, Douglas Anderson (unfortunately merely as an 
aside) links Peirce’s emphasis on the role of feeling in an argument for God to A Treatise 
Concerning Religious Affections (169). It is worth making a quick detour through that text in 
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order to follow up Anderson’s astuteness by comparing Edwards with Peirce as 
constituting posthumanist and second-order descriptions of religious feeling. 
 
Jonathan Edwards and Religious Affections 
 
“But although there was nothing that was seen, nothing that the world 
saw, or that the Christians themselves ever saw with their bodily eyes, that 
thus influenced and supported ‘em; yet they had a supernatural principle 
of love to something unseen; they loved Jesus Christ, for they saw him 
spiritually, whom the world saw not, and whom they themselves had never 
seen with bodily eyes” 
—Jonathan Edwards (Reader 140) 
 
 
 Edwards wrote A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections in 1746, nearly twenty years 
before The Nature of True Virtue, and in some ways his development of an asymmetrical 
dualism, his emphasis on process, is less acute than in that final major statement. Religious 
Affections seeks to challenge the orthodox dismissal of the recent religious enthusiasms that 
had swept across New England in a most curious way. Edwards takes his theme from 
Timothy: “Hence true religion is called the power of godliness, in distinction from the 
external appearances of it, that are the form of it, ‘Having a form of godliness, but 
denying the power of it’ (II Tim. 3:5)” (Reader 144). True to Calvinist doctrine, Edwards 
insists on a sharp distinction between the natural and the spiritual, only to use that 
fundamental difference to produce a tension that defends religious feeling as true only 
insofar as it produces Christian practice. As Edwards puts it in a phrase quite unexpected 
in a text with the explicit aim of defending the potential truth of states of feeling, 
“Christian practice is a costly laborious thing” (Reader 168). The demonstration of the 
truth of religious affection, what designates it as spiritual and not natural, is to be found in 
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work. Not works, not the finished and burnished proofs of saintliness, but work itself, 
saintliness as a practice. It would seem that the very subject of the essay is excluded from 
the process it is intended to ground. 
Edwards notes that there are “laws of the union of soul and body” that mean that 
“there never is any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or 
inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body” while “on the other hand, 
from the same laws of the union of soul and body, the constitution of the body, and the 
motion of its fluids, may promote the exercise of the affections” (Reader 142). But what is 
the nature of this union? Edwards predictably insists on a dualism. Body and “animal 
spirits” are never “anything properly belonging to the nature of the affections; though 
they always accompany them, in the present state; but are only affects or concomitants of 
the affections, that are entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way 
essential to them” (Reader 143). It is precisely at this point that I’d like to press on 
Edwards’s dualistic scheme. What is properly considered affections is entirely distinct 
from the body. And yet they are in this world inseparable. His religious convictions insist 
on the distinction, but it is also possible to observe here an interesting tension between the 
spiritual and disembodied inclinations of the soul and how those inclinations are 
manifested in a material or bodily sense, how affections are transformed by the material 
and prosthetic means of their expression. Teasing out this tension is the aim of the treatise 
as a whole. Later, Edwards writes, “He who has no religious affection, is in a state of 
spiritual death, and is wholly destitute of the powerful, quickening, saving influences of 
the Spirit of God upon his heart. As there is no true religion, where there is nothing else 
but affection; so there is no true religion where there is no religious affection” (Reader 148). 
True religion is defined here by its source in religious affection, “He that has doctrinal 
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knowledge and speculation only, without affection, never is engaged in the business of 
religion” (Reader 145), but affection cannot constitute true religion alone. As Peirce might 
say, the feeling must be tested. 
Edwards clarifies himself at great length, but cannot really escape the circularity of 
his argument. What’s particularly striking is his rather Peircean penchant for 
qualification. Witness just two examples, emphasis added: “True religion, in great part, 
consists in holy affections” (Reader 141); and true religion, again, “consists in a great measure, 
in vigorous and lively actings of the inclination and will of the soul, or the fervent 
exercises of the heart” (Reader 143). True religion is, and is not, at the same time, a 
product of effusive religious feeling. It is marked, in other words, with a distinction. I’d 
like to suggest that for Edwards that it is a distinction, one between natural and spiritual 
affections. Natural affections, as Edwards argues, set the world we observe in motion: 
“These affections we see to be the springs that set men agoing, in all the affairs of life, and 
engage them in all their pursuits: these are the things that put men forward, and carry 
‘em along, in all their worldly business” (Reader 145). Indeed, the familiar world of worldly 
business would cease if affections were not engaged: “take away all love and hatred, all 
hope and fear, all anger, zeal and affectionate desire, and the world would be, in great 
measure, motionless and dead” (Reader 145). But the other side, the side left unmarked 
and designated as “spiritual affection,” cannot be so easily put to work in the world: “The 
Spirit of God, in all his operations upon the minds of natural men, only moves, impresses, 
assists, improves, or some way acts upon natural principles; but gives no new spiritual 
principle” (Reader 162). 
Spiritual sense does not offer any determinate mode of conduct, it does not go to 
work in the world as itself. Instead, it refers only to itself. It leads to its own reproduction, a 
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repetition of its difference from the material world of determinate modes of conduct. 
Feelings lead to actions, but religious feeling also leads back to itself as forever different 
from any particular action. As Edwards writes in a very difficult passage, 
This new spiritual sense, and the new dispositions that attend to it, are no new 
faculties, but are new principles of nature. I use the word ‘principles,’ for want of a 
word of a more determinate signification. By a principle of nature in this place, I 
mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular 
manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul; or a natural habit or 
foundation for action, giving a person ability and disposition to exert the faculties 
in exercises of such a certain kind; so that to exert the faculties in that kind of 
exercises, may be said to be his nature. So this new spiritual sense is not a new 
faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, 
for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. So that new holy 
disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a 
foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of will (Reader 
161). 
Spiritual feeling is “new” because it effects a change in natural habits—without being 
identified with those particular habits. It is the newness, what Emerson calls “onwardness,” that 
matters, and only in this sense is Christian practice identified. The operation of this 
practice can then be best clarified by understanding it as a self-referential distinction. 
Religious feelings are the repetition of a difference from the habits they give rise to, a re-
entry of the distinction into itself. True religion, then, is an engagement, not a doctrine: 
“That religion which God requires, and will accept, does not consist in weak, dull and 
lifeless wishes, raising us but a little above a state of indifference: God, in his Word, 
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greatly insists upon it, that we be in good earnest, fervent in spirit, and our hearts 
vigorously engaged in religion” (Reader 143). This is a hard requirement, as it requires a 
certain passivity. One does not grasp religious feeling, one is grasped by it. The signs of 
saintliness are only demonstrated in Christian practice, and thus no actual habitual 
practice at all. One cannot set ones watch by God, who dispenses His grace as He sees fit: 
“…it was never God’s design to give us any rules, by which we may certainly know, who 
of our fellow professors are his, and to make a full and clear separation between sheep 
and goats: but that on the contrary, it was God’s design to reserve this to himself, as his 
prerogative. And therefore no such distinguishing signs as shall enable Christians or 
ministers to do this, are ever to be expected to the world’s end” (Reader 154). Spiritual 
feeling persists as the unmarked side of every distinction, and there is no final sign. 
 
Systems and Self-Organization 
 
 
“Noise destroys an order, the order of discourse; it also announces another 
order. Disorder is the end of order and sometimes its beginning. Noise 
turns around, like a revolving door. The beginning or the end of a system 
for the former; an entrance or exit for the latter. Exclusion, inclusion.” 
—Michel Serres (244). 
 
 
A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections represents from the perspective of theology 
an account of something very much like Peirce’s Musement. As Edwards developed his 
religious questioning from within the protocols of theology and Puritan homiletic 
doctrine, demonstrating self-limiting forms from within those disciplines, Peirce would do 
the same in his own chosen disciplines of logic, science, philosophy, including of course 
the “ugly” one he invented for himself known as pragmaticism. His religious musings are 
usually confined to tantalizing digressions peppered throughout a body of work that is 
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most certainly not short of digressions in general, of every conceivable sort. Outside of the 
“Neglected Argument,” then, it is tempting to argue that Peirce had no truly developed 
idea of the role of religion in his philosophy, that it was merely yet another field in which 
Peirce felt himself compelled to dabble. Michael Raposa’s Peirce’s Philosophy of Religion 
corrects this tendency while maintaining that the “Neglected Argument” “represents both 
the maturest form of his thought and one of the very few extended treatments of a 
religious topic produced by him during a lifetime of philosophizing” (3). As much is 
evident by the volume of criticism attending the essay, in which Peirce’s argument for the 
existence of God is exhaustively connected or differentiated from the vast history of that 
seemingly bottomless topic. What makes Peirce’s argument a novelty, at least at the time 
it was written, is the focus on imagining a God in keeping with scientific process. Douglas 
Anderson points out that Peirce was relatively hostile to mainstream theological thought 
for the reason that it did not allow for revision. As Peirce writes, “Religious truth having 
once been defined is never to be altered in the most minute particular” (CP 1.40). By 
contrast, Peirce’s conception of religion dovetails neatly with his conception of science as 
process. Anderson goes on to say, “The ‘Neglected Argument’ thus seems to have 
developed out of Peirce’s ongoing dual interests in the practice of religion and the 
thinking of science, logic, and philosophy. It is the fullest attempt he made to illustrate the 
continuity of religion and science, to show that they need not be fundamentally 
antagonistic tendencies in one’s life, despite the tension between their spirits” (137).  
Peirce’s argument for the reality of God thus bears directly on his conception of 
the scientific method, particularly hypothetical thinking, alternately called retroduction or 
abduction. As Anderson notes, for Peirce, “induction and retroduction face opposite 
directions” (161). For Anderson, this means they meet in the middle and form a 
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continuity, as the “Neglected Argument” shows “a link between ‘direct experience’ and 
‘instinct’” as well as a “continuity between perceptual judgment and abductive inference” 
(167) and finally between theory and practice: “Peirce reveals the humble argument as 
functioning at the boundary between instinctive, perceptual judgment and abductive 
inference; within the confines of a single developing belief, God’s reality begins, then, to 
work simultaneously in two directions. In one direction, it begins to supply an ideal for 
the conduct of life; in the other, it leads us to pursue its nature as an explanatory 
hypothesis. Having come to us through instinct and scientific reflection, it now suggests 
consequences for practice and theory” (170). Ultimately, “we acquire a belief that 
performs two jobs and whose wholeness is born of tension” (170). Such dialectical 
formulations will be familiar to any reader of Peirce. But it is possible to build from 
Anderson’s approach by arguing that the “Neglected Argument” can be read more 
precisely by examining what the nature of such a continuity between religion and science 
may look like while preserving the “tension” or boundary as an aporia that may be 
approached but not crossed. Wholeness is abandoned since on this reading continuity 
may understood as a unity but not an identity. Continuity, in this sense, takes on a 
relative character, and Peirce hints that even it is not necessarily free from difference. It is 
a matter of perspective: “The indeterminate future becomes the irrevocable past. In 
Spencer’s phrase, the undifferentiated differentiates itself. The homogenous puts on 
heterogeneity. However it may be in special cases, then, we must suppose that as a rule 
the continuum has been derived from a more general continuum, a continuum of higher 
generality” (CP 6.191). In other words, continuity can be produced within a 
heterogeneous system of difference through a repetition of the constitutive distinction on 
just one side. But how? 
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It may be helpful to consider Francisco Varela’s “Not One, Not Two” (note again 
the double negative) as representing a similar attempt at a triadic philosophy in which 
“pairs are related but remain distinct” (62). Varela continues, “In our (shall we say) 
cybernetic or post-hegelian paradigm, dualities are adequately represented by imbrication 
of levels, where one term of the pair emerges from the other…The basic form of these 
dualities is asymmetry: both terms extend across levels” (64). Or as he writes elsewhere, 
“The seeming paradox resides in a two-way movement between levels: ‘upward’ with the 
emergence of properties from the constituting elements, and ‘downward’ with the 
constraints imposed by global coherence on local interactions” (Ethical 61). This paradox 
introduces the basic form of Peirce’s triadic system as well, in which Firstness (moving 
“upward”) and Thirdness (“downward”) interact in a mutual fashion all the while 
embodied in Secondness as “constituting elements” and “local interactions.” Varela’s 
formulation of the paradox poses exactly the problem that Peirce’s philosophy attempts to 
frame and eventually answer: how do we account for the mutual existence of both chaos 
and order without resolving one in the other, or in a final synthesis of a third term? In the 
particular case at issue here, how do we avoid reducing science to religion, or vice versa? 
 Michael Raposa writes that “Peirce’s religious and scientific concerns cannot be 
neatly separated from one another, however. He was fully aware of the problematic 
nature of the relationship between them; but, in general, he construed that relationship in 
such a fashion that the essence or ‘spirit’ of religion and that of science are not in 
opposition. Existing tensions and apparent conflicts are the symptoms not of a 
fundamental incommensurability but of various human frailties, prejudices, and 
misconceptions” (10). Again, the opposition is relieved in the form of a hidden or essential 
identity that fails to preserve the distinction. Raposa unifies the conflict in Peirce’s 
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thought in a humanist framework—essentially using human fallibility to make such a 
unity comprehensible. The only way to avoid such formulations, to avoid interpreting 
continuity as identity, is to lean on a self-referential concept of distinction as a unity but 
not an identity. Continuity, in other words, is paradoxically the result of difference, as 
neither here nor there, as the discontinuity of continuity and discontinuity, bouncing us 
back and forth. There is no resting in the bivalent symmetry of a dualistic opposition. 
Consider, for instance, how Anderson analogizes Peirce’s desire to leave feelings open for 
revision, referring to the well-known duck-rabbit illusion: “If one definitely ‘sees’ a duck, 
why look for a rabbit? However, Peirce argues, if we look closely or, better, if we reflect, 
we will notice that this ‘Idea’ functions as a hypothesis, as the first step in an inquiry that 
must be pursued in controlled and critical fashion” (170). The tension of the duck-rabbit 
takes the form of a Derridean undecidable since any decision confronts its own exclusion: 
to see a duck means to not see a rabbit, and vice versa. A hypothesis, as Anderson 
indirectly notes, includes this difference. Considered as a Third it is a double negative: not 
a duck, not a rabbit.  
How this relates to the duck-rabbit monstrosity of the “Neglected Argument” 
becomes clear when the essay as a whole, and Musement in particular, is interpreted as 
observing the unity but not the identity of science and religion, observing them instead, to 
use Luhmann’s terminology, as functionally differentiated systems within society. Raposa 
gestures in this direction by highlighting Peirce’s technical use of the term “vague” as 
indicating a kind of third position: 
Yet surely there is some rationale underlying Peirce’s claim that religious language 
is vague of necessity, that it is misleading or issues in falsehood when excessively 
precise, and that predicate-signs attached with clear meaning to other subjects can 
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be applied to God only vaguely. His logic of vagueness was a genuinely pioneering 
effort foreshadowing the kind of work that is now being done in the analysis of 
fuzzy sets and systems. Furthermore, if such vague symbols are the models most 
appropriately employed for the representation of a real indeterminacy, then a 
better understanding of the special logic of their usage seems crucial to the 
development of a general theory of religious language. For example, seemingly 
paradoxical utterances about the Deity might be explained in terms of their 
vagueness, by appealing to a logic that defines the “vague…as that to which the 
principle of contradiction does not apply” (150). 
This approach can be further unfolded through the concept of second-order observation 
as the observation of a unity that the first-order observervation cannot see. This includes 
above all the observation of the second-order observation’s own first-order observation, 
thus introducing the paradox of self-reference. The paradox is implicit in Peirce’s 
description of Musement—since to describe it at all would seem to be a fundamental 
betrayal of its nature. It occupies what Luhmann calls an imaginary space, the double 
negative of a Third position: 
Everything that is communicated is communicated in society. Everything that 
happens, occurs in the world. This, too, holds for observations and descriptions, 
no matter with what kind of authorship (subject, science, etc.) they wish to equip 
themselves. For this very reason, the unity of society (of the world) cannot be 
reintroduced in to society (the world). It cannot be observed or described as a 
unity, especially not on the basis of a representation without competition or on the 
grounds of some didactic authority. For each observation and description requires 
a distinction for its own operation. The observation of the One within the One, 
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however, would have to include what it excludes (that against which it 
distinguishes its designation). It would have to be enacted in the system (in the 
world), just as the distinction between self-reference and external reference is 
enacted in the system (in the world). Such an enactment is possible, and it gives its 
paradox the form of a "re-entry," but the solution requires an imaginary space (as 
one speaks of imaginary numbers), and this imaginary space replaces the classical 
a priori of transcendental philosophy (Theories 72). 
Luhmann identifies this imaginary space as an ironic repetition of transcendental 
philosophy. Most importantly, this repetition reproduces itself as a difference and not the 
identity of an a priori principle. Peirce’s description of this phenomenon usually involves 
the intrusion of possibility, chance, or chaos (as entropy) into deterministic systems. In an 
early essay he writes, “The dissipation of energy by the regular laws of nature is by those 
very laws accompanied by circumstances more and more favorable to its reconcentration 
by chance…And from this it follows that chance must act to move things in the long run 
from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity” (EP1 221). This passage is quoted 
by Prigogine and Stengers as an early description of the evolution of complexity in 
dissipative systems. In Order out of Chaos, they write, “The famous law of increase of 
entropy describes the world as evolving from order to disorder; still, biological or social 
evolution shows us the complex emerging from the simple. How is this possible? How can 
structure arise from disorder? Great progress has been realized in this question. We know 
now that nonequilibrium, the flow of matter and energy, may be a source of order” (xxix). 
This neatly summarizes what’s at issue in the “Neglected Argument,” in which Peirce 
attempts to account for growth as what is now known as emergent complexity—the 
unaccountable and thoroughly improbable emergence of order. 
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 If the growth and complexity of a system runs parallel to entropy then there is a 
paradoxical relationship between order and disorder that is best understood as a self-
referential distinction. That is, the distinction between order and disorder repeats or re-
enters itself on the side of order, producing a progressive enfolding of complexity that 
increases the autonomy of the system at the same time that it increases sensitivity to the 
environment. This is the fundamental property of what is known as a self-organizing 
system, systems that operate based on self-reference. Luhmann writes, “Whatever 
functions as an external system boundary no longer filters something out, but instead 
allows more to pass through; at the same time the system, if it is structured differently 
from the environment, will become more sensitive to the environment insofar as a 
schematic of differentiation for this function of increasing information has been chosen 
adequately” (Social 194). The system attempts to accomplish the perfect loop of 
autopoietic closure, but upon its return the starting point is no longer the same—time (as 
entropy) has passed. As Bruce Clarke shows in his essay “Heinz von Foerster’s Demons,” 
“No system of any stripe can be adequately treated in the absence of the environment it 
constitutes for itself by emerging as a system…Although certain systems do self-organize, 
or decrease their internal entropy, they do so only in the presence of conditions provided 
for elsewhere, by environments that lend a necessary other to the self of self-organization” 
(Emergence 42). Self-organizing systems defy like Maxwell’s Demon the second law of 
thermodynamics by increasing complexity, understood as an increased capacity for 
selection, as a reaction to entropy. But, as von Foerster argues, “this term [self-organizing 
system] becomes meaningless, unless the system is in close contact with an environment, 
which possesses available energy and order, and with which our system is in a state of perpetual 
interaction, such that it somehow manages to ‘live’ on the expenses of this environment” 
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(Understanding 3). This argument culminates for von Foerster in the “order from noise” 
principle, in which “no order was fed to the system, just cheap undirected energy; 
however, thanks to the little demons in the box, in the long run only those components of 
the noise were selected which contributed to the increase of order in the system” 
(Understanding 13). It is in this way, through the all important system/environment 
distinction, that a system selects or distinguishes its way to self-organization by increasing its 
own complexity.  
 Concepts such as self-reference and self-organizing systems are relevant to the 
“Neglected Argument” because Peirce is concerned in that essay with the phenomenon of 
growth, a process Peirce often characterizes as an asymptotic approach towards reality 
because he does not account for a self-organizing system’s increase in sensitivity to the 
environment—which is to say that a system’s increase of autonomy paradoxically makes 
it more susceptible to perturbations in the environment. Setting that difficult point aside it 
is nevertheless true, as Prigogine and Stengers point out, that Peirce’s thought prefigures 
an understanding of dissipative systems as the emergence of order from disorder. In the 
“Neglected Argument,” Peirce unfolds this paradox through the hypothesis of God. 
Peirce’s explicit or “rational” description of the characteristics of God runs in such a 
circular and confusing manner that it almost resembles a particularly devious Zen koan, 
but like so much of Peirce’s philosophy it is so with the purpose of inhabiting an 
imaginary space, the observation of re-entry: 
The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely 
incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such, supposes its object to 
be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves the hypothesis but one way of 
understanding itself; namely, as vague but as true so far as it is definite, and as 
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continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit. The 
hypothesis, being thus itself inevitably subject to the law of growth, appears in its 
vagueness to represent God as so, albeit this is directly contradicted in the 
hypothesis from its very first phase. But this apparent attribution of growth to 
God, since it is ineradicable from the hypothesis, cannot, according to the 
hypothesis, be flatly false. Its implications concerning the Universes will be 
maintained in the hypothesis, while its implications concerning God will be partly 
disavowed, and yet held to be less false than their denial would be. Thus, the 
hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of each Universe as purposed; and 
this will stand or fall with the hypothesis. Yet a purpose essentially involves 
growth, and so cannot be attributed to God. Still it will, according to the 
hypothesis, be less false to speak so, than to represent God as purposeless (EP2 
440). 
Here Peirce dispenses with the protocols of clear and rational argumentation (or more 
precisely puts them in overdrive) to such a degree that it is difficult to take away anything 
more than a headache. But this passage represents nothing so much as a certain well-
worn theological tradition of describing God’s indescribability. For example, Nicholas of 
Cusa’s theology understands God as the “absolute maximum” but interprets this as 
process, one not unlike Peirce’s triadic semiotics: “The maximum unity, therefore, is not 
other than indivision, distinction, and connection” (99). I’d like to understand Peirce’s 
passage above as following this three-step process, in particular the process of 
hypothetical reasoning as a self-referential distinction. The hypothesis of God understands 
itself as a contradiction. In other words, this particular quality of feeling is itself the 
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product of a distinction. As Cusa writes, “For God causes not-being to enter into being 
and being to enter into not-being” (211).  
The hypothesis understands itself as true and definite only insofar as it is marked 
with falsity and indefiniteness. The hypothesis itself, the very irruption of religious feeling, 
is marked through with a distinction (definite/indefinite, or true/false) that cannot 
observe its own unity, but only re-enter itself on one side. And for this reason the 
hypothesis cannot rest as itself, but enacts a second-order observation of itself, and thus 
must grow beyond itself and re-contain itself in a double gesture, approaching God 
without ever arriving. In a passage that could come straight out of Peirce’s own essay, 
Cusa writes, “So the intellect, which is not truth, never comprehends truth so precisely 
but that it could always be comprehended with infinitely more precision” (91). This is 
because all observations are constituted by a distinction, and so cannot grasp the unity of 
the world except as its erasure. The unmarked space escapes determination, growth, and 
even purpose as those qualities re-enter on the side of order—as if God leaves them 
behind in a world now marked by His absence. Which is to say that order, growth, and 
purpose (the reductions of entropy) are the products of a distinction, while the mystery of 
“conditions provided for elsewhere” remains on the other side. Much like religious feeling 
for Edwards, these qualities represent the repetition of a difference. In this respect, God 
represents the paradoxical unity of every distinction—the exclusion, maybe even the 
sacrifice, that makes the world possible, and makes it new. 
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Conclusion  
“The Assistance of Grace” 
 
“There is, however, nothing more wholesome for us than to find problems 
that quite transcend our powers and I must say, too, that it imparts a 
delicious sense of being cradled in the waters of the deep,--a feeling I 
always have at sea.” 
—Charles S. Peirce (CP 8.263). 
 
 
 In American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning Mitchell Breitwieser notes that 
Perry Miller’s influential scholarship on the Puritans derives from a fascination for the 
negative theology of Karl Barth. In particular, what Breitwieser terms a “dialectical 
negativity” resembles in some respects what I have been calling a double negative: 
Criticism’s inquiry into the dialectical negativity of Puritan typologism follows 
almost inevitably form the work of Perry Miller, whose allegiance to the negative 
theology of Barth, Tillich, and Niebuhr led him away from what was in his time 
the prevailing view of Puritanism as a static body of dogmatic affect and into the 
dialectical energetics that he called the marrow of Puritan divinity. Whether in 
praise or blame of Puritanism, the critics with whom he chose to disagree failed to 
perceive, according to Miller, its essential commitment to Calvin’s unknown 
god…Cataclysm rather than code, Miller’s unknown god lies beyond the 
possibility of adequate articulation in word or image—a god to be experienced in 
awe and dread, but not thought, spoken or translated into practice (25).  
Breitwieser takes Miller’s argument to mean that the Puritan must, intellectually at least, 
take all actual forms and institutions as bereft of the actual truth of God, as “more or less 
embarrassing capitulations to necessity” (27). As Breitwieser writes, “However much 
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Miller may individually admire the practical compromises made by these theologues 
caught in the ‘coils’ of present necessity, and however much he may insist that his heroes 
never forgot the ‘leap’ into the inscrutable, he nevertheless regards the move to 
administration as the commencement of a decline into the dry rationalism of the 
bourgeois Enlightenment. The social articulation of the Protestant genius adulterates and 
betrays it, confining that genius to sporadic subsequent resurrections like those of 
Edwards and Emerson” (26). In opposition to Miller, Breitwieser argues that such 
capitulations to necessity were not perceived merely as failures, but involved a 
“conception of negation as the refinement of holy society through the work of history 
rather than the incessant demolition of all attempts to socialize the good” (27). In this 
respect, Breitwieser sees Puritan institutions as involved in something resembling progress 
without presuming the ultimate appropriation of the hidden God: “I am not challenging 
Miller’s argument that the theology of the unknown god was a durable factor in the 
ideology of the American Puritans, but rather contending that they chose to see positive 
institutionalization as a triumphal passage out of the interlude of the negative rather than 
as a regrettable accommodation to the practical demands of worldliness” (28).  
 Breitwieser extends his point with a reading of Hegel’s contention that the 
sublimation of grief (which is to say the sublimation of affective attachments to what is 
singular in experience) constitutes a necessary sacrificial act that props up the 
hermeneutic dominance of the social order. Breitwieser’s book, however, is principally 
about how grief resists sublimation and operates as an outside intrusion into systems of 
meaning, a disharmonious force on the margins, using a concept he can only thematize as 
a form of realism: 
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…though the idea of a coherent reality distinct from the work that legitimates the 
work on the basis of a criterion of mimetic adequacy has been discarded, there is 
nonetheless a largely consistent attention to an X that breaks into or through the 
work’s aspiration to formal and ideological coherence, an aspiration that 
motivates the work’s positing of a guaranteeing or legitimating reality. I feel like 
I’m trying to pick up a dime with a thick glove here, but I want to suggest that all 
this attention to a surreptitious getting-through amounts to a different way of 
seeing literary realism, as a transcription of reality’s astonishing and at least 
discursively hurtful impact on systems of coherent representation. I do not mean 
that what I call the real at this point has an extradiscursive, extratextual, or 
extrahistorical authority, all of which propositions ultimately dissolve into logical 
absurdity, but that it exceeds the specific coherence the writer intends to 
achieve—even if this exceeding is a contrary intention (12).  
We may pause at this liminal point of tension to note Hegel’s long shadow which seems to 
trail even the most assiduous attempts to reach beyond the dialectic. It would seem that 
even the most self-suspecting of gazes cannot curtail the force of a recuperative effect, a 
bringing together that erases in effect the turbulent force of astonishment. We cannot, as 
it were, remain in suspense for very long, as one cannot be at home on a staircase.  
There remains a longing to harmonize the difference, to recover and bring back 
into the fold our exclusions and losses, to stop this exhausting pull in two directions. All at 
the same time there is a persistent negativity which perceives all worldly forms as 
declension, as a continuous falling away from divinity (as if the very act of creation was 
itself a fall, a difference or negation of God) and what Breitwieser sees as progressive 
refinement through negativity, an onwardness with the divine as the ultimate unreachable 
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horizon. All at once there is both the falling away and the coming closer, progress and a 
regress, moving backwards and forwards at the same time, or maybe (with Derrida) 
simultaneous protention and retention. Or even (with Peirce) an expansion and 
contraction that projects at once into independence and draws into harmony. As if God’s 
absence somehow signified his presence. Miller’s words, as always, mark the dilemma as 
well as anyone: “The law, which no man can perfectly fulfill anymore, exists as a ‘school-
master,’ it teaches us what we should do, whether we can or no, and as soon as we realize 
that we cannot, we flee to Christ for the assistance of grace. And since Christ has satisfied 
God by fulfilling the law, there is no necessity that we do it also. It is only necessary that 
we attempt it” (Errand 82). If the task was, by Miller’s estimation, one of “bringing God to 
time and reason” (Errand 56), to live by an impossible law, then for the Puritan the 
attempt (and therefore failure) is the utmost achievable form, achievable as unachievable. 
As Emerson puts it, “The ardors of piety agree at last with the coldest skepticism,—that 
nothing is of us or our works,—that all is of God” (Prose 207). But in “Fate” this notion 
itself flips over: “But if there be irresistible dictation, this dictation understands itself. If we 
must accept Fate, we are not less compelled to affirm liberty, the significance of the 
individual, the grandeur of duty, the power of character” (Essays 943). There is a sense of 
being in two places at once, like some exotic sub-observable particle, the “double 
consciousness” of everything becoming its contrary: “how fate slides into freedom, and 
freedom into fate” (Prose 278). 
What is at work in this entangling and enfolding of order and disorder, fate and 
freedom, the finite and infinite—the one always within the other? In another framework 
Prigogine and Stengers ask, “Are there two sciences, two truths for a single world?” (209). 
Not one, and not two. Thrown irreversibly into time, into process as the repetition of a 
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difference, modernity cannot but interpret this predicament as being thrust upon the 
terror of an abyss, the death of the unseen. Is there another way? As Stengers asks, “Can’t 
irreversibility, or the increase of entropy, be given a positive meaning?” (Cosmopolitics 215). 
There is perhaps a different kind of thought, a thinking not of privation, lack, or loss but 
something like gratitude or reception, a passivity or openness as in Peirce’s vision of 
Musement: “Enter your skiff of Musement, push off into the lake of thought, and leave 
this breath of heaven to swell your sail. With your eyes open, awake to what is about or 
within you, and open conversation with yourself; for such is all mediation” (EP2 437). 
This thought transforms the threatening abyss into a calm expanse of water, horizons on 
all sides, a state of mind also reflected in Whitman’s notion that “all goes onward and 
outward, nothing collapses. And to die is different from what anyone supposed, and 
luckier.” Do we not find here an experience which is not the annihilation of an individual 
self but its expansion and articulation (it is both) through an indefinite and unlimited 
community? 
There is a sense in which Peirce’s idea of community excludes our entry. 
“Sacrifice your own perfection,” Peirce tells us, “to the perfectionment of your neighbor” 
(EP1 353). This is a vision of community as what is radically other to the self or 
individual, a community that, as Peirce’s maxim implies, depends on something like self-
sacrifice or self-abandonment. Emerson notes as much when he says “This insight throws 
us on the party and interest of the Universe, against all and sundry; against ourselves, as 
much as others” (Prose 270). The attachments of yesterday and today are met with an 
unsurpassable limit, and in this way broach the unlimited. We cannot cross over, but we 
may be carried:   
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It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that 
our interests should not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must 
embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be limited, but 
must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come into immediate or 
mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however vaguely, beyond this 
geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice his own soul to 
save the whole world is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, 
collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle (Peirce CP 2.654).  
Beyond all bounds, beyond the anxious preservation of a self into what Emerson calls 
“the majesty into which we have suddenly mounted, the impersonality, the scorn of 
egotisms, the sphere of laws…we are as men in a balloon, and do not think so much of 
the point we have left, or the point we would make, as of the liberty and glory of the way” 
(Essays 955). We may sail on the winds of a thought into a realm that leaves our paltry 
selves behind, into what Edwards would call the newness of a spiritual revelation, what is 
for Peirce the continued creation of the universe. It is for this reason that Peirce claims, 
“The supreme commandment is to complete the whole system,” not because it is possible 
in this life, but because it isn’t (or is it both?): “In fulfilling this command, man prepares 
himself for transmutation into a new form of life, the joyful Nirvana in which the 
discontinuities of his will shall have all but disappeared” (CP 1.673). We are paradoxically 
afforded a view of a unity we cannot see (which is to say we are afforded a view of a 
paradox) through the momentary exultations of the new, of the improbable and 
unaccountable emergence of order from chaos.  
Peirce’s community, like Emerson’s impersonal, may only be accomplished 
through a surpassing or exceeding of the self through a love given to the other: “There 
	   235	  
are those who believe in their own existence, because its opposite is inconceivable; yet the 
most balsamic of all the sweets of sweet philosophy is the lesson that personal existence is 
an illusion and a practical joke. Those that have loved themselves and not their neighbors 
will find themselves April fools when the great April opens the truth that neither selves 
nor neighborselves were anything more than mere vicinities; while the love they would 
not entertain was the essence of every scent” (Peirce CP 4.69). To take leave of the self as 
ego, to abandon self-love, threatens to plunge one into the bottomless depths of an abyss. 
It takes some courage to endure this passage, to swim out away from certain safety. But 
perhaps the threat of drowning is not to be overwhelmed or diffused, but to be isolated 
and beyond communication, forever apart from any relation. Perhaps the only answer to 
this threat, the only way to stay afloat, is self-surrender—a commitment to speak even if 
what is most urgently essential to say can never, finally, be said.  
Alone and adrift on the ocean, as Melville writes, “the awful lonesomeness is 
intolerable. The intense concentration of self in the middle of such a heartless immensity, 
my God! who can tell it?” (321). How to communicate such isolation? What can be said? 
Who can speak it? Perhaps there is no coming back, as with poor Pip cast off the Pequod, 
driven mad by an infinite horizon, coming at last to “that celestial thought, which, to 
reason, is absurd and frantic; and weal or woe, feels then uncompromised, indifferent as 
his God” (322). Perhaps there is nothing to say. But at the end of Moby Dick, Ishmael finds 
himself in Pip’s place, remaining afloat upon a dear friend’s coffin, and he returns, he 
comes back, to tell his story. “I am not,” as Emerson insisted, “alone and unacknowledged” 
(Prose 29). This is a glimpse of calm waters. As for Michel Serres, “Quiet, serene, no 
anxiety. The high seas” (253). All rivers run to the ocean. 
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